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Using People – 
Scope, Role and Justification of a Common 
Sense Concept
Preface
The assumption that it is morally wrong to use a person is deeply 
entrenched in common sense morality. To blame another person by 
saying 'You were just using me!' is always a serious accusation and 
usually accompanied by strong negative emotions. In the light of 
these strong intuitions it is not surprising that many moral 
philosophers avail themselves of the concept of using people as well. 
The prohibition against using people therefore plays an important 
role in the theoretical discussions of moral philosophy, and in 
Applied Ethics diverse practices are judged by asking if they involve 
the use of persons. The common employment and broad acceptance 
of the prohibition notwithstanding, there are still a number of 
intriguing questions that have to be answered: First, we have to 
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know what practices actually fall within the scope of the prohibition 
against using people. Second, it is unclear what exact role the 
prohibition can play within moral theory. Third, it still needs to be 
explained why using people is morally wrong. This book pursues the 
aim of giving coherent answers to these three questions about the 
scope, the role and the justification of the prohibition against using 
people.
In pursuing these aims, at many points in my argument I will stress 
that the common sense concept of using people is already a rich and 
fascinating notion. It is my conviction that moral theorists have to 
take this pretheoretical material into account, if they want to take 
advantage of the strong intuitions that come along with the 
colloquial use of this concept. The common sense notion cannot 
answer our questions by itself, though, and needs to be improved 
and rearranged by moral theory. The first philosopher who picked up 
this notion that already was popular at the time was Immanuel Kant. 
Kant adopted this concept and gave it a central position in his moral 
theory by using it to spell out one version of the Categorical 
Imperative, his famous Formula of Humanity: ‘So act that you use 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, 
always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.’ Almost 
all existing analyses of the notion of using people refer at some point 
to this formula. 
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In the past two decades we have witnessed an increasing interest in 
Kant's account of using people and recently a re-evaluation of its 
central ideas. All these contemporary accounts are inspired by Kant, 
but also claim to do justice to the common sense notion. In this book 
I draw equally on both sources, but I will neither try to give a 
detailed picture of the common sense notion, nor will I enter deeply 
into Kantian exegesis. Instead it is my aim to give an improved 
answer to the systematic questions concerning the scope, the role 
and the justification of the prohibition against using people.
In the first chapter I will present my methodological approach in 
answering the above questions. I am inspired methodologically by 
Bernard Williams' idea of thick concepts as well as by John Rawls' 
notion of a wide reflective equilibrium. Both stress the importance 
of taking seriously the ideas that guide our moral judgements in 
everyday life. I will thus survey our common sense concept of using 
people in the second chapter and try to present it in its breadth as 
well as in its depth. The third chapter deals with Kant's account of 
using people. Kant's work alludes to this and related ideas at 
numerous places, but he does not offer a coherent theory. My 
presentation of Kant will therefore be a loose collection of 
quotations and summaries that is primarily meant to give an 
overview of the material that inspired my own and the other 
accounts of using people that I present in this book. The following 
three chapters are dedicated to these contemporary accounts which I 
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labelled the 'procedural', the 'attitudinal' and the 'value-based' 
account. I profited greatly from all of these theoretical proposals on 
how to form the common sense concept of using people, although 
my own account is closest to the last one. In developing my own 
proposal I combine elements of all other accounts and argue at the 
same time that my account comes closest to the ideas that we find in 
common sense. I call my own proposal the 'contextual' account of 
using people, as I argue that we need to supplement the moral 
principle offered by the value-based theory with the description of a 
concrete context that allows us to derive particular moral duties from 
this general principle. During the whole text I found it helpful to rely 
on a short story written by Vladimir Nabokov that describes a 
paradigmatic case of using people. Literature is able, I believe, to 
bring even subtle and ambiguous moral intuitions to our 
consciousness and can therefore provide good test cases to evaluate 
our moral theories. This being said, I want to stress that neither 
literary texts nor common sense notions can replace accurate moral 
theory. Literature and common sense often leave us puzzled and 
helpless in the face of the moral problems that we confront in our 
lives. It is the careful theoretical reflection of test cases and common 
sense notions that offers solutions to these problems. I hope that my 
attempt to theoretically shape the concept of using people will help 
to confront some of our moral problems.
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I Methodological Introduction
1. A literary example
More than 15 years before publishing his world-famous novel 
Lolita Vladimir Nabokov wrote a short-story with a similar plot.1 
This novella, entitled The Enchanter, and Lolita share an important 
part of the story, but they differ significantly not only in length, but 
also in content, narrator’s perspective and composition of characters. 
The Enchanter focuses on the immoral core of the plot, leaving aside 
the character and collaboration of the girl and the first-person-
narrator’s unreliable but mitigating presentation of the strongly 
repelling events. The novella therefore challenges the reader’s moral 
sensibilities even more than Lolita does. But Nabokov presents the 
case with many complexities and provides his readers with a 
comprehensive picture of the moral wronging that is the topic of this 
book. I will thus start my considerations with this literary example 
and come back to it at several points in my argument. In this chapter, 
I want to use the example to illustrate my methodological approach.
The story of The Enchanter can be summarised as follows: A 
paedophile marries a terminally ill woman in order to obtain custody 
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of her daughter. Shortly after the marriage the mother dies and the 
eponymous ‘enchanter’ takes his stepdaughter on a trip by car. In a 
hotel he masturbates looking at the half-naked girl supposing that 
she is asleep. The girl wakes up, however, begins to scream and 
thereby attracts the other guests of the hotel. The enchanter escapes 
from the hotel and throws himself in front of a truck.
I think everyone who listens to the events of Nabokov’s novella is 
shocked by its protagonist’s behaviour. The game he plays with 
mother and daughter is abhorrent and only the end of the story 
alleviates our indignation when the ‘cynical, contemptible 
protagonist’ receives a due punishment.2 But while it is clear that the 
enchanter’s behaviour is wrong, it is not obvious why we find it so 
repelling. In fact, the enchanter does not kill or rape or physically 
violate the girl or her mother. He does not commit any of the crimes 
that easily come to mind when we think of the atrocities committed 
by human beings.3 But we certainly find his behaviour strongly 
despicable. What, then, explains our indignation towards the events 
that Nabokov relates?
There are, of course, many ways to characterize the flaws of 
character and behaviour that the story's protagonist exhibits. 
Edmund White, for example, calls the enchanter a man ‘with a hard 
heart and calculating loins’4 and Angela Carter characterizes him as 
‘a constantly self-justifying but hitherto thwarted pervert’5. For my 
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purposes, the most interesting characterization of the moral wrongs 
that are depicted in the story is offered, though, by Nabokov’s son 
Dmitri in the postscript to his edition of the text. He criticizes the 
enchanter by saying that the woman is to him ‘a repellent means to a 
criminal end and the girl an instrument for his gratification’6. In my 
opinion, this description accurately captures our intuitions towards 
the summary of the story given above. It seems very convincing to 
say that the protagonist’s treatment of both the mother and the 
daughter is repelling because he regards them merely as means and 
tools in his sneaky plan. Furthermore, the description fits well with 
many passages of the original text. This is obvious when the narrator 
tells us that the protagonist thinks of the mother ‘that the material, 
apart from its specific function, had no potential whatever’7 or when 
he values the relationship with her solely for its ‘direct benefit’8. 
Dmitri Nabokov thus offers a good explanation of the strongly 
repellant feelings we have towards the events narrated in the novella 
and it is fair to say that, at least at first glance, his characterization 
has an intuitive explanatory power.9
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2. Explanatory power
Thus far, I have presented a literary portrayal of a moral wronging 
and I have argued that the narrated events can be convincingly 
characterized by saying that the protagonist is treating the other 
characters of the story merely as means. But what is it that makes 
this characterization attractive? What constitutes our intuition that 
the expressions used by Dmitri Nabokov have an explanatory 
power?
Vladimir Nabokov's novella presents us with a chain of events that 
raise feelings of indignation and disgust, but the novella itself does 
not tell us why these feelings are justified. We were therefore 
looking for an alternative characterization of the depicted events, 
one that not only narrates what was happening. The search for such a 
characterization is motivated by practical aims: We want to describe 
moral situations in such a way that we can explain to ourselves and 
to others why we feel about them in the way we do. We argue with 
others and try to convince them about the adequacy of our reactions 
and about their underlying reasons. In addition, we not only judge 
the behaviour of others, but often want to decide for ourselves what 
to do. We therefore picture the character of the available options and 
sometimes this reflection on possible courses of action is not carried 
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out with regard to a particular decision but to find out for ourselves 
which values we want to guide our lives. We are therefore looking 
for characterizations of real or possible events that not only tell us 
what happens, but that also reveal the event's evaluative character.
The value of an event is constituted by our emotional reactions and 
by actions that are an adequate response to the value-bearers. 
Emotions and reasons for action come in binary quality and 
continuous quantity: They are for or against an action or attitude and 
they are stronger or weaker on a gradual scale. They are furthermore 
understood as responding to features of the world, i.e. of real or 
fictitious but possible situations. When we are looking for a 
characterization that not only narrates but also evaluates events in a 
way that contributes to our practical aims, we will thus judge the 
quality of a given characterization by three criteria: First, a good 
characterization must correspond to the quality of our evaluative 
reactions. If the enchanter's negatively evaluated behaviour is 
characterized in a way that would justify a positive reaction towards 
it – like, for example, if we say that he is “caring for the girl” – then 
it fails to be a plausible characterization. Second, it must also match 
the strength of our evaluative reactions. To say that the protagonist 
in Nabokov's novella is “lecherous”, for example, is true but seems 
to be too weak an expression to characterize the narrated events and 
explain our reactions towards them. Third, the characterization must 
match the non-evaluative features of the situation. To say that the 
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enchanter acts unjustly, for example, would justify the moral 
reactions that we actually have but it does not fit the situation. To act 
unjustly would, roughly speaking, involve a distribution of 
advantages or disadvantages and this is not the context in which the 
story of the novella is set. When Edmund White, Angela Carter and 
Dmitri Nabokov describe the behaviour of the protagonist they 
capture all at once the evaluation, the strength and the context that 
the case exhibits, and therefore seem convincing.
It is interesting to note that all the descriptions of the novella's 
events and its protagonist provided by White, Carter and Nabokov 
try to capture the evaluation, its strength and the features of the 
situation with a single expression – though not necessarily with a 
single word. This is interesting because we can describe the case in 
ways that fulfil the criteria separately. To see this one can look at the 
summary that I gave at the beginning: ‘A paedophile marries a 
terminally ill woman in order to obtain custody of her daughter.’ 
Even if it is hard to imagine that somebody does not share our 
condemnation of the events described in this sentence, it is logically 
possible to utter this sentence and insist that there is nothing wrong 
with the depicted kind of behaviour. The summary given is a purely 
descriptive characterization of the events and does not imply any 
form of evaluation. If we say, in contrast, that the paedophile treats 
the woman as a means to marry her daughter, then we can hardly 
argue that the behaviour is morally impeccable. It would be 
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confusing to assert both that the enchanter treats the mother as a 
means and that he does not do anything wrong because the use of the 
expression ‘to treat somebody as a means’ strongly suggests that we 
negatively evaluate the agent’s behaviour.10 
The strength of an evaluation is usually expressed together with a 
judgement about the evaluation's quality. We often use adverbs to 
modify the evaluative adjective or verb such as 'very' or 'absolutely', 
or we use evaluative adjectives that already imply a claim about the 
strength of our valuation, such as when we assert that a deed was 
'terrible', 'abhorrent' or 'horrendous'. It is nevertheless at least 
theoretically possible to express the strength of an evaluation 
without saying if the value is positive or negative. This is sometimes 
the case in natural language when we say that an event was 
'extreme', 'tremendous' or 'glaring'. It is also true that we can 
evaluate an event without suggesting anything about the strength of 
our evaluation. Both these cases may be relatively rare, but what is 
important is that a concept may contain information about either the 
quality or the strength of a value judgement and thereby play a role 
that differs from the role of a concept that contains information 
about both issues.
We can furthermore express our evaluation of an event without 
referring to the situational features of what happened. This can be 
illustrated by a characterization of the novella with the words ‘The 
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enchanter treats the mother very badly.’ This description obviously 
also implies a moral evaluation and expresses the conviction that the 
agent should dispense with this kind of behaviour. But it differs 
from the charge of treating the mother as a means in that it does not 
tell us anything about why we react in the way we do and why an 
agent should avoid the particular behaviour. To call somebody’s 
behaviour 'bad' does inform us that there are reasons for indignation, 
blame and for avoiding the action, but it does not tell us what these 
reasons are. We may call this way of describing events a purely 
evaluative description.
The phrase ‘to treat someone as a means’ and other expressions like 
‘hard-hearted’, ‘lecherous’ and ‘unjust’ thus have two typical 
features: First, they imply a moral evaluation - often together with 
intuitions about the strength of the evaluation - and, second, they 
provide reasons for the execution or omission of some kind of 
behaviour.11 They thereby differ in their explanatory power from two 
other kinds of descriptions. Purely descriptive characterizations 
represent the features of the situation, but they do not map our 
evaluative responses. Purely evaluative descriptions represent our 
evaluations but they do not point to features of a situation that 
provide reasons for actions or emotions. Descriptions that contain 
expressions such as 'treating someone as a means' in contrast refer to 
our moral responses and to the features of the situation at the same 
time and fulfil a double function in common sense discourse.
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3. Thick concepts
Expressions with this double function have received considerable 
attention in moral philosophy and the notions they express are 
nowadays called ‘thick concepts’. Bernard Williams, who created 
this label12, characterizes them as follows: 
“The way these notions are applied is determined by what the world is like 
(for instance, by how someone has behaved), and yet, at the same time, their 
application usually involves a certain valuation of the situation, of persons or 
actions. Moreover, they usually (though not necessarily directly) provide 
reasons for action.”13
This characterization of thick concepts is first of all a 
characterization of a linguistic phenomenon. It asserts that some 
expressions of natural languages are peculiar in referring to moral 
responses and to situational features at the same time. 'Thick 
concept' is a term of art14, though, that is not only used to describe a 
linguistic phenomenon, but is usually accompanied by substantial 
assumptions about normative values and morality. Philosophers 
employing the notion of thick concepts usually claim that what is 
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special about them is not only that they describe and evaluate 
simultaneously – two tasks that could be fulfilled in principle by two 
distinct expressions as well. They would furthermore insist that only 
concepts that play this double role can contribute to our practical 
aims of explaining our emotional responses and revealing reasons 
for action. The adherents of thick concepts thus say that it is not a 
contingent feature of our languages that there are expressions that 
serve simultaneously to describe and evaluate persons and their 
behaviour, but rather claim that the linguistic phenomenon reveals 
an essential feature of our practical and social constitution as human 
beings. Bernard Williams therefore resolutely rejects the assumption 
of his teacher Richard Hare, that thick concepts can be expressed by 
a conjunctive phrase that contains a description of the situational 
features in the first conjunct and the evaluative verdict in the second, 
and that these conjunctive phrases can fulfil the same practical task 
as the original thick concept.15 If we are left with pure descriptions 
and “thin”, i.e. purely evaluative characterizations, then, Williams 
argues, our moral statements lose their power to explain and guide 
us. The theoretical acceptance of thick concepts thus becomes tied to 
the assumption of their unanalysability.16 
Many contemporary philosophers remark that the thesis of the 
unanalysability of thick concepts and the arguments in its favour are 
difficult to understand and spell out clearly.17 Nevertheless, I think 
that we can gain insights from the idea of thick concepts for moral 
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theorizing even without spelling out a general thesis about their 
analysability. What seems most important to me is that any attempt 
to analyse our common sense concepts has to take into account that 
there is a lot of moral discourse there already.18 People talk about 
moral situations and compare different descriptions. They 
distinguish between more and less fitting characterizations and have 
an interest in finding the ones that are most able to capture the 
situation and guide them in explaining their emotions and deciding 
on courses of action. Evaluative concepts thus play diverse roles in 
our social practices and moral theory has to take care not to lose 
sight of the practical role that a concept plays in our social life 
before adopting it within a theoretical framework.
4. Thick concepts and moral theory
I thus agree with Williams that the acceptance of the linguistic 
phenomenon that he labelled 'thick concepts' has important 
implications for moral philosophy. As we have seen from the 
example of Nabokov's novella, we have a variety of concepts at 
hand to describe the behaviour of its protagonist. We naturally pick 
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up concepts like 'hard-hearted', 'treating as a means', 'self-justifying', 
'pervert' etc. that describe and evaluate his behaviour at the same 
time. Compared to this employment of thick concepts, the use of 
purely evaluative or 'thin concepts' to describe moral situations is 
quite unusual.19 Once we become aware of this pervasiveness of thick 
concepts in our moral discourse we may find it difficult to accept 
certain widespread forms of moral theorizing:
A common starting point for moral theorizing is to stress the 
shortcomings of our common sense discourse on moral questions. 
Many philosophers point to the vagueness and the ambiguities of the 
moral concepts that we commonly employ and propose an 
improvement by moral theory. The harshest possible reaction of 
moral theorists to the observation of common sense's insufficiencies 
is to deny the importance of our pre-theoretical intuitions for moral 
theorizing altogether. Peter Singer explicitly draws this conclusion20 
and many other philosophers express at least a general scepticism 
about the utility of pre-theoretical hunches and concepts.21 These 
theorists want to build moral theory on a better ground and usually 
have in mind empirically justified sciences or very abstract moral 
principles as an adequate foundation. I cannot argue here at length 
and do justice to all the complexities and possible defences of such 
theories, but I want to outline two objections that are related to the 
idea of thick concepts: First, I find it generally difficult to 
understand how to start theoretical construction without relying on 
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pre-theoretical intuitions. Singer and others will, of course, agree 
that we have to have some convictions in order to begin to argue and 
will thus try to distinguish between generally reliable and unreliable 
convictions, calling only the latter ones 'intuitions'. This distinction 
surely makes sense, but I cannot see why all our convictions about 
moral reasons are condemned to belong to the second class. In 
addition and more importantly, these theories have a particular 
problem in justifying the application of their abstract principles to 
particular cases, if they do not make any reference at all to our pre-
theoretical moral intuitions and especially to our intuitions about 
morally relevant reasons. It therefore seems to me that when these 
theories come to particular cases thick concepts such as 'wellbeing' 
or 'equal consideration' very often sneak in again.
Secondly, I think that with regard to these theories Williams' critique 
that moral theories unduly demand that agents leave aside all the 
considerations they consider important is justified:
'The model is that I, as theorist, can occupy, if only temporarily and 
imperfectly, the point of view of the universe, and see everything from the 
outside, including myself and whatever moral or other dispositions, affections 
or projects, I may have; and from that outside view, I can assign to them a 
value. The difficulty is [...] that the moral dispositions, and indeed other 
loyalties and commitments, have a certain depth or thickness: they cannot 
simply be regarded, least of all by their possessor, just as devices for 
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generating actions or states of affairs.'22 
With regard to our context, Williams can be understood to point here 
to the problem that theories that deny the relevance of intuitions 
about our moral reasons for action do not leave the theorist and his 
readers with the motivational resources to act. But moral theories 
should be action-guiding and these theories thus fundamentally miss 
their point.
An alternative to the complete rejection of our moral intuitions 
seems to be a partial one. According to another widespread account 
of common sense morality and moral theory, common speakers 
generally have clear pre-theoretical intuitions about the wrongness 
and rightness of particular acts or act types, but only very vague 
ideas about the reasons for their wrongness. This theoretical model 
therefore retains our intuitions about the rightness and wrongness of 
particular acts or act types and leaves aside our intuitions about the 
features of a situation that seem relevant for their moral description. 
It is then the task of moral theorists to collect these “right-or-
wrong”-intuitions about particular cases and spell out the principles 
that underlie and justify our intuitions. This relationship between 
common sense morality and moral theory is sometimes illustrated by 
comparison to the work of grammarians: Speakers of natural 
languages follow rules of grammar reliably but unconsciously and 
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grammarians analyse this common usage until they find the 
underlying rules. Analogously, moral philosophers have the task of 
detecting the unconscious rules that underlie our moral intuitions 
about the rightness and wrongness of acts. Although this account is 
actually opposed to his considered views, John Rawls defends the 
grammatical account of moral theory in some passages of his work.23 
He only adjusts the picture a little by pointing to the fact that even 
native speakers of natural languages sometimes deviate from 
common use. As the use of language is sometimes irregular we 
cannot expect to find rules that match our common usage perfectly.24 
Rules of grammar are therefore not only descriptive but also 
normative: They depict widespread use, but they also show us that 
sometimes we have to correct our own practice. Analogously, in the 
field of morality we should also expect to find cases where our 
intuitions do not fit the principles that moral theories have 
discovered. If the principles are otherwise well established, we 
should sometimes revise our intuitions instead of changing the 
principle. Metaphorically speaking, we have to look for a balance 
between our moral intuitions and our moral principles.
Although this image of the aims and methods of moral theories is 
rarely explicitly defended it is prevalent in many philosophical 
accounts.25 The awareness of the pervasiveness of thick concepts 
calls this image into question because it reveals that we often react 
to moral situations with a mixture of evaluative and descriptive 
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judgements. That is, we not only produce moral verdicts about the 
rightness and wrongness of acts, but our verdicts usually come 
together with an intuition about their underlying principle. In this 
respect our moral intuitions significantly differ from our linguistic 
ones, as in the case of our use of language we often have no clue 
about the actual rules that govern it. In addition and even more 
importantly, in the case of grammar the rules we follow are largely 
irrelevant for our practical purposes. We want to talk grammatically 
correctly in order to be understood and not because we care about 
the features that determine, for example, if we should use a present 
tense or a present perfect form. We look for the rule to have an 
epistemic criterion in cases of doubt, but if we already know what 
form is correct we are not interested in the underlying rules any 
more. In the case of morality, in contrast, these rules contain the 
reasons why we do what we do. We seek to do what is morally right 
because we believe we have good reasons to do so. When we 
describe a moral situation we do not refer to mere criteria for the 
rightness or wrongness of the behaviour at hand, but look for 
descriptions that tell us what reasons we have for this kind of 
behaviour. The descriptions we usually give of moral situations 
usually contain a reference to such reasons in the form of thick 
concepts. A comparison of moral theory to linguistics is thus 
misleading.
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The biggest problem of the depicted account is not the comparison 
with linguistics, though, but the supposed possibility of the 
separation of our intuitions. The account suggests that a moral 
theorist can say to a test person: 'I am not interested in your reasons, 
just tell me if it's right or wrong.' But such a demand can often not 
be satisfied, as we can only tell if an action is right or wrong, if we 
presuppose that certain situational features are given. Our evaluation 
of a moral situation is always an evaluation insofar as these features 
are given. There are thus no separable intuitions with the content 
'This is right' or 'This is wrong', that can reasonably be taken as data 
on which to build a moral theory.
As common sense morality deeply involves ideas about the reasons 
for action, it is not convincing methodology to build up theories that 
try to split off our intuitions on rightness and wrongness and leave 
our intuitions about the relevant reasons aside. This is one of the 
reasons why Williams asserts that moral theory fails to capture our 
moral discourse and sometimes even undermines confidence in our 
common morality. He argues that moral theories in general (and 
utilitarianism in particular) just ask moral agents if a particular act is 
right or wrong, whereas they should also ask 'what sort of 
considerations come into finding the answer'26. Given the 
pervasiveness and strength of our intuitions contained in thick 
concepts it is essential that we take these concepts into account.
Paulus Kaufmann – Using People       27
All these observations notwithstanding, I would like to resist 
Williams' conclusion that the whole project of moral theorizing 
should therefore be abandoned. It is rather certain forms of moral 
theory that must be given up. Moral theory should take our intuitions 
about the reasons for our moral verdicts seriously. As thick concepts 
contain the reasons we believe to be morally relevant, these concepts 
form a good starting point for moral theorizing. But the thick 
concepts we find in our moral discourse are not infallible guides on 
how to reason best about performing or avoiding certain forms of 
behaviour. Our common discussions about how to describe a 
situation and our ambitions to find a description as fitting as possible 
actually reveal that our employment of thick concepts is not like 
operating a repertoire of fixed evaluative labels. When we search for 
the best description of a case we compare several concepts with each 
other and look for the one with the strongest explanatory power. I 
can see no reason why this search should stop with the concepts as 
we already employ them in everyday discourse.27 
When we employ thick concepts we do so with practical aims: We 
want to describe moral situations and explain our moral reactions to 
them; we argue with others and try to convince them; we want to 
decide what to do and therefore picture the character of the available 
options; and we aim to find out for ourselves which values we want 
to guide our lives. But, like all natural concepts, thick concepts as 
we find them in everyday moral discourse suffer from various 
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shortcomings with regard to these aims: They are often ambiguous 
and vague and their explanatory and inferential connections to other 
concepts are not clear. In contrast to Williams, I think that these 
deficits can be dealt with and that our moral thinking on thick 
concepts can be improved by moral theorizing.
5. Wide reflective equilibrium
Which forms of moral theory can improve our pre-theoretical 
concepts without discarding their explanatory power? Williams 
argues that the only form of moral theory that might have a chance 
to improve our existing moralities would be to spell out what would 
be the best ethical life for human beings in general.28 Such a project 
would have to aim for a convergence of the different thick concepts 
that we find in different societies by relating them to an objective 
idea of human nature. According to Williams
'[The] objective grounding would not bring it about that judgments using those 
concepts were true or could be known: this was so already. But it would 
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enable us to recognize that certain of them were the best or most appropriate 
thick concepts to use.'29
This account of a moral theory is characterized by the following 
features: First, it starts with the thick concepts that we actually find 
in our societies. Second, it tries to improve the use of these existing 
concepts by enabling their convergence. Third, a convergence will 
be enabled, amongst other things, by linking these concepts to other 
notions, particularly to the concept of human nature. Fourth, such a 
method will not generate new knowledge, but would improve the 
way we express and realize this knowledge.
If I focus on these features in Williams' characterization of an at 
least comprehensible moral theory I cannot help seeing a striking 
similarity to another account of an ideal moral theory, namely to the 
idea of a wide reflective equilibrium as presented by John Rawls.30
Rawls bases his methodological reflections on the assumption that 
the members of a society have a shared conception of central moral 
notions such as a sense of justice, for example. The disposition to 
employ these notions enables moral agents to render 'judgments on 
institutions and actions […] accompanied with supporting reasons'.31 
Once we assume this capacity, moral philosophy can be roughly 
understood as an attempt to describe it. But Rawls cautions moral 
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theorists against supposing that this task may be easily achieved and 
stresses that the principles to be detected 'must be presumed to have 
a complex structure, and the concepts involved will require serious 
study'.32 Furthermore, the theoretical description of our sense of 
justice, for example, should not be understood as a mere inventory 
of our extant intuitions about just behaviour and institutions. 
Theorizing is understood instead as a creative endeavour that aims to 
form concepts and accounts that increase the coherence of our moral 
convictions:
'When a person is presented with an intuitively appealing account of his sense 
of justice […] he may well revise his judgments to conform to its principles 
even though the theory does not fit his existing judgments exactly. He is 
especially likely to do this if he can find an explanation for the deviations 
which undermines his confidence in his original judgments and if the 
conception presented yields a judgment which he finds he can now accept. 
From the standpoint of moral philosophy, the best account of a person's sense 
of justice is not the one which fits his judgments prior to his examining any 
conception of justice, but rather the one which matches his judgments in 
reflective equilibrium. […] This state is one reached after a person has 
weighed various proposed conceptions and he has either revised his judgments 
to accord with one of them or held fast to his initial convictions.'33 
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Rawls' account presented so far shares some important features with 
Williams’ idea of a feasible moral theory. It can be emphasized in 
the first place that both insist that 'we begin with judgments about 
the moral relevance of certain considerations'34. They furthermore 
agree that such considerations have often emerged in a society's 
concept formation and face us as singular expressions of this 
society's language. Williams and Rawls can thus be said to be aware 
of the linguistic phenomenon referred to by the idea of thick 
concepts and both can be said to attach great importance to these 
value-laden notions.35
Moreover, Williams and Rawls believe that the prevalent use of 
thick concepts in a society can be carefully improved. Their ideas 
about the aims and methods of such an improvement differ 
significantly, but there are still some further structural features that 
both approaches have in common: For both an improvement of 
common sense notions can only be a relative one. Theoretical 
structuring can yield better concepts than were available before, but 
it cannot lead to an absolute conception, i.e. a comprehensive and 
unchangeable account whose superiority can be judged 
independently of the perspective initially taken. The state to be 
arrived at by moral theory is described by Williams and Rawls as a 
'harmonious whole'36 or a 'wide reflective equilibrium', understood to 
be transient states that vary with the initial position and with the 
development of science, technology and culture. A relative stability 
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of the equilibrium can be obtained, however, by linking the moral 
concepts to the concepts of other sciences like psychology, 
sociology or economics, and to other parts of philosophy. But the 
propositions of these different fields and the moral propositions 
themselves are not connected solely by inferential relations opening 
up a hierarchical structure that ends with a small set of axioms. The 
'harmonious whole' is rather to be understood as a net with various 
kinds of explanatory relationships, some of them reciprocal, some of 
them inferential. According to Williams and Rawls, morality is one 
section of such a net, but it remains relatively independent in the 
sense that propositions from some other field do not yield ethical 
truths directly. This is also true for propositions about the meanings 
of ethical terms. Both thus dissociate themselves from Richard Hare 
and emphasize that it is impossible to structure our moral thinking 
with an analysis of the way we use our moral concepts in common 
discourse. The analysis should rather be a connective one showing 
the relations to other concepts and to our judgements in particular 
cases.
There are, of course, still significant differences in the positions of 
Williams and Rawls37, but I hope to have shown that their accounts 
have more in common than is commonly assumed and is assumed by 
Rawls and Williams themselves. More important than the historical 
question about the similarity of these two accounts is the observation 
that the comparison between them has illustrated that there is not 
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necessarily a contradiction between taking thick concepts seriously 
and an engagement in moral theorizing. Both accounts show a way 
to pay respect to the considered judgements of a society and at the 
same time aim to improve the conceptual framework that is already 
there. This way is not a new one. According to John Rawls, it is 
actually the way pursued by Aristotle, Kant, Sidgwick and many 
other eminent moral philosophers.
6. Forming the concept of treating people as a means
How can Williams' and Rawls' ideas about moral theory help to 
improve the short-comings of the common sense concept of 'treating 
someone as a means'? First of all, they urge us to take any concept 
seriously that has an intuitive explanatory power. As the example of 
The Enchanter has shown, to say that someone treats another person 
merely as a means can be a very fitting description of moral 
situations. The expression accurately captures our repellent feelings 
and our intuitions about their strength and reasons, so that Williams 
and Rawls will advise us to give it a place in our moral theory.
I will thus argue in the next chapter that we have a vague but helpful 
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idea of what it is to treat a person as a means in ordinary language. 
This idea also has some aspects that are clear and elaborate as can be 
revealed by an analysis of our employment of the phrase 'to use a 
person', for example. This kind of analysis is essentially a linguistic 
one: I will analyse our use of terms and our willingness to substitute 
them with others. But Williams and Rawls have made us sensitive to 
the limits of this method. I will accordingly go on to argue that the 
concept, as we find it, leaves open many important questions that 
have to answered in order to form the concept into a useful tool for 
our practical aims.
Linguistic analysis can increase our consciousness about these 
questions, but it cannot answer them. To improve the working of our 
conceptual net it will not suffice to analyse its structure, but we have 
to form our concepts to make them fit. We have to decide which 
connections to other concepts that we find in common language we 
want to stress and which we would like to cut off. These decisions 
aim to retain the strength of our intuitions, but to remove 
inconsistencies. But our decisions in the process of concept 
formation will inevitably result in giving up some of our intuitions, 
even our considered ones. The giving up of intuitions can only be 
justified by an attractive alternative and such an alternative can only 
be provided if we connect our concept to independently plausible 
accounts of related notions. In the following four chapters I will thus 
examine how other philosophers have tried to improve the thick 
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concept that we find in common sense. I will focus on the scope that 
the concept has after they have formed it, the function it is meant to 
play in our moral discourse and how they try to justify its claims on 
us. 
In the last chapter I will draw conclusions for my own understanding 
of the idea of treating people merely as means. First, I will present 
what are, in my eyes, the most important insights that can be gained 
from the existing accounts of using people that I presented in the 
previous chapters. Second, I will try to combine these insights and 
show how, taken together, they yield an attractive account of using 
people integrated into a specific form of moral theory. And finally I 
want to sketch how the concept formed by moral theory is still 
connected to the common sense notion and how it manages to play 
the roles that the concept has in everyday discourse.
There is one more thing we can learn from Williams and Rawls here. 
They teach us that we cannot expect our analysis to cover all 
possible cases. No theory can make a claim to completeness, not 
even completeness about one particular concept. Our theory cannot 
provide us with a procedure that spits out answers to our questions 
with regard to particular cases. Many cases will be disputable and 
we will need good judgement to settle these disputes. But moral 
theory can, I believe, provide us with a structure to start the 
discussion.
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II Using People and Common Sense
1. A concept in use
Let me start my investigation into the common sense concept of 
using people by imagining the following situation: A young woman 
is dating a man because she feels old and wants to have a baby soon. 
After she becomes pregnant she immediately leaves the man. He 
feels deeply hurt and writes her a letter complaining ‘You were just 
using me’. The abandoned lover's complaint is certainly familiar to 
us. Accusations of having been used are an element of our repertoire 
of morally significant descriptions and are common in everyday 
discourse. The concept of using people is thus indeed a common 
sense concept. Furthermore, there are situations, like the one above, 
where the characterization as a case of using seems most fitting.
There are other moral notions, though, that we use more frequently 
and with greater consciousness. The concept of a lie, for example, 
will come quickly to our minds when we think about moral notions. 
We all know that lying has something to do with not telling the 
truth, that it is often morally problematic to lie, but that there are 
also cases such as white lies and benevolent lies where a moral 
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judgement is more difficult to render. In comparison to the concept 
of lying, the concept of using a person is less frequent, vaguer in 
content and generally employed without much awareness of 
problematic cases. This lack of popular reflection notwithstanding, 
the concept of using people is a concept in use and its employment is 
accompanied by relatively stable intuitions that express part of our 
moral sensibility. It is thus reasonable and intriguing to ask how the 
concept works in our common discourse.
A first thing to notice about our common use of the concept is that in 
the description of cases like the one above or the literary example of 
The Enchanter we are not using one single expression to refer to the 
behaviour at hand. Instead we employ a family of slightly differing 
phrases. We say, for example, that 'the young woman uses the man' 
or that 'she treats him as a means' or that 'the mother is a repellent 
means in the eyes of the enchanter’ and that 'the girl is for him an 
instrument for his gratification'. We also say that 'A regards B as a 
means' or 'as a tool' and the somewhat technical term 'to 
instrumentalise' has also found its way into colloquial language, 
especially into the mass media.1 All these expressions are often used 
interchangeably and we jump from one of them to the next without 
recognizing a change in meaning. The different expressions do carry 
different connotations, though, and in some contexts not all 
expressions seem to fit equally well.2 This feature of the expressions 
circulating in everyday language can be neatly illustrated by an 
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example used by Nancy Davis3: A beggar takes a cute child with him 
in order to move the passersby to give more money. While in such a 
case we are willing to say that the beggar is using the child, it is less 
clear if he regards the child as a mere tool. To decide on the 
adequacy of this second description we would need further 
information about his relationship and attitude towards the child. We 
thus have a couple of different expressions with slightly different 
meanings to describe the cases we are considering. 
The example of the beggar and our reactions to it reveal a further 
interesting feature of our common sense concept. The decision about 
which of our expressions is adequate in a specific context depends 
on the object we are evaluating. Are we talking about one particular 
act or about a series of actions? Are we talking about an attitude, a 
current mental state or a behavioural disposition towards another 
person or group of people? The many expressions we use in 
everyday discourse can refer to all these different objects. It is also 
true, however, that some of them seem to be more adequate with 
regard to one particular kind of object. When we say that a person is 
regarded as a means, as a tool or as an object, we are more likely to 
be condemning an agent's attitude. If we say, in contrast, that a 
person uses another we are in most cases talking about an act type 
and not about an attitude. The phrase 'to treat somebody as a means', 
finally, is the widest possible description and can refer to both 
groups of objects. The expressions referring to the use of people are 
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thus ambiguous with regard to whether they express a negative 
evaluation about an attitude or about an act type.4
The expressions we are considering are not only flexible with regard 
to the objects that can be evaluated by them, they also cover a broad 
range of possible contexts: The examples chosen so far all come 
from the context of close interpersonal relationships and this indeed 
seems to be the paradigmatic field of use for our expressions.5 These 
same expressions can be used without bending natural language, 
though, to characterise very different kinds of interactions as well. 
Some of the protesters in Tehran in June 2009, for example, 
complained that they felt like ‘having been used’6 or ‘taken 
advantage of’7 by the Iranian government. Another example8 is 
provided by the Japanese singer and political activist Karin 
Amamiya who condemns Japanese companies and the government 
for ‘using and dumping’ young workers without stable working 
contracts.9 Many more contexts for using people are conceivable and 
it does not seem exaggerated to say that an instrumental treatment of 
other people is possible in every field of human interaction. 
A further feature of our common sense notion that has to be 
mentioned is its evaluative character. In the first chapter, I claimed 
the concept to be a thick concept, i.e. a notion that contains both a 
descriptive and an evaluative judgement. But even here things seem 
to be more complicated.10 Asked to comment about the statement that 
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'everyone is using everyone' a blogger on the internet made the 
following comment:
'I think, in some ways we are all using people, but not necessar[il]y in a bad way. 
We all have friends (or most of us) and we use them to converse with, we use 
them [as] support. That's what friends are there for. In that way, yes, we all use 
each other.'11
If we accept this blogger's linguistic intuition that we can say that we 
are using a friend in a good conversation, for example, then we have 
to accept that not all utterances claiming that a person is used are 
negatively loaded. This evaluatively neutral use of language can also 
be seen in catchy book titles such as Code Leader: Using People, 
Tools, and Processes to Build Successful Software or How Leaders 
Build Value: Using People, Organization, and Other Intangibles to 
Get Bottom-Line Results.12 We may perhaps disagree with the 
authors of these books about the evaluation of certain forms of 
personal management, but their examples illustrate that the 
expression 'to use people' can be competently employed without an 
intention to negatively evaluate the behaviour so described. Many 
philosophers accept the possibility of a neutral use of the expression 
and would not object to saying, for example, that I use a taxi driver 
who drives me to work or a postman who delivers my mail.13 These 
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philosophers thus have to agree that if the concept of using people is 
a thick concept it is a fluid one in Blackburn's sense, i.e. it does not 
generally come with one particular evaluative attitude.14 
I take these intuitions about a purely descriptive employment of the 
expression 'to use a person' as relatively clear and reliable data about 
our common sense notion. Nevertheless, I want to add some 
qualifications: First of all, even if it sounds semantically impeccable 
to say that we use our taxi driver or postman, we hesitate to do so. 
The aforementioned blogger confirms this observation when he/she 
tells us that 'when I think of the statement "using people", I hold a 
negative connotation with this word'.15 Second, while it might be true 
that we can employ the expression 'to use a person' in a purely 
descriptive way, it is less clear if we can do so with the other 
expressions of our family as well. I would still insist, for example, 
that it would be very confusing to assert both that the enchanter 
treats the mother as a means and that he does nothing wrong. The 
use of the expression ‘to treat somebody as a means’ strongly 
suggests, to my mind, that we negatively evaluate the agent’s 
behaviour. Third, there are cases where we might be in doubt if a 
description of a case is evaluative because our evaluation is 
somewhat elusive. Take the following case: 
Paulus Kaufmann – Using People       47
“Friendly” neighbour: A young man meets his neighbour, a woman 
in her 60s, at the supermarket. He offers to carry her bags back 
home, because he hopes that out of gratitude she will invite him in 
for a cup of tea and so he will have a chance to meet her attractive 
daughter.
I think most people would not object to saying that the young man is 
trying to use his neighbour. He is pursuing a goal and believes the 
woman to play some role in its achievement. Furthermore, it seems 
clear to me that we would all agree that the young man is not doing 
anything terribly wrong. I doubt, nevertheless, that we would be 
willing to say that his action is without any moral failure. If I 
imagine alternative courses of action and motivation I cannot help 
thinking that the young man should help the lady for benevolent 
motives and try to get close to the girl in other ways. A second 
example, provided by Thomas Scanlon16, might help to further clarify 
this point: 
Ballroom: A woman invites her male colleague to the big end-of-
the-year dance to associate with “the in crowd” who accept him as a 
member.
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To render a final judgement about the woman's behaviour in this 
example we certainly would need to have more information about 
her motives and beliefs and about the previous relationship between 
her and her colleague. But I suspect that we would agree even 
without further clarifications that the woman is indeed using her 
colleague in the usual sense of this expression and that her behaviour 
is objectionable to some degree or, at the very least, not ideal. I 
conclude that the expression 'to use a person' sometimes carries an 
evaluation even in cases where we are sure that the agent is not 
acting wrongly in a strict moral sense. In such cases there is thus an 
evaluative element in our describing them as 'a use', although it is a 
different kind of evaluation from our judging an act to be morally 
wrong. We thus find three modes of evaluation that are linked to the 
expression 'to use a person' in common sense: In some innocent 
cases, such as the one with the taxi driver, to say that I use him does 
not seem to involve a moral evaluation. In a second category of 
examples, my describing the case as a case of using does involve a 
strong moral verdict. The third category is made up of cases of using 
a person that seem objectionable in a way, but not morally wrong in 
a strict sense.
In examining our common sense notion of using people I have so far 
stressed the notion's diversity: The notion can be expressed by many 
different words that differ in connotation; it can be used to evaluate 
different objects such as actions and attitudes; it can be employed in 
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diverse contexts and it can be used in descriptive as well as in 
various evaluative ways. These findings about our common sense 
notion have led Nancy Davis to the following conclusion:
'I am inclined to doubt that our commonsense views about using persons can 
play an important role in philosophical argument, either in the construction or 
in the criticism of moral theories. Two considerations underlie this scepticism: 
first, the things that philosophers have said about using persons do not happily 
characterize our commonsense notions, and second, a closer look at these 
notions reveals them to be elusive in important ways, ones that make their 
philosophical application problematic.'17
Davis' way of presenting the conclusion of her paper helps me to 
spell out the aims of the rest of this chapter, of the chapters to follow 
and of my book as a whole. Davis' thesis consists of two 
considerations and a conclusion. Her second consideration about the 
elusiveness of our common sense concept of using people will be the 
topic of the next section. Davis' first consideration on the relation 
between our common sense notions and existing theories will be one 
of the items to be discussed in the chapters to follow. Davis' 
conclusion that our common sense notion of using people does not 
have a role to play in moral theory, is the challenge that runs through 
this whole book and will be evaluated in its concluding chapter.
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2. Too elusive a concept?
Nancy Davis motivates her investigation on the common sense 
notion of using persons18 with the following consideration:
'If our aim is to do justice to the depth and complexity of commonsense 
morality (rather than simply formulate a technical notion that rivals, or has no 
clear engagement with, our commonsense notions), then we must consider a 
variety of cases.'19
With this statement Davis seems to embrace the view that I 
attributed to Williams and Rawls in the introduction and that I 
embrace myself, namely that moral theory has to do justice to our 
existing moral convictions and that this suggests a careful analysis 
of its important moral notions. But a closer look at Davis' text shows 
us quite a different approach to common sense morality. Her paper 
reveals that she does not consider it to be a condition of adequacy 
for moral theories in general to do justice to common sense morality, 
but that her interest in the common sense notion is only due to the 
fact that some rival theories refer to them20. Robert Nozick and 
Charles Fried, for example, employ the common sense notion of 
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using persons to argue against consequentialism.21 Davis, who is a 
consequentialist22, wants to evaluate these arguments and therefore 
turns towards common sense to see if the notion she finds there is 
indeed a threat to her favourite moral theory. Davis herself is quite 
sceptical in general about whether common sense can help us much 
in answering important moral questions23 and she also comes to a 
negative conclusion with regard to the concept of using persons. 
This concept cannot be an important notion in moral theorizing, 
according to Davis, because it is elusive. This elusiveness is 
twofold: The concept does not have a clear scope, as there are many 
cases where it is hard to decide if they fall under the concept or not. 
In addition, the concept does not provide a theoretically valuable 
justification, because it is already morally loaded:
'The appeal to our commonsense views cannot provide us with a neutral or 
authoritative basis for the assessment or construction of a moral theory, for the 
classification of a case as one of using involves reference to our views about 
nature, scope, and value of human interactions.'24
At the end of her paper Nancy Davis draws her conclusion with 
regard to the common sense concept of using persons. She sums up 
rather carefully:
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'I have argued that commonsense notions of using persons are subtle and 
elusive, and I have suggested that their philosophical application has been, and 
is likely to be, problematic. I have not claimed that moral theorists can get no 
mileage – positive or critical – out of an appeal to commonsense views about 
using persons. This […] is an open question, but I am not optimistic about the 
outcome.'25
Although I want to emphasize that Davis' analysis of the common 
sense concept of using persons reveals many important insights, I do 
not share her pessimism about its philosophical application. I find 
her negative conclusion premature and believe that this is ultimately 
due to a mistaken view of the relation between moral theory and 
common sense morality. Let me spell out my reservation step by 
step:
First, Davis stresses at many points in her paper that the common 
sense concept of using persons does not have a clear-cut scope and 
that it is 'vague', 'subtle' and 'elusive'. I share Davis' inconclusiveness 
about the application of the concept in many cases. I am not sure, for 
example, if I would say that a photographer uses the person he snaps 
on the street and whose photograph appears in his next exhibition.26 
But the fact that the common sense concept of using persons is 
vague with regard to many examples does not show that it is not 
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useful for moral theories. We certainly expect a moral theory to help 
us in deciding what to do, but moral theories contain many concepts 
and not every concept must provide us with a decision-procedure. 
We thus should not judge a common sense concept's quality as a 
theoretical notion before we have a picture of its actual role in our 
theory.27
The idea of a diversity of conceptual roles in moral theory leads me 
to a second and more general objection. I find it remarkable that 
Davis asks if our common sense notion is up to the task it has been 
assigned to by certain moral theories, but that she does not consider 
the case where a moral theory fails to capture the role that a concept 
actually fulfils in common sense. Sometimes it is not the actor but 
the person who casts the actor who is responsible for a bad 
performance. A moral theory might thus fall short of convincing us 
because it does not give our concepts the roles that they can really 
play. It seems to me that Davis does not consider this possibility 
because she fails to consider Williams' more general point that 
common sense notions already have their role. The concepts and 
beliefs that prevail in a society serve to 'help us find our way in a 
social world'.28 This involves a variety of tasks and the diversity of 
conceptual roles in moral theory simply mirrors the diversity of 
conceptual roles in common sense morality. Moral theorists have to 
be aware of these pre-theoretical roles of a concept in order to assign 
a role to it that fits its conceptual character.
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Davis' neglect of the roles that concepts already have when they are 
applied in common sense seems to be due to a certain picture about 
the relation between common sense morality and moral theory. This 
picture can be seen clearly in her argument that our common sense 
views on using persons cannot be an 'authoritative basis for the 
assessment or construction of a moral theory' because they already 
imply moral convictions about the 'nature, scope, and value of 
human interactions'29. She illustrates her argument by pointing out 
that to decide if a particular interaction is a case of using we 
sometimes have to know, for example, what can be legitimately 
expected from a friend. To answer this last question we must have 
an account of the value of friendship and maybe also of the value of 
human interactions in general. We thus need a coherent account of 
not only one, but of several morally important concepts. According 
to Davis such an account can only be provided by moral theory and 
if we want to criticise or construct a moral theory we cannot refer to 
such loaded common sense notions because we would be 
presupposing what we are trying to achieve. This argument neatly 
separates two spheres of moral considerations. On the one hand, we 
have common sense morality consisting of rather scattered intuitions 
about what is right and wrong and a repertoire of act descriptions 
that may or may not coincide with morally relevant boundaries. On 
the other hand we have moral theory as a more or less coherent 
system of moral beliefs about the principles that determine these 
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boundaries and show the connections between morally relevant 
concepts. Moral theory cannot ignore common sense morality 
altogether and must correspond with a relevant part of its isolated 
intuitions, but moral theory provides the 'views about the nature, 
scope, and value of human interactions' and gives answers to 'the 
most important questions that confront us as serious moral agents', 
questions that cannot even be 'satisfactorily addressed' in common 
sense discourse.30 This portrayal of the relation between common 
sense morality and moral theory seems wrong to me for several 
reasons. At this point I only want to stress that it underestimates the 
coherence of our common sense discourse. To be sure, all our 
systems of moral beliefs are inconsistent and lack explanations and 
justifications for many of their convictions. But the moral beliefs 
that we find are not, in general, isolated intuitions, but webs of 
concepts and beliefs with many conceptual and explanatory 
junctions. Davis is therefore right in claiming that our common 
sense views on using persons do not provide us with a neutral basis 
on which to build a moral theory. But she is wrong in supposing that 
there are common sense views that are not equally entrenched in 
other moral beliefs and that moral theory should and could be built 
without such views. Davis is likely to respond to my criticism by 
asking how we can build a theory if we only have concepts that 
presuppose the existence of a theory. The answer is that a theory is 
already there. We find such a theory in our common sense discourse 
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provided by our repertoire of thick concepts. This folk-theory31 is, to 
start with, an incomplete and unsatisfying bunch of ideas that can 
and should be improved in many regards, but it is the only material 
we have to create a better theory.
3. Deep use
So far I have presented the common sense concept of using persons 
in all its breadth and I have argued that breadth is not necessarily an 
obstacle to theoretical application. But focussing on the breadth of a 
concept can result in us losing sight of the concept's depth. To say it 
less metaphorically: An analysis of the broad range of uses of a 
concept can reveal that there are no common rules that govern them 
all; the diverse uses may be connected more loosely instead by a set 
of only partly overlapping rules. But this loosely connected set of 
rules may have subsets that are clear and elaborate. Such subsets of 
rules may be the rules that govern the use of one particular word or 
phrase or the rules of application in one particular context. A theory 
which aims to improve our common sense notion will select from 
the rules governing the notion and will leave out some of them as 
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peculiarities of colloquial language. The theory will often be 
especially interested in the deeper parts of the web of rules and focus 
on these clearer subsets. The selection of subsets has to be 
undertaken carefully, though, as by too deliberate a choice one 
might lose sight of the particular role that the concept in question 
plays in common sense. One such careful approach to the concepts 
of common sense is the analysis of paradigmatic cases. These are 
the cases where the notion is most confidently used and it is 
therefore reasonable to expect that the concept is here employed in 
its central role and that the employment follows clearly identifiable 
rules.
The concept of using persons is a concept that not only has diverse 
uses, i.e. breadth, but also particular applications that are governed 
by relatively clear and elaborate rules, i.e. depth. To say that the 
common sense concept of using persons is entirely elusive is 
therefore exaggerated. To illustrate the concept's depth I want to 
come back to the example of Nabokov's Enchanter, as I consider it 
to be a paradigmatic case of using a person. By analysing this 
example and comparing it to other cases I want to highlight the rules 
that determine the scope of the most common expression 'to use a 
person'. I will also shed some light on the justifications that are 
connected to the notion in common sense and, finally, I want to 
point to some questions that remain open and that must be answered 
by a refinement by moral theory.
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3.1 Using people and using tools
The protagonist of Vladimir Nabokov's novella The Enchanter 
marries a terminally ill woman in order to obtain custody of her 
daughter after she dies. This strongly repellant behaviour can be 
characterized fittingly by saying that the enchanter is 'using' the 
mother. But what do we mean by this expression? The very common 
verb ‘to use’ can be combined with many different object 
expressions. We talk of using knives, methods, cars, opportunities, 
capacities, stones and so on. The most typical use of 'use' is the use 
of material objects of a medium size, though, objects that were often 
built to be used such as tools, pens or machines. We are borrowing 
this expression when we speak about using people and therefore 
often add further attributes to it like 'as a tool', 'as an object' or 'as an 
instrument'. It is therefore plausible to analyse the expression 'to use 
a person' by comparing it with the expression 'to use a tool'. 
Unsurprisingly both expressions have many features in common. 
According to my analysis, in order to say that somebody uses a 
person or a tool three basic conditions have to be fulfilled:
First, I only use a tool if I do something with the tool. If I only look 
at a hammer or talk about it I do not thereby use it. Similarly I only 
use a person if I interact with that person. This condition should be 
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understood to imply that an act of mine has some foreseeable effect 
on that other person. I have to admit, though, that natural language is 
rather vague on this point. Imagine the following case:
Helicopter: A helicopter is looking for a place to land. The pilot 
knows the region to be very muddy. He therefore looks for people 
strolling around and lands close to where they had been walking.
It is not unnatural to say that the pilot uses the people as points of 
orientation. But then the example seems to conflict with the first 
condition as he is not interacting with them in the relevant sense: His 
action is not likely to affect them in any way. But we can respond to 
this objection that we in fact do hesitate to say that the pilot uses the 
walkers even if we feel more comfortable saying that he uses them 
as points of orientation. It is in connection with expressions of the 
form 'as an A' that the interaction condition can be violated. This is a 
common phenomenon, as becomes clear when we think of using 
tools. I do not use a knife when I only look at it. But although I’m 
only looking at it I might use it as a model for drawing. Our 
ambiguous reaction towards examples such as Helicopter is thus due 
to the peculiarities of the expression 'to use something as something' 
and it is not necessary to cover these examples in a definition of the 
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expression 'to use a person'.32
Second, in our interaction we pursue a goal that is not directed 
towards a state of the tool itself. That is, we do not use a knife if we 
sharpen it because the sharpness we are aiming at is a state of the 
knife itself. Similarly, A does not use person B if in interacting with 
him she is ultimately aiming for a state that is supposed to be good 
or even for a state that is supposed to be bad for B. Consider the 
following two examples:
Christmas: In December Ron and Jill are doing some shopping. Jill 
gets enthusiastic about a scarf but doesn’t buy it. Half an hour later 
Ron pretends that he forgot something. But in fact he goes back to 
the shop and buys the scarf as a Christmas present for Jill.
Insult: A young man on a bicycle rides in the middle of the road 
thereby preventing a car from overtaking. When the car finally 
manages to pass the bicycle the car driver opens the window and 
shouts abuse at the cyclist.
It seems clear to me that we would not speak of someone using 
another person in any of these situations. Ron deceives Jill to realize 
one of his goals, but as his goal is to make Jill happy we wouldn’t 
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say that Ron uses Jill. In Insult, the car driver wants to offend the 
cyclist, but he does not use him. The reason why we hesitate to 
speak of using in this case seems to be due to the fact that the 
driver’s act is directed against the cyclist. These two points may be 
taken together by claiming that, for A to use B, A must pursue a goal 
that points away from B.33 A is then neither acting to bring about a 
state that is good for B, nor to bring about a state that is bad for her. 
He is thus not acting for B's sake at all and his end can be spelled out 
without essentially referring to B.34
Third, we only use a tool if we interact with it because we believe it 
to be useful for our purposes. We don’t use a hammer for example, 
if we take it out of the tool box to have more space to look for the 
screwdriver. In this case the hammer is not useful to us but an 
obstacle in pursuing our goal. We are also not using a can on the 
street that we kick away because we are angry. Similarly, A only 
uses a person B if A believes that B can contribute to his goal. B’s 
presence or participation must play a role in A’s plan towards his 
ends, as the following examples may illustrate:
Pollution: The chemistry company Chisso introduces industrial 
waste polluted with mercury into the open sea close to the city of 
Minamata. Approximately 10,000 people are severely harmed. 
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Assassin: Trevis wants to kill the president. He stands in the crowd 
and shoots at the open car of the president. He aims badly and would 
have missed the president if the driver had continued to drive at the 
same speed. But the driver suddenly slows down and the bullet hits 
the president.
Chisso interacts with the people of Minamata and pursues a goal that 
does not refer to these people. It would have been a lot easier for the 
managers of Chisso, though, to realize their goal without these 
people. Thus Chisso didn’t use them. In Assassin the driver’s 
participation is necessary for the success of Trevis’ project, but he 
also doesn’t use the driver because the driver’s behaviour wasn’t 
part of Trevis’ plan.
This analysis gives us a clear picture of the depth of our employment 
of the expression 'to use a person'. It also fits well with the 
paradigmatic case of using people that is depicted in Nabokov's 
novella. The story's paedophile protagonist meets a 12-year-old girl 
in a park and is immediately fascinated. From this moment on he 
wants to get close to the girl and comes to the park frequently. By 
talking to the girl's foster mother he learns about her real mother and 
acquires the belief that some of her properties, namely her custody 
rights and her illness, can be helpful in realizing his goal to get close 
to the girl. He then visits the mother for the first time pretending to 
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be interested in some of her antique furniture. In accordance with 
our analysis we can thus say that the enchanter interacts with the 
mother because he believes that her presence or participation can 
contribute to the realization of his goal, a goal does not point to her, 
but to her daughter instead.
It is interesting to look at the case of The Enchanter in this analysis, 
as it helps to distinguish the enchanter's behaviour from other kinds 
of wrongdoing: The protagonist of Nabokov's short story has no 
intention of harming the girl's mother. He is not deeply concerned 
about her wellbeing either, but his actions are not directed against 
her as the car driver's derogatory words are in Insult or as the 
behaviour of someone who acts out of anger, revenge or jealousy is. 
This might be one of the reasons why it is not obvious from the start 
what is wrong with the enchanter's behaviour: Offences like murder 
and mayhem that come quickly to our minds when we think of 
moral wrongdoing often point directly to their victims, but the 
enchanter's behaviour is not like one of these categorized crimes. 
We also cannot charge him with negligence or indifference to 
another person's wellbeing. As Nabokov tells us he even, in a 
certainly limited sense, cares for the mother and tries to make her 
feel comfortable:
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'He was unfailingly attentive. He made mooing sounds of consolation and 
accepted her awkward caresses with concealed hatred […]. Always even-
tempered, always self-controlled, he sustained the smooth tone he had assumed 
from the start, and she was grateful for everything – for the old-fashioned 
gallantry with which he treated her, the polite form of address that in her 
estimation gave tenderness a dignified dimension, the way he satisfied her 
whims, the new radio phonograph, his docile acquiescence to twice changing 
the nurses who were hired to care for her around the clock.'35
To be sure, the enchanter's care and compassion are false and under 
the surface of his courtesy lie hate and 'ohnmaechtiger zorn' (p.45). 
But he differs morally from the chemistry company Chisso, for 
example, that pollutes the ocean without any thought to the 
consequences for the people living nearby, and he also differs from 
the priest and the Levite who ignore the injured man lying on the 
road to Jericho36. The enchanter's acts are not better than theirs – he 
is certainly no benevolent Samaritan either – but they are wrong for 
different reasons.
The analysis of our common use of the expression 'to use a person' 
has helped us to see that using persons differs in kind from other 
moral wrongdoings. We should be aware, however, that the analysis 
cannot explain what is wrong with using persons. The three 
conditions of my analysis tell us what it means to use a person, but 
they certainly do not name a property that makes these acts wrong. 
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There are many cases where using a person – in the sense just 
defined – is morally innocent: The conditions are, for example, 
fulfilled when I climb on a friend’s back to pick an apple or when I 
take a taxi to get to work. In both cases I’m interacting with another 
person believing that this person’s presence or participation can help 
me to realize a goal that does not point to this person. But in such 
cases I’m usually not doing anything morally objectionable. A 
further look at The Enchanter and our common sense discourse can 
help us, however, to say something more about a possible 
justification for the wrongness of certain forms of using people. I 
will argue that there is one justification available in common sense 
discourse that is philosophically interesting and that at the same time 
fits well with the analysis of 'using a person' that I presented above. 
Furthermore, I want to reject another justification that seems to be 
part of common sense discourse, but that is – as I will argue – less 
central to it than it might appear.
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3.2 To feel used
Let me start the search for a common sense justification of the 
wrongness of using people by ruling out one that suggests itself. 
Nancy Davis reminds us of it:
'When we are asked to think of a case of using, what generally comes to mind 
are cases in which the Controller [i.e. the person who uses the other] is both 
exploitative and narrowly self-seeking.'37
Dmitri Nabokov seems to have something similar in mind when he 
says that the enchanter regards the girl as 'an instrument for his 
gratification'38 and thus points to his egoistical motives. The 
enchanter is indeed looking for a possibility to satisfy his 
paedophiliac desires throughout the whole story and it sounds 
convincing to say that it is this self-seeking attitude that renders his 
actions so horrendous. But we have several reasons to doubt this 
route of justification. To be able to evaluate it better we have to 
clarify first what can be meant by the word 'self-seeking'. Nabokov's 
alternative expression 'gratification' suggests that we criticise the 
agent's end in interacting with others because it is directed solely 
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towards his own pleasure. This criticism can be understood to 
condemn the content of the enchanter's end and Nabokov would then 
criticise the paedophiliac desires of the story's protagonist. This 
criticism is a peculiarity of the example, though, and the charge of 
self-seeking motives does not generally refer to specific 
motivational contents. The charge should thus better be understood 
to be about the form of the pursued ends, i.e. about their self-
regarding character.
To criticise an action or an agent as narrowly self-seeking cannot 
simply mean that she is motivated by her own desires or interests. 
Most people are most of the time motivated by such self-regarding 
motives and while this may be a reason to lament the world's pitiful 
condition, it is not an adequate reason to criticise one particular 
course of action. The objection to the enchanter's motivation is thus 
not only that he is longing to satisfy his private desires, but also that 
he is trying to do so 'narrowly', i.e. without further thought about the 
wishes and interests of other people. This objection sounds 
convincing at first glance, but it is again dependent on a peculiarity 
of the example: We can easily change the setting of the story a little 
and imagine that the enchanter is really trying to get close to the girl, 
because he wants to present her to his paedophiliac brother. But this 
change in the motivational structure of the agent does not render his 
action permissible. In many cases our indignation about one person 
using another will be the same or only slightly reduced if the agent's 
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aims are not for his own benefit but for the benefit of people dear to 
him. Their wrongness therefore does not depend on the motives 
being self-seeking in a narrow sense.39 
We can then try to state the objection more precisely: The problem 
in interacting with somebody in a narrowly self-seeking manner is 
not that the agent's ends are not for the benefit of any person other 
than himself, but that they are not for the benefit of his interaction 
partner. This interaction partner helps the agent in achieving his 
ends and so we may expect him or her to profit as well. Interactions 
that benefit only one of the interacting parties and that are also 
intended by the profiting party to have this one-sided outcome seem 
to be 'exploitative' and to be wrong for this reason.
This new objection loses its plausibility with regard to the Enchanter 
Case, though, when we remember that the enchanter is indeed caring 
for the mother. It does not seem right to say that he is exploiting the 
mother in that she does not profit enough from their interaction. He 
wants her to feel comfortable and she actually seems to die more 
happily than she would have without their marriage. She also 
ensures that the marriage is to her advantage by checking his bank 
account, for example (p.27f.). Having this paradigmatic case in mind 
I am therefore not convinced by the justifications for the wrongness 
of using persons that point to its self-seeking or exploitative nature.
Nancy Davis and others will respond to my rejection of this 
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particular justification by saying that even if my arguments are right 
I am already abandoning the common sense understanding of what it 
means to 'use a person'. The common sense notion is, according to 
these critics, too closely connected to the condemnation of egoistical 
motives to leave this justification out of its analysis. This close 
connection seems to be apparent in expressions such as 'to become a 
means to somebody else's ends', 'she regards him as a tool for her 
pleasure' etc. But I think we can and should read these common 
expressions in a different way. The indignation that is usually 
contained in such utterances is not, from my point of view, due to 
the fact that the agent is looking for his own happiness. Rather I 
think that the ends a person is pursuing in using another person are 
problematically his ends in another sense. If we say that one person 
uses another person as a means to his ends, we can be understood to 
mean that these ends are his and not the other person's ends because 
they point away from the person he is interacting with. If he uses the 
other person, it follows by definition that he is not interacting with 
the other person for her sake, but for the sake of something else. 
This something can be his own pleasure, but it might also be the 
pleasure or harm of a third party. We thus don't need to read the 
expression 'his ends' as referring to egoistical ends – although they 
will be egoistical in many cases – but we can also understand these 
ends to be 'his own' ends in the sense that they are not related to the 
person with whom he is interacting.
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The idea of an intention that points away from the interaction partner 
is not only a grammatical peculiarity of the term 'to use a person'. It 
is closely connected to a particular sensation that we can express by 
saying that we feel used. I have argued above that the woman in 
Nabokov's novella, for example, cannot complain that she has been 
exploited or treated without any care for her wellbeing. But she 
certainly has good reasons to feel hurt by the enchanter's behaviour 
and she can neatly express her negative sensations by complaining 
that she feels used. What do we mean by this common expression?
A speaker who uses the words 'I feel used' usually tries to explain 
the wrongness of the behaviour towards him by pointing to an 
unpleasant feeling. This feeling differs in kind from other unpleasant 
sensations such as pain, sadness or fear. It typically combines 
elements of anger, frustration and a feeling of degradation. First of 
all, we often hold a grudge against our users. We always hold them 
responsible for their behaviour and believe that they could and 
should have acted otherwise. Our feeling is thus a moral feeling that 
contains an element of anger or indignation. A second feature of the 
feeling can be illustrated by the example that I presented at the 
beginning of this chapter. The young man who was dumped by the 
woman after she became pregnant could have specified his feelings 
by saying: 'I thought it was love, but I found out that I had only been 
used'. He thus points to a state or relation he considers to be 
especially valuable and argues that reality disappointingly did not 
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come up to this ideal. He is therefore likely to feel frustrated and 
disappointed about how things turned out. This element of feeling 
used is typically expressed by a sighing or angry utterance of 'She 
did not mean me!'. The abandoned lover will feel that the woman 
did interact with him because of his potential as a genitor and not 
because he is the person he is.40 He thereby notices that her intention 
is pointing away from him and this causes him to feel frustrated. The 
act of having been used feels furthermore like a special kind of 
degradation. A person that was used often feels like she has been 
treated in a way that may be appropriate for entities of lower rank, 
but that is not appropriate to her rank. People therefore say things 
like 'I am not just your tool' or 'Don't treat me like a mere object!'.41 
This analysis of the sensation of feeling used provides us with a 
possible justification for our indignation about using people. To feel 
used is to feel an unpleasant mixture of anger, frustration and 
degradation that arises when we are not treated as the persons we 
are. We seem to have strong reasons to avoid any behaviour that 
would arouse this feeling in other people.
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4. Open questions
In the preceding section I analysed the two expressions 'to use a 
person' and 'to feel used' to illustrate that the common sense notion 
of using people is not only broad but also deep. But some significant 
problems remain. Let me highlight four of them:
1. The analysis of the most common expression 'to use a person' has 
shown that it is exaggerated to say that the notion is elusive through 
and through. Its employment is governed by quite clear rules that 
define a class of actions that is easily distinguishable from insults 
and other acts that are directed against a person, from negligence 
and ignorance as well as from paternalistic treatment. Not all acts 
that fall under this definition are impermissible, though. I also use a 
taxi driver, according to this definition, if I climb into his car and he 
gets me to work, for example. The common sense notion therefore 
does not provide a criterion to distinguish permissible and 
impermissible uses. But we certainly have to know when I act 
wrongly in using a person.
2. Another question about the common sense concept of using 
people is imposed on us by The Enchanter: Until now I have only 
spoken about the enchanter using the mother, but Dmitri Nabokov 
told us that the woman is a repellent means to the enchanter and the 
Paulus Kaufmann – Using People       73
girl an instrument for his gratification. He therefore condemns the 
enchanter's behaviour towards the girl as well. But does the 
enchanter commit the same fault with regard to both mother and 
daughter? Or if both wrongs are different, are they somehow 
interrelated as Nabokov's quotation suggests?
3. We have also seen that some of the expressions that refer to the 
concept of using people are employed in common sense both to 
evaluate acts and attitudes. This raises the question of how and why 
one single concept fulfils both of these tasks. Is it a mere accident 
and misleading feature of natural language that it contains 
expressions that are ambivalent with regard to their moral function? 
Or is there an underlying rationale in employing the same 
expressions in both these roles?
4. We can surely agree that it is an unpleasant sensation to feel used 
and that we should avoid this feeling if we can. But some people 
may feel used without good reason. Such people may have 
misunderstood the behaviour of their presumed users or they may 
have a pathological need for gestures of recognition that makes them 
feel used without any reason at all. If we are looking for a 
justification of our indignation about using people we thus need to 
know when we are justified in having this feeling. Moreover, we 
need to know what follows from the fact that the feeling is indeed 
justified. Can we make claims on another person to change his 
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behaviour, for example? This is certainly the case when the 
protagonist of The Enchanter uses the mother of the girl he desires. 
But in some cases we may feel used because we hoped that some 
other person loves us and find out that she needed someone to 
discuss her problems. This hope for love does not seem to justify a 
claim on that person under all circumstances. What then justifies our 
feeling used? And what can we reasonably expect from another 
person when we feel this peculiar sensation?
The first two of these questions are about the scope of the concept of 
using people and ask what acts fall under the intuitively convincing 
claim that it is wrong to use people. The third question asks about 
the role that this prohibition plays. The fourth question, finally, 
concerns the justification that we have for the claim that it is wrong 
to use people. These questions together will help us, I believe, to 
evaluate the theoretical accounts of using people to be examined in 
the following chapters. I will therefore present them by asking how 
they think about the scope, the role and the justification of the 
prohibition to use people and by highlighting the solutions they 
propose to these systematic problems.
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III Kant's Account of Using People
The first attempt to theoretically form the concept of treating 
someone as a means was made by Kant.1 He did not invent the 
notion, though. The German expression for using people – 
'jemanden gebrauchen' – was already established at Kant's time and 
had a negative moral connotation in certain contexts.2 Kant took up 
this concept and gave it a central position in his moral theory by 
using it to spell out one version of the Categorical Imperative, his 
famous Formula of Humanity: ‘So act that you use humanity, 
whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at 
the same time as an end, never merely as a means.’3 Almost all 
existing analyses of the notion of treating people as means refer at 
some point to this formula.4
In spite of the importance of the concept of using people as means 
for Kant's theory he does not offer a careful analysis. It may be 
partly due to this fact that Kant's Formula of Humanity was not 
much appreciated by many moral philosophers. W.D. Ross, for 
example, passes the judgement that the second formulation of the 
categorical imperative is an embarrassment to Kant's genius5. Kant's 
moral theory was therefore often identified with his Formula of 
Universal Law instead. This assessment changed with the resurgence 
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of Kantian philosophy at the end of the 1970s in Anglo-American 
philosophy and nowadays many philosophers inspired by Kant even 
prefer the Formula of Humanity and rely on Kant's account of using 
people.
Contemporary commentators still complain about Kant's scarce 
remarks on this central notion, though, and try to build their 
interpretations and elaborations on very few passages.6 Kant does 
indeed refer to the concept at many points in his works and certainly 
not only in the passages usually quoted. It is nevertheless true that 
compared to his account of duty or his theory of moral motivation, 
for example, Kant is stingy with his remarks on treating people as 
means. He does not offer a comprehensive account and some of his 
remarks even seem to contradict each other. In what follows I will 
therefore neither try to construe a theoretical account out of these 
references, nor will I attempt to shed light on exegetical details. 
Instead I present Kant's remarks on using people as a background for 
the systematic questions discussed in this book, i.e. I will analyse 
what Kant had to say about the scope, the role and the justification 
of the prohibition against using people. No contemporary account of 
using people can ignore Kant's ideas because, on the one hand, 
almost all existing accounts are inspired by Kant and claim to 
represent his ideas. On the other hand, Kant's work certainly 
contains some of the most important insights into the topic. I am 
actually no exception in believing that my own account is 
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compatible with Kant's ideas and can be understood as spelling out 
what Kant hinted at. I will not defend this claim, though, and will 
instead present Kant merely as a source of inspiration for my own 
and for the other accounts of using people that I present in this book. 
1. The scope of Kant's prohibition
Although Kant does not give us a list of examples or a procedure to 
decide whether person A is merely using person B, we can get a 
rather clear picture of the scope of Kant's account by looking at the 
passages where Kant applies the concept. There are, actually, quite a 
lot of them. Allen Wood points to the fact that, contrary to an 
alleged vagueness of the Formula of Humanity, Kant uses it quite 
often and even more often than his other Formulas to show the 
wrongness of particular act types. Wood counts 14 such instances in 
the Metaphysics of Morals alone.7 Samuel Kerstein is more cautious 
in his count, but agrees that Kant frequently applies the Formula.8 
One has to keep in mind, though, that the Formula of Humanity is a 
complex principle containing several richly loaded notions. The 
concept of treating someone merely as a means is just one of them, 
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so one must check the instances that Wood and Kerstein counted and 
other such passages to see if they involve a reference to the concept 
of treating someone merely as means or if they hinge on other 
notions of the Formula of Humanity.
As we have seen before, there is not only the phrase 'to treat 
someone as a means'; we also have a number of expressions in our 
common discourse that refer to a similar kind of moral phenomenon. 
We say that ‘A uses person B’, or that she ‘regards him as a means’ 
or that she ‘treats him as a mere tool’. Kant is actually not much 
stricter in his use of words. While in his Formula of Humanity he 
warns us 'never to use humanity merely as a means', at other points 
in his works he criticises 'to merely make use of people', 'to treat 
them merely as means' or 'to estimate them merely as means'9 
without distinguishing between these diverse wordings. Kant's 
terminology thus shares an ambiguity with our common sense 
discourse in that it leaves open if he is talking about an attitude or an 
act type. While the phrases 'to use humanity' or to 'make use of 
people' seem to refer to a class of acts, 'to regard' or 'to estimate 
someone merely as a means' sounds like a description of someone's 
attitude towards other people.
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1.1 Using oneself
Kant actually introduces a new ambiguity by making up the 
expression 'to use humanity'. More specifically, he says in the 
Formula of Humanity that one should never merely use humanity 
'whether in your own person or in the person of any other'. This 
wording illustrates that, in contrast to our common sense 
understanding of treating someone as a means10, Kant assumes that 
this 'someone' can also be the agent herself. I thus cannot only use 
other people in a morally illegitimate way but also myself. It is 
important to notice that this widening of the concept of treating 
people merely as means is not an eccentric idea of Kant that can be 
ignored in examining his moral theory. Kant insists that it is actually 
such duties to oneself that are at the heart of morality.11
The idea of people using themselves is maybe most plausible when 
we think about using our own bodies. Like we say that someone uses 
a knife to cut a piece of wood, we speak about using one's hands to 
grab something. We can make mistakes in using a knife and we can 
even make moral mistakes, like, for example, when we use the knife 
in a careless way that is likely to destroy the knife or endanger 
people nearby. One might therefore suggest that Kant has something 
similar in mind with regard to the use of one's body parts.
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Kant does indeed think that some uses of our own bodies or its parts 
are morally wrong and he lists several cases where a person is 
making a morally illegitimate use of his own body:
'Unnatürlich heißt eine Wohllust, wenn der Mensch dazu nicht durch den 
wirklichen Gegenstand, sondern durch die Einbildung von demselben, also 
zweckwidrig, ihn sich selbst schaffend, gereizt wird. [...] Daß ein solcher 
naturwidrige Gebrauch (also Mißbrauch) seiner Geschlechtseigenschaft eine 
und zwar der Sittlichkeit im höchsten Grad widerstreitende Verletzung der 
Pflicht wider sich selbst sei, fällt jedem zugleich mit dem Gedanken von 
demselben sofort auf […] Der Beweisgrund liegt freilich darin, daß der 
Mensch seine Persönlichkeit dadurch (wegwerfend) aufgiebt, indem er sich 
blos zum Mittel der Befriedigung thierischer Triebe braucht.'12
Kant shrinks from giving a name to the misbehaviour he is 
describing in this passage, but it is clear that he is condemning all 
sorts of masturbation13 and believes that this a case of merely using 
oneself. Suicide committed for certain reasons14 is another example 
of treating one's body in a way that implies that one thereby uses 
oneself as a mere means:
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'Das Subject der Sittlichkeit in seiner eigenen Person zernichten, ist eben so 
viel, als die Sittlichkeit selbst ihrer Existenz nach, so viel an ihm ist, aus der 
Welt vertilgen, welche doch Zweck an sich selbst ist; mithin über sich als 
bloßes Mittel zu ihm beliebigen Zweck zu disponiren, heißt die Menschheit 
in seiner Person (homo noumenon) abwürdigen, der doch der Mensch (homo 
phaenomenon) zur Erhaltung anvertrauet war.'15
In this passage Kant employs the concept of using a person merely 
as a means to show the wrongness of many forms of suicide and of 
what he calls 'partial suicide', i.e. the excision of body parts for 
commercial purposes. Like the examples discussed before, these 
forms of killing oneself are also violations of a 'duty towards 
oneself as an animal'16, i.e. as a bodily being. But whereas the 
former example involves a maltreatment of bodily parts, suicides 
are cases of treating the whole organism in an objectionable way.
If we look at these examples we can see that Kant's account of 
merely using oneself does not simply proceed from the common 
sense idea that tools – including one's hands, feet, legs etc. – can be 
used in an objectionable way. The way one uses a knife – or one's 
legs in kicking a ball, for example – can be morally wrong because 
it endangers other people or destroys something that is of value to 
them. Merely using one's own body in Kant's sense, in contrast, is a 
wrong done by me, with me and to me. It thus differs from the 
common sense notion in at least two ways: First, while in the case 
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of masturbation it may be still plausible to say that a person uses 
herself by using a part of her body, people who kill themselves or 
give away parts of their body cannot be said to use their bodies or 
its parts because they actually try to get rid of them. Second, if I 
commit suicide, for example, I am doing something with my body 
that leads to its extinction. The moral problem of this behaviour is 
not that I may thereby harm other people like my relatives or my 
fellow citizens17. According to Kant, I am rather wronging myself in 
doing so. It seems to me that the idea of using oneself that is 
characterized by these two features is unfamiliar to common sense 
morality and presents a significant extension of the thick concept 
widely used in everyday discourse.
Besides violations of duties towards oneself as a bodily creature 
Kant also discusses cases of merely using oneself as a moral being:
'Der Mensch als moralisches Wesen (homo noumenon) kann sich selbst als 
physisches Wesen (homo phaenomenon) nicht als bloßes Mittel 
(Sprachmaschine) brauchen, das an den inneren Zweck (der 
Gedankenmittheilung) nicht gebunden wäre, sondern ist an die Bedingung 
der Übereinstimmung mit der Erklärung (declaratio) des ersteren gebunden 
und gegen sich selbst zur Wahrhaftigkeit verpflichtet.'18
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In this passage Kant is talking about lying, but not about lying to 
others but about lying to oneself, a wrong that Kant calls an 'inner 
lie'. An agent who commits this kind of self-deception is, according 
to Kant, also using himself merely as a means.
1.2 Using others
Peculiar though it is, Kant's account of using oneself can help us to 
determine the scope of Kant's prohibition against using other 
people as well. The relation between both classes of duties 
becomes clear when we consider that what others can permissibly 
do to us depends in many cases on our allowing it. In these cases 
we have a right that others do not perform certain actions, but we 
can waive this right and legitimize the actions if we want to. The 
idea of waiving one's right to be treated in a certain way cannot be 
applied to cases of merely using oneself, though. If my practical 
rationality tells me that I am not allowed to kill myself out of self-
love, for example, then I am not justified in releasing myself from 
this duty. But this implies that neither am I justified in releasing 
anybody else from his duty not to kill me.19 We thus see that the 
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scope of the prohibition against using myself merely as a means is 
linked to the scope of the prohibition against using others in this 
way. If I am not allowed to kill or mutilate myself for certain 
reasons or to lie to myself or to humiliate myself then nobody else 
is. Kant thus argues, for example, that the 'outer lie', the lie to 
others is also a way of treating them merely as a means:
'[…] Was die nothwendige oder schuldige Pflicht gegen andere betrifft, so 
wird der, so ein lügenhaftes Versprechen gegen andere zu thun im Sinne hat, 
sofort einsehen, daß er sich eines andern Menschen bloß als Mittels bedienen 
will, ohne daß dieser zugleich den Zweck in sich enthalte.'20
This consideration shows that some duties to oneself, like the 
prohibition of inner lies, have a correspondent duty towards others, 
like the prohibition of outer lies. Two such corresponding duties 
have a common rationale: To present something as true that one 
believes to be false, for example, is a mere use of the capacity to 
form beliefs and thus a wronging of the will. This provides us with 
a strong reason not to commit such an act, no matter whether the 
person I try to persuade is another person or myself.21 A similar 
argument with regard to mutilations is hinted at when Kant remarks 
in an aside that 'he who destroys another's limbs thereby makes use 
of humanity as he wishes'22. We even find a correspondent duty to 
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masturbation: Kant thinks that sex is generally a use of another 
person's genitals and as such something that is objectionable. In 
contrast to the use of one's own sexual organs, sex with others can 
be legitimized if the two partners sign a contract that would 
concede the right to the use of one's sexual organs reciprocally and 
exclusively to the other, i.e. if they marry. But if two people have 
sex outside such a contractual framework they would be using each 
other as they subjugate their rational capacities to their animal 
pleasures.23
These considerations suggest that Kant would probably be willing 
to apply his account of mere use to cases where he did not 
explicitly do so. If we find a duty to others that corresponds to a 
duty to myself that Kant explicitly describes as a case of mere use, 
we can assume that Kant would justify the duty to others with the 
concept of mere use as well. The prohibition of murder, for 
example, seems to be a duty corresponding to the prohibition of 
suicide and Kant would probably agree that a murderer would 
'dispose of his victim as a mere means to his arbitrary ends'.
Besides the duties to others that have a corresponding duty to 
oneself, Kant assumes that we can treat other people merely as a 
means in cases where no such relation to self-regarding duties 
exists:
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'Deutlicher fällt dieser Widerstreit gegen das Princip anderer Menschen in 
die Augen, wenn man Beispiele von Angriffen auf Freiheit und Eigenthum 
anderer herbeizieht. Denn da leuchtet klar ein, daß der Übertreter der Rechte 
der Menschen, sich der Person anderer bloß als Mittel zu bedienen, gesonnen 
sei, ohne in Betracht zu ziehen, daß sie als vernünftige Wesen jederzeit 
zugleich als Zwecke, d.i. nur als solche, die von eben derselben Handlung 
auch in sich den Zweck müssen enthalten können, geschätzt werden sollen.'24
It is obvious that I can violate another's person's freedom and 
property in ways in which I cannot violate my own freedom and 
property. We may think of robbery, misappropriation, coercion and 
fraud, for example. As Kant describes some such offences as cases 
of merely using this person, we see that there are cases of merely 
using others that have no corresponding violation of a duty towards 
myself.
If we accept this extrapolation of Kant's examples, we arrive at a 
large class of duties that fall under Kant's concept of using people 
merely as a means. Suicide, murder, masturbation, extra-marital 
sex, self-deception, lying, organ donation, mutilation, theft, 
coercion and fraud, all fall under its scope. Kant's account thus 
comprises many more duties than the common sense concept. It 
adds violations of duties to oneself, but also cases of wronging 
others that point directly against them such as murder and 
mutilation. Kant therefore cannot refer to the analysis of the 
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common expression 'to use a person' that I presented in the 
previous chapter in order show what all the duties he mentions 
have in common. He offers us a different criterion, though, that 
does not refer to the specific context of interaction, but to the form.
1.3 Perfect duties
Kant's moral theory groups duties according to different criteria. It 
will be instructive to see if any of these groupings matches Kant's 
peculiar application of the concept of mere use. It is actually rather 
complicated to gather a coherent system of duties from Kant's 
many scattered remarks on features of duties that may be relevant 
to their classification. Any attempt to reconstruct this system must 
interpret some of these remarks as misguided deviations from the 
essential structure. It seems possible, nevertheless, to find a place 
for Kant's notion of mere use in his attempts at classification. A 
first hint to this place is given in Kant's employment of the phrase 
'to use humanity merely as means' in his famous Formula of 
Humanity:
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‘So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person 
of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.’25
It is generally agreed that Kant’s Formula can be divided into two 
parts26: The command to treat humanity as an end in itself and the 
prohibition against using humanity merely as means. It is 
furthermore undisputed that, according to the Formula, the first 
command is more demanding and implies the prohibition, so that 
we cannot violate the prohibition as long as we obey the command. 
But then the prohibition seems redundant. It seems that the 
Imperative could be reformulated in the following way without any 
loss of meaning: ‘So act that you always treat humanity as an end.’27 
What role then is left for the prohibition to play? According to a 
plausible interpretation of the prohibition’s role in the Formula of 
Humanity, Kant needs it to express the distinction between 
necessary and contingent duties. This distinction runs parallel to the 
more famous distinction between perfect and imperfect duties 
introduced with regard to the Formula of Natural Law some pages 
before in the Groundwork. In the earlier passage Kant offers two 
criteria to test the permissibility of a maxim: He tells us to ask ‘Can 
its universalization be thought without contradiction?’ and ‘Can its 
universalization be willed without contradiction?’ Any maxim that 
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fails the first test will also fail the second and any action on a 
maxim that fails the second test is forbidden. But some maxims not 
only fail the second but also the first test. The universalized maxim 
to make a false promise, for example, not only contradicts our own 
will but also our concept of promising. The duties to avoid acting 
according to such double-outlaw maxims are stricter than the duties 
to refrain from actions whose maxims only fail the second test. The 
duties of the first class are therefore called ‘strict’ or ‘perfect 
duties’, whereas the duties of the second class are called ‘imperfect 
duties’. The prohibition against using humanity merely as a means 
has the same function as the first test, the ‘contradiction-in-
conception-test’: It serves to pick out the duties that are stricter and 
prevail over the duties of the other type. Kant thus employs the 
expression ‘using humanity merely as means’ in his Categorical 
Imperative to sum up all such perfect duties.28 
Kant gives us a number of characterizations of perfect duties that 
changed in the course of his elaboration of a system of duties. To 
see what is characteristic of perfect duties it is helpful to contrast 
perfect duties with their counterpart, imperfect duties: All 
imperfect duties are duties of virtue and therefore duties in relation 
to certain obligatory ends. But they are duties not only to act in 
accordance with these ends, but to adopt them and pursue them as 
far as possible. An imperfect duty thus commands us to add an 
obligatory end to the set of ends that one pursues from inclination. 
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In Kant's eyes there are two obligatory ends: To improve one's own 
nature and to promote the happiness of others. It is thus my duty to 
care for others and to adopt their ends as my own ends. But there 
are many such ends and I cannot pursue them all at the same time. 
As my capacities to pursue ends are limited, there may be conflicts 
between these duties. I may have to choose, for example, to help 
my parents in a financial crisis or to donate money to an aid 
organisation. In such cases neither my parents nor the people 
helped by the organisation are wronged if I decide to help the other 
party. On the other hand, both acts will be meritorious.
Perfect duties are just the duties that have the opposite 
characteristics: They prohibit maxims or acts and do not prescribe 
pursuance of certain ends. In Kant's eyes, this implies that the 
compliance with perfect duties is 'owed' and violations incur blame. 
Compliance with perfect duties is thus not 'meritorious' as is the 
case with imperfect duties. Violations of perfect duties furthermore 
wrong individual people, while violations of imperfect duties do 
not wrong anyone in particular. Finally, perfect duties cannot 
conflict with each other.
We now know that we always use a person when we violate a 
perfect duty, i.e. a strong duty that we owe to a particular person. 
But Kant's account of using people as a violation of perfect duties 
does not provide us with a criterion to decide if someone is used or 
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not. Kant's account is in this regard even vaguer than the common 
sense notion. According to him, to say that someone merely uses 
another person informs us that he wrongs this person and that he 
violates a duty of a particularly strong kind, but it does not tell us 
independently when a person is used. 
1.4. Permissible and impermissible use
Kant is very clear, though, with regard to an ambiguity mentioned 
in the previous chapter. As I argued there, our common vocabulary 
has expressions that do not carry a moral evaluation in every 
context. We can say that I use a taxi driver when he brings me to 
the airport, for example, without implying any moral evaluation. 
This ambiguity was even stronger with regard to the German of 
Kant's days. It was not uncommon to say that a soldier, a 
messenger or a servant was used by his lord29 and Kant agrees with 
this neutral use of words when he says that it can, in general, be 
legitimate to use a person. To distinguish terminologically between 
the legitimate and the illegitimate use of a person Kant coins the 
expression 'to use somebody merely as a means'. While it is 
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morally acceptable and, moreover, almost unavoidable to use other 
people, it is always, at least pro tanto, wrong to merely use them. 
By clarifying the ambiguity of natural language Kant creates a 
thick concept that describes and, at the same time, reliably 
evaluates moral situations. But a terminological distinction does 
not give us a criterion to distinguish and we have criticised 
common sense for not offering such a criterion. Does Kant provide 
us with such a criterion?
The threshold that Kant draws between permissible and 
impermissible use can be seen in his famous example of a lying 
promise:
'Denn der, den ich durch ein solches Versprechen zu meinen Absichten 
brauchen will, kann unmöglich in meine Art, gegen ihn zu verfahren, 
einstimmen und also selbst den Zweck dieser Handlung enthalten.'30
Kant thus argues that the moral status of an act of use crucially 
depends on the consent of the person used. The person I use must 
give his consent that we have an interaction at all and must roughly 
agree about what kind of interaction we have. The morally required 
consent can be expressed in diverse manners. In many cases 
consent is given verbally, of course, but in suitable situations a nod, 
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a kiss or even staying silent can be acts of morally transformative 
consent. Some other forms of using people can only be made 
permissible by creating certain legal arrangements such as the 
institution of a marriage contract. Within such an institution a 
person is still using another person, but she is no longer merely 
using him and is therefore acting permissibly. Similar arrangements 
are necessary to legitimize using another person as a soldier and as 
a labourer. Kant discusses the case of military service and denies 
the supposed right of stately rulers 'to use its subjects in war against 
other states'31. Such a use of a person can only be legitimized if this 
person agrees to be used in the way proposed by the rulers:
'Dieser Rechtsgrund aber (der vermuthlich den Monarchen auch dunkel 
vorschweben mag) gilt zwar freilich in Ansehung der Thiere, die ein Eigenthum 
des Menschen sein können, will sich aber doch schlechterdings nicht auf den 
Menschen, vornehmlich als Staatsbürger, anwenden lassen, der im Staat immer 
als mitgesetzgebendes Glied betrachtet werden muß (nicht bloß als Mittel, 
sondern auch zugleich als Zweck an sich selbst), und der also zum Kriegführen 
nicht allein überhaupt, sondern auch zu jeder besondern Kriegserklärung 
vermittelst seiner Repräsentanten seine freie Beistimmung geben muß, unter 
welcher einschränkenden Bedingung allein der Staat über seinen gefahrvollen 
Dienst disponiren kann.'32
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Kant argues similarly with regard to employment relations. 
According to him, all such relations can be understood as cases of 
one person using another. But, as we cannot prohibit all forms of 
employed work, we need socially established arrangements to 
render these interactions permissible. Working contracts are the 
means to do that:
'Daß jemand durch einen Vertrag berechtigt werden könne die Kräfte eines 
Andern zu jenes seiner Absicht zu gebrauchen (locutio operae) ist keinem 
Zweifel unterworfen denn dadurch begiebt er sich nicht seiner Persönlichkeit 
als freyes Wesen vielmehr sind diese Leistungen Acte seiner Persönlichkeit.'33 
(20:456) 
Without such contracts one person having another work for his gain 
would be impermissible. As agreements between free people, 
contracts can be seen as legitimising otherwise impermissible 
interactions. But this also means that the interactions that we have 
called 'innocent uses' so far – the use of a taxi driver and of the 
postman were our favourite examples – are not really that innocent 
according to Kant. They are not situations of a kind that places 
them outside the reach of moral evaluation. They are rather 
legitimised interactions that are generally wrong or morally 
objectionable, but whose moral status can be changed by adequate 
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interpersonal or social arrangements.34 
Kant here offers us a rather clear criterion to distinguish between 
permissible and impermissible uses of persons. It is the consent of 
the person used that legitimises an interaction of use. It should be 
kept in mind, though, that contracts can have this legitimizing 
power only as long as they can be understood as agreements 
between free people. There are limits on what can be agreed on in 
such contracts:
Durch einen Vertrag kann sich niemand zu einer solchen Abhängigkeit 
verbinden, dadurch er aufhört, eine Person zu sein; denn nur als Person kann 
er einen Vertrag machen. Nun scheint es zwar, ein Mensch könne sich zu 
gewissen, der Qualität nach erlaubten, dem Grad nach aber unbestimmten 
Diensten gegen einen Andern (für Lohn, Kost oder Schutz) verpflichten 
durch einen Verdingungsvertrag (locatio conductio), und er werde dadurch 
bloß Unterthan (subiectus), nicht Leibeigener (servus); allein das ist nur ein 
falscher Schein. Denn wenn sein Herr befugt ist, die Kräfte seines Unterthans 
nach Belieben zu benutzen, so kann er sie auch (wie es mit den Negern auf 
den Zuckerinseln der Fall ist) erschöpfen bis zum Tode oder der 
Verzweiflung, und jener hat sich seinem Herrn wirklich als Eigenthum 
weggegeben; welches unmöglich ist.'35
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According to Kant, it is thus impossible to agree to become a slave 
or a bonded labourer as no such agreement can be understood as a 
real, morally legitimizing agreement. Social arrangements such as 
contracts therefore owe their legitimizing power to conditions, such 
as human freedom and equality, which exist prior to the completion 
of the contract and must persist in the period during which the 
agreement is in force.36 In Kant's eyes, there are thus no contracts 
that can render slavery or bonded labour permissible. These limits 
on contracts can be seen as well in the case of sexual relations, 
when Kant insists that no contract whatsoever can legitimize 
prostitution or polygamy.37
With the distinction between using and merely using people and the 
idea of consent Kant seems to offer a criterion to distinguish 
between perfect and imperfect duties. As the prohibition against 
using people is meant to cover all perfect duties, the criterion 
would also clarify the scope of this prohibition. Kant's remarks on 
the limits of the legitimizing power of consent and contracts reveal, 
however, that we still do not have such a criterion. Being aware 
that consent cannot render permissible many kinds of actions in 
Kant's eyes, we now have to know when consent is legitimizing and 
Kant does not offer us a clear-cut answer to this question. What we 
thus get from Kant is a picture of a huge class of duties that are 
covered by the prohibition against using people merely as means. 
But we do not get a criterion to tell why these duties fall under the 
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prohibition and whether there are further duties belonging to this 
class that were not mentioned in Kant's texts.
Let us now move on to the role that the concept of using people 
plays in Kant's account.
2. The concept's role in Kant's moral theory
Let me recapitulate what we have found out about the function that 
the notion of mere use plays in Kant's ethical theory. Kant employs 
the phrase 'to use humanity merely as a means' in spelling out one 
of the formulas of the Categorical Imperative, Kant's supreme 
principle of morality. While the whole formula is meant to cover all 
moral duties that we have as human beings, the prohibition of mere 
use comprises an important class of duties, i.e. all the duties that we 
directly owe to ourselves and our fellow humans. In the 
Groundwork Kant says that he uses the categories of perfect and 
imperfect duties only to order the examples he presents to illustrate 
the application of the Categorical Imperative, but it is unlikely that 
this is all Kant has in mind in introducing his categories. If we want 
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to understand more precisely why Kant wants to distinguish perfect 
from imperfect duties and what role the concept of merely using 
people has for him, we have to look at the function of the 
Categorical Imperative as a whole. 
Philip Stratton-Lake distinguishes between three different roles the 
Categorical Imperative can be supposed to play.38 These three roles 
can be characterized as answers to the following three questions: 1. 
Why shall we perform some action? 2. How do we know what we 
shall do? 3. How is it possible that we are morally obliged to act in 
certain ways? A principle that gives an answer to the first question 
plays an explanatory role and gives us the normative reasons that 
render our actions right or wrong.39 An answer to the second 
question does not provide normative reasons for action, but rather 
epistemic reasons to believe that we have conclusive normative 
reasons to act in a certain way. A principle that gives an answer to 
this question has a criterial role to play.40 The third question must 
be answered by pointing to the conditions that have to be fulfilled 
for us to have any moral duties at all, besides the existence of 
normative reasons. An answer to this question would play a 
transcendental role in our moral theory. To fulfil this role one has 
to state what it means to say that an act is wrong.41
According to Stratton-Lake, the Categorical Imperative can play 
the second and the third role, but it cannot play the first one. 
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Stratton-Lake argues that normative reasons must be reasons that 
can motivate us to act. But the Categorical Imperative does not 
provide any reason that can directly motivate us. It only tells us if 
an action would be permissible or forbidden, but it does not point 
to the reasons for performing or omitting the act in question. The 
merits of Stratton-Lake's distinction notwithstanding, it seems clear 
that he is mistaken in supposing that his argument about the role of 
the Categorical Imperative presents Kant's own views. If we look at 
the passages where Kant argues for the existence of certain duties, 
such as the prohibition of suicide, of masturbation or of lying, we 
see that Kant means to name the reasons for the wrongness of these 
act types by referring to the Formula of Humanity. He is explicit 
about this in his argument for the wrongness of masturbation:
'Daß ein solcher naturwidrige Gebrauch (also Mißbrauch) seiner 
Geschlechtseigenschaft eine und zwar der Sittlichkeit im höchsten Grad 
widerstreitende Verletzung der Pflicht wider sich selbst sei, fällt jedem 
zugleich mit dem Gedanken von demselben sofort auf. […] Der 
Vernunftbeweis aber der Unzulässigkeit jenes unnatürlichen und selbst auch 
des blos unzweckmäßigen Gebrauchs seiner Geschlechtseigenschaften als 
Verletzung (und zwar, was den ersteren betrifft, im höchsten Grade) der 
Pflicht gegen sich selbst ist nicht so leicht geführt. Der Beweisgrund liegt 
freilich darin, daß der Mensch seine Persönlichkeit dadurch (wegwerfend) 
aufgiebt, indem er sich blos zum Mittel der Befriedigung thierischer Triebe 
braucht.'42
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Kant argues here that we all know that it is wrong to masturbate. 
We thus do not need the Categorical Imperative to tell us this. 
What we do not see directly is why such behaviour is so abhorrent 
and this can be proved by referring to the Categorical Imperative. 
This principle thus definitely plays an explanatory role in the 
derivation of duties.43 
Examples such as the one above have led Mark Timmons to offer 
an alternative interpretation. He argues that the Formula of 
Universal Law indeed offers a decision-procedure and plays a 
merely criterial role in the detection of wrongness. The Formula of 
Humanity, in contrast, provides the reasons for the wrongness of 
acts.44 Timmons thus confirms our findings about Kant's use of the 
Formula of Humanity in the derivation of concrete duties. I also 
find Timmons arguments for the role of the Formula of Universal 
Law convincing – especially if taken together with Stratton-Lake's 
considerations concerning the motivating force of its concepts –, 
but I will not argue for the role of the Formula of Universal Law 
here. What matters to me at this point is that Kant intends the 
notion of a mere use of humanity to give us reasons for the 
wrongness of certain act types, namely all violations of perfect 
duties. Kant thereby assigns a role to the concept of merely using 
people that it already has in our common sense discourse: He 
employs the concept to evaluate a specific type of action – a type 
with a very wide scope, though – and he sees the evaluation as a 
Paulus Kaufmann – Using People       105
morally strict one. At the same time, the concept gives us the 
normative reasons for our morally strict judgement of the 
behaviour at hand and thus plays an explanatory role in Stratton-
Lake's sense. 
This explanatory role of the notion of mere use makes it one of the 
most central notions of Kant's moral theory. But I think that the 
notion's role is not limited to this. Let us look at Kant's 
condemnation of organ donation for commercial purposes:
'Sich eines integrirenden Theils als Organs berauben (verstümmeln), z.B. 
einen Zahn zu verschenken oder zu verkaufen, um ihn in die Kinnlade eines 
andern zu pflanzen, oder die Castration mit sich vornehmen zu lassen, um als 
Sänger bequemer leben zu können, u.dgl. gehört zum partialen Selbstmorde; 
aber nicht ein abgestorbenes oder die Absterbung drohendes und hiemit dem 
Leben nachtheiliges Organ durch Amputation, oder, was zwar ein Theil, aber 
kein Organ des Körpers ist, z.E. die Haare, sich abnehmen zu lassen, kann 
zum Verbrechen an seiner eigenen Person gerechnet werden; wiewohl der 
letztere Fall nicht ganz schuldfrei ist, wenn er zum äußeren Erwerb 
beabsichtigt wird.'45
In the last two lines of this passage Kant introduces a new category 
of evaluation. He judges it to be permissible to cut off and sell 
one's hair, but he insists that even this kind of behaviour is 'not 
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without blame'. Here again it is not the external act itself that is 
responsible for the negative evaluation but rather the end intended 
by the agent. If he cuts off his hair in order to sell it, he is not 
thereby treating himself merely as a means, but he is still treating 
himself in an objectionable way.
A similar evaluation can be seen when Kant expresses his 
disapproval of any attempt to influence people by appealing to their 
inclinations. He does not try, for example, to hide his aversion to 
rhetorical artistry:
'Ich muß gestehen: daß ein schönes Gedicht mir immer ein reines Vergnügen 
gemacht hat, anstatt daß die Lesung der besten Rede eines römischen Volks- 
oder jetzigen Parlaments- oder Kanzelredners jederzeit mit dem 
unangenehmen Gefühl der Mißbilligung einer hinterlistigen Kunst vermengt 
war, welche die Menschen als Maschinen in wichtigen Dingen zu einem 
Urtheile zu bewegen versteht, das im ruhigen Nachdenken alles Gewicht bei 
ihnen verlieren muß. Beredtheit und Wohlredenheit (zusammen Rhetorik) 
gehören zur schönen Kunst; aber Rednerkunst (ars oratoria) ist, als Kunst 
sich der Schwächen der Menschen zu seinen Absichten zu bedienen (diese 
mögen immer so gut gemeint, oder auch wirklich gut sein, als sie wollen), 
gar keiner Achtung würdig.'46 
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Kant dislikes any use of people by appealing to their inclinations. 
In his eyes, this way of moving them does not deserve our approval 
and can sometimes even be 'deceitful'. But Kant does not condemn 
these cases of using people as treating them merely as means. Kant 
thus employs the concept of using people not only to pick out a 
class of impermissible actions, but also to characterize other forms 
of treating people that are not morally wrong. These permissible 
cases, nevertheless, are not simply beyond all moral reservations. 
To say that a rhetorician makes use of his audience's weaknesses 
does have a moral connotation in Kant's eyes, implying that the 
agent's behaviour is missing something for a full moral approval. 
Not only the notion of using people merely as means, but also the 
notion of using people is thus a thick concept in Kant's eyes. Using 
people is for him always morally critical, but only some forms of 
use are morally impermissible. The second role that Kant assigns to 
the concept of using people is thus again similar to one that we find 
in common sense. As the example of the “Friendly Neighbour” 
was meant to show in the preceding chapter, we sometimes employ 
the concept of using people to describe cases with a critical 
connotation, but without condemning the behaviour at hand as 
morally wrong in a strict sense. Kant accepts this use of his 
theoretically formed notion as well.
Kant thus accepts four roles for the prohibition against using 
people: The prohibition plays a criterial, an explanatory and a 
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transcendental role in judging the wrongness of acts and it offers, in 
addition, an ideal for the development of our moral character and of 
the institutions of our society. In this regard Kant's account of using 
people is certainly clearer than the notion that we found in common 
sense. Like the common sense notion, however, Kant still does not 
provide us with a reason why he uses expressions that refer to act 
types as well as to attitudes. It is therefore still an open question if 
is it a misleading feature of Kant's terminology that it contains 
expressions that are ambivalent with regard to their moral function 
or if there is an underlying rationale in employing the same 
expressions in both these roles?
3. Kant's justification for the wrongness of using people
Our survey into Kant's account of using people has revealed the 
distance of his position from the common sense notion with regard 
to the concept's scope. The role that the concept plays in his theory, 
in contrast, is quite similar to the one that we detected in common 
sense. Kant completed and explained the common sense notion 
furthermore by adding the idea of consent as the relevant criterion 
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to distinguish between the legitimate and the illegitimate use of 
persons. With regard to the justification of the impermissibility of 
using persons, Kant's account seems to differ again from the 
justification that we found in common sense. If asked what reason 
they have to complain about having been used, many people will 
answer that they feel used and maybe add that this is an unpleasant 
sensation. To feel used is a negative consequence of an act and 
Kant stresses at many points in his work that the consequences of 
an act can have no influence on the act's moral quality.47 Kant 
would therefore, it seems clear, reject the common sense 
justification. But let us have a look at his actual strategy in 
justifying the prohibition against using people merely as a means.
4.1 Means and ends
If we have a look at the passage where Kant introduces the concept 
of using people in the Groundwork, we find that Kant's search for 
the justification of moral principles is a typical example of his 
transcendental method: He has already analysed what a moral 
principle is and now asks what conditions have to be fulfilled for 
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such principles to be real and valid. Pointing to the necessary 
conditions of moral principles and showing them to be fulfilled is 
what would justify our following them. Kant analyses the necessary 
conditions for the existence of moral principles in the second part 
of his Groundwork. The proof that these conditions are fulfilled is 
undertaken in the third part and revised in the Critique of Practical 
Reason. I will confine myself to presenting Kant's considerations 
about what conditions have to be fulfilled for a moral principle to 
exist and skip his difficult and unsatisfying attempts to prove that 
they are fulfilled as well.
Kant believes that he has shown that a moral principle for human 
beings must have the form of a categorical imperative. In contrast 
to merely hypothetical imperatives, categorical ones have three 
characteristics: They command with 'absolute necessity', they 'hold 
for all rational beings' and they can be known a priori:
'Everyone must admit that a law, if it is to hold morally – that is, as the 
ground of an obligation – must carry with it absolute necessity; that the 
command 'Thou shalt not lie' does not hold just for men, without other 
rational beings having to heed it, and similarly with all the other genuine 
moral laws; and that consequently the ground of obligation here must be 
sought, not in the nature of man or in the circumstances of the world where he 
is located, but solely a priori in the concepts of pure reason.'48
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A principle has absolute necessity, according to Kant, if its 
addressee cannot exempt himself from its force, either by pointing 
to the circumstances or by making an exception for himself. All 
such necessary principles furthermore hold for all rational beings as 
their necessity rules out the possibility that they depend on 
particular features of an individual person. We thus know them to 
hold and know everybody else to know them to hold without 
empirical observations about our own psychological features or the 
state of the world. According to Kant, we have an a priori 
knowledge of everything that morality requires.49
How can there be moral principles that possess these features, i.e. 
how are categorical imperatives possible? Kant starts his answer to 
this question with a summary of his theory of action: 
'Der Wille wird als ein Vermögen gedacht, der Vorstellung gewisser Gesetze 
gemäß sich selbst zum Handeln zu bestimmen. Und ein solches Vermögen 
kann nur in vernünftigen Wesen anzutreffen sein. Nun ist das, was dem 
Willen zum objectiven Grunde seiner Selbstbestimmung dient, der Zweck 
[...]. Was dagegen bloß den Grund der Möglichkeit der Handlung enthält, 
deren Wirkung Zweck ist, heißt das Mittel'.50
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Kant argues here that in all their actions rational beings act 
according to laws, they act for the sake of ends and they choose the 
means that serve them. The first statement must, I think, be 
understood to mean that rational agents act for reasons and that the 
grasp of reasons always proceeds via the representation of some 
general principle. This is already one feature of practical reasoning 
that makes categorical imperatives possible, according to Kant, and 
he uses it to spell out his first formula, the Formula of Universal 
Law. But one may wonder what can motivate us to follow such an 
abstract principle that only gives us the form of a moral law. Kant 
therefore looks for another basis of categorical imperatives and 
moves on to the other elements of his theory of action, to means 
and ends. Kant believes that all acts are done for some end and that 
we have to look here to find the material that can serve as a 
foundation for categorical imperatives. But certainly not every end 
can play this role. Kant therefore examines what conditions an end 
must meet to ground a necessary, objective and a priori moral 
principle. Kant's answer is straightforward: An end that grounds a 
necessary, objective and a priori principle must be necessary, 
objective and a priori itself. Something more has to be said, of 
course, to see more clearly what such an end would look like, but 
before I come to this question I want to try to solve two puzzles 
about Kant's notion of an end.
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Kant defines ends as 'what serves the will as the objective ground 
of its self-determination'. This definition is puzzling as Kant goes 
on to distinguish between subjective and objective ends in the 
passage that directly follows the definition and one must ask how 
objectivity can be part of the definition of ends if there are also 
subjective ends. A closer look reveals that Kant is actually talking 
about 'objective grounds' and not about 'objective ends', but this 
observation alone does not remove our puzzlement unless Kant can 
also explain how subjective ends can be objective grounds of self-
determination. Kant's answer will refer, I believe, to the ambiguity 
of the word 'objective'. The predicate 'objective' can indicate that 
something is not only relative to one particular subject, but that it 
has a larger area of validity; or it can be understood – following 
expressions such as 'the object of my perception' etc. – to refer to 
the content or 'object' of some mental state. When Kant 
distinguishes between subjective and objective ends, he has the first 
sense in mind, and when he talks about 'objective grounds' he 
presupposes the second. We also find this second sense in Kant's 
statement that ends are 'objects of the will'51. His definition in the 
Groundwork should therefore be taken to mean that ends are the 
contents that we have in mind as the sake for which we act.
The second puzzle concerns Kant's definition of 'means': 'Was 
dagegen bloß den Grund der Möglichkeit der Handlung enthält, 
deren Wirkung Zweck ist, heißt das Mittel'. I think we can make 
Paulus Kaufmann – Using People       114
sense of this awkward characterisation, if we realize that an end 
alone cannot lead to an action. If I have the end to become a 
lawyer, for example, I still have to consider how I can get there 
before I begin to act. I must look for the 'possibility of action' and 
that is, for the means to become a lawyer. Kant says furthermore 
that ends are the 'Wirkung' or 'consequence' of means and this 
suggests a causal understanding of 'means' and 'ends'. Means and 
ends are thus links in a causal chain of events.52 This is a 
widespread understanding of means and ends53, but it causes some 
difficulties for Kant that come to the fore if we look at passages 
where Kant says that bread can be an end and a mill can be the 
means to achieve it.54. The 'objective grounds' that Kant has in mind 
here as means and ends are not events but individual things. This 
understanding of 'means' is not foreign to our contemporary use of 
language. We say that studying law is a means to become a lawyer, 
but we also say that a pencil is my means to draw a portrait, for 
example. The expression 'means' is thus ambiguous in that it can 
refer to events as well as to concrete objects.55 But if Kant wants to 
include both events and individual objects in his notion of means 
and ends he cannot understand their relation to be causal, as only 
events can be causally related. The analogy between means as 
things and means as events is thus not a causal one, but Kant has an 
alternative way of justifying his use of 'means' that covers both 
aspects:
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'Wir nennen einiges wozu gut (das Nützliche), was nur als Mittel gefällt; ein 
anderes aber an sich gut, was für sich selbst gefällt. In beiden ist immer der 
Begriff eines Zwecks, mithin das Verhältniß der Vernunft zum (wenigstens 
möglichen) Wollen, folglich ein Wohlgefallen am Dasein eines Objects oder 
einer Handlung, d.i. irgend ein Interesse, enthalten.'56
Kant here distinguishes between means and ends in terms of their 
goodness. Both are related to some 'Wohlgefallen am Dasein eines 
Objects oder einer Handlung', but whereas ends are these objects or 
acts and 'please for themselves', means are only good for this 
object. Their goodness is therefore only relative as it depends on 
other things being good. The distinction between means and ends 
in this sense is a distinction between different kinds of value.57 The 
value of a means can be relative in the sense that the means stands 
in a causal relation to some end and achieves value by bringing this 
end about. The causal and the evaluative understandings of means 
and ends coincide with regard to such cases. But means can also 
achieve value through other kinds of relations and the causal 
understanding of means and ends is thus only part of the wider 
evaluative understanding of these terms. 
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4.2 Values
Kant's use of the word 'end' is idiosyncratic and therefore often 
misleading. We thus might wonder why Kant did not choose the 
word 'value', that expresses what he actually meant and that he also 
uses quite frequently. But Kant's introduction of the term 'end' is 
not just an oddity. The choice of this term makes it clear that 
something is a value in Kant's eyes only if it can be something that 
guides our action. An end is always something for the sake of 
which we act and Kant believed that values are action-guiding in 
the same way. Kant thus defended a dispositional theory of value 
according to which all value is constituted by being valued in some 
way.58 The valuation of moral value in particular cannot be a merely 
contemplative state of mind in Kant's eyes, but must always 
provide reasons for action. As Kant calls all reasons for actions 
'ends', it also makes sense to use this word within his theory of 
value.
I abandoned my search for Kant's justification of the prohibition 
against using people for a moment to clarify his notions of means 
and ends. The notion of an end is important for Kant's strategy of 
moral justification because he believes that an end must provide the 
material for a categorical imperative to be possible.59 As the 
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categorical imperative is a necessary, objective and a priori 
principle, according to Kant, the end to ground such a principle 
must be necessary, objective and a priori as well. What does such 
an end look like?
I want to start one step before Kant enters into the discussion by 
saying that, first of all, an end to ground a categorical imperative 
cannot be a means. This sounds paradoxical as something being an 
end seems to preclude it from also being a means. But this is not 
true. Means in a causal sense are ordered hierarchically so that one 
means leads to an end that is a means to some further end. My 
studying law at university can be the end of my efforts at high-
school, but, at the same time, it can be my means to become a 
lawyer. 'Means' and 'ends' in a causal understanding therefore 
denote relational concepts in the sense that an answer to the 
question if some event is an end or a means depends on the event to 
which we compare. Kant believes that it goes without saying that 
the end he is looking for cannot be an end that is at the same time a 
means to some other state or event. If an end is a causal end, it can 
thus only ground a categorical imperative if it is a final end in my 
plan of action. 
Kant argued that an end that grounds a necessary, objective and a 
priori principle must itself be necessary, objective and a priori. A 
necessary end is an end that I am forced to pursue in all situations 
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and under all circumstances. This condition rules out most of the 
final ends that we pursue in our lives. It is sometimes the final end 
of our plans to have a nice game of tennis. We then pursue no 
further end with such a game, but simply want to spend a nice time 
playing tennis. But at some other time we may play tennis to stay in 
good shape or to earn money. Such ends that we sometimes pursue 
for their own sake and sometimes for some further end, are not a 
necessary ends, as their being final depends on the circumstances. 
Such ends cannot be the grounds for categorical imperatives.
Some of the ends that we pursue in our lives we never pursue for 
the sake of anything else. I may have the end to become a lawyer, 
for example, just because I find a lawyer's work interesting and 
fulfilling. This end may always be a final end in my motivational 
set, but it is surely not an objective end as many people, thank God, 
do not want to become lawyers. As a categorical imperative is 
thought to be authoritative for everybody, the end that grounds 
such a moral principle cannot be based on an end that depends on 
'ein besonders geartetes Begehrungsvermögen des Subjects'60.
It was already argued by Aristotle that there is indeed one end that 
everybody pursues as a final end, namely the end to be happy. But 
happiness is something that is, at least partly, brought about by 
human action, and Kant argues that 'die Zwecke, die sich ein 
vernünftiges Wesen als Wirkungen seiner Handlung nach Belieben 
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vorsetzt (materiale Zwecke)'61 are all only relative and cannot 
provide the grounds for a categorical imperative. This argument 
would rule out all events and all individual objects that can be 
produced by human beings as candidates for grounding moral 
principles and we may ask what reasons Kant has to offer for this 
surprising claim. The main line of Kant's argument can be seen, I 
believe, in the following passage:
'Entweder ein Vernunftprincip wird schon an sich als der Bestimmungsgrund 
des Willens gedacht, ohne Rücksicht auf mögliche Objecte des 
Begehrungsvermögens [...] oder es geht ein Bestimmungsgrund des 
Begehrungsvermögens vor der Maxime des Willens vorher, der ein Object der 
Lust und Unlust voraussetzt, mithin etwas, das vergnügt oder schmerzt, und 
die Maxime der Vernunft, jene zu befördern, diese zu vermeiden, bestimmt die 
Handlungen, wie sie beziehungsweise auf unsere Neigung, mithin nur 
mittelbar (in Rücksicht auf einen anderweitigen Zweck, als Mittel zu 
demselben) gut sind, und diese Maximen können alsdann niemals Gesetze, 
dennoch aber vernünftige praktische Vorschriften heißen. Der Zweck selbst, 
das Vergnügen, das wir suchen, ist [...] nicht ein Begriff der Vernunft, sondern 
ein empirischer Begriff von einem Gegenstande der Empfindung.62
Kant here contrasts two fundamental ways of setting an end: Some 
ends are directly given by reason. These ends provide reasons for 
action, but they do so without appealing to our faculty of desire. The 
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other kind of ends is suggested to us by our faculty of desire by 
presenting them as likely to produce pleasure and pain63. These latter 
kinds of ends can therefore only motivate us if we presuppose 'einen 
anderweitigen Zweck', namely the end to seek pleasure and to avoid 
pain. This implies that they are only 'mittelbar gut' and thus cannot 
ground a categorical imperative. Let us take an example. I want to 
become a lawyer and it seems to me that I am pursuing this end just 
for its own sake. But Kant wants to know how such an end can 
motivate me to act, how it can motivate me to study law at 
university, for example. An end is a representation of an event or an 
individual object and if the event or the object are things to be 
brought about through my acts, than they can only motivate me, 
according to Kant, if they are represented as pleasant. As future 
entities in the world they have no other attraction than their promise 
of pleasure, even if this pleasure is of a refined kind such as the 
pleasure of having a fulfilling job.
The problem with ends to be realised through our actions is not that 
the pleasure they promise is something despicable – though Kant 
sometimes speaks as if that were the case. Neither is it their problem 
that they are ends that cannot be shared by most people – though 
Kant also sometimes suggests this. The problem with ends to be 
brought about is rather that they can only be acknowledged as ends 
by experience. Such an end is 'nicht ein Begriff der Vernunft, 
sondern ein empirischer Begriff' and this is a problem for grounding 
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a categorical imperative because the necessity that we expect of a 
categorical imperative, according to Kant, can only be provided by 
ends that can be known a priori. 
But how can there be an end that is not known empirically? How can 
we be motivated without imagining some effect in the world? As we 
already saw, Kant believes that there is a second way to set ends. 
The will cannot only be moved by the representation of some 
pleasant future state, but can also be determined directly by reason. 
The end that reason determines directly cannot be a future state for 
the reasons we just saw. It must be what Kant calls a 'selbstständiger 
Zweck'64, i.e. it must be an individual thing that already exists. It is 
unusual to say that an existing individual thing can be the end of our 
action65, but if we remember that Kant calls everything an 'end' that 
provides reasons for action, we can make sense of his claim. It is 
plausible to say that there are existing individual things for the sake 
of which we act. We can act for the sake of the American flag or for 
the sake of a beloved person, for example.66 The end that grounds a 
categorical imperative cannot be an existing individual thing that we 
happen to like, however, because these ends again can only be 
known empirically and become our ends by our setting them. In this 
respect, many existing ends do not differ from ends that can be 
brought about through our actions. Kant therefore argues that the 
end that is given directly by reason must be an end that is not set by 
us, but an existing end that can motivate us to direct our behaviour 
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in a certain way.
So far we have seen what conditions an end must fulfil in Kant's 
eyes to be able to serve as a source for moral principles. These 
conditions might seem so demanding that it is hard to imagine an 
end that really meets them. But Kant believes that there is indeed 
such an end. Let us have a look at the passages where he says what 
this end is:
'Nun sage ich: der Mensch und überhaupt jedes vernünftige Wesen existirt 
als Zweck an sich selbst, nicht bloß als Mittel zum beliebigen Gebrauche für 
diesen oder jenen Willen, sondern muß in allen seinen sowohl auf sich selbst, 
als auch auf andere vernünftige Wesen gerichteten Handlungen jederzeit 
zugleich als Zweck betrachtet werden. […] dagegen vernünftige Wesen 
Personen genannt werden, weil ihre Natur sie schon als Zwecke an sich 
selbst, d. i. als etwas, das nicht bloß als Mittel gebraucht werden darf, 
auszeichnet, mithin so fern alle Willkür einschränkt (und ein Gegenstand der 
Achtung ist). Dies sind also nicht bloß subjective Zwecke, deren Existenz als 
Wirkung unserer Handlung für uns einen Werth hat; sondern objective 
Zwecke, d. i. Dinge, deren Dasein an sich selbst Zweck ist. [...] Wenn es 
denn also ein oberstes praktisches Princip und in Ansehung des 
menschlichen Willens einen kategorischen Imperativ geben soll, so muss es 
ein solches sein, das aus der Vorstellung dessen, was nothwendig für 
jedermann Zweck ist, weil es Zweck an sich selbst ist, ein objectives Princip 
des Willens ausmacht, mithin zum allgemeinen praktischen Gesetz dienen 
kann. Der Grund dieses Princips ist: die vernünftige Natur existirt als Zweck 
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an sich selbst.'67
Kant's answer looks simple at first glance. He seems to be saying 
that there is only one end that fulfils his criteria for grounding a 
categorical imperative: human beings and all other rational 
creatures. But this answer, clear though it seems, leads to new 
puzzles. Two of the most intriguing ones are the following 
questions: How can human beings or rational creatures be the ends 
of our actions? Why are they supposed to possess absolute value? I 
will try to sketch Kant's answer to the first question in the 
remainder of this chapter. The second puzzle has led to a 
controversy about whether Kant is really speaking about human 
beings in this passage. He often says that 'humanity' is an end in 
itself, but some interpreters argue that the meaning of this word is 
less obvious than it seems. Especially the expression 'rational 
nature' seems to allow the interpretation that Kant is not speaking 
about the class of all human beings, but of the nature of human 
beings, or more concretely, about the capacity that is essential to 
being human. Depending on which of these interpretations is 
chosen, the answers to the question of why rational nature is 
supposed to be absolutely valuable differ. I will present these 
different interpretations and their attempts to solve the problem of 
the last step in Kant's justification of the Formula of Humanity in 
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the chapters that follow. I will use the word 'rational nature' in the 
following as this expression seems most apt to express both 
interpretations and allows me to stay neutral for the moment.
4.3 Dignity
So far I have presented Kant's argument in the Groundwork that 
there is only one end that can be thought to ground a categorical 
imperative, an end that Kant calls 'rational nature'. Although we do 
not know exactly what Kant meant by this expression, we know 
that it is supposed to refer to an existing individual thing that gives 
us reason for action. But how can an existing thing provide us with 
reasons for action?
One step of Kant's argument had been that the end that grounds a 
categorical imperative cannot be an end that we can bring about 
through our actions, but must be an existing end. The argument 
stresses that any end that can be brought about must be a future 
state and we can never know a priori if some future state is capable 
of motivating every rational being. The same argument seems to 
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apply, though, to any kind of action that is defined by its results. 
Some existing objects that seem valuable in some way require these 
kinds of actions: Useful tools ought to be maintained, tasty apples 
should be reproduced and good books should be multiplied. 
Moreover, existing capacities can be promoted and increased. But 
'to bring about', 'to maintain', 'to reproduce', 'to multiply', 'to 
promote' and many other verbs describe activities that can only be 
said to have been performed if a certain result is achieved.68 Kant 
therefore cannot say that the value of rational nature directly gives 
us reason to reproduce or to promote it because reproduction and 
promotion resemble the act of bringing about in that they are 
directed at the future states of its object and our aiming at such 
future states would, again, presuppose an external or, as Kant 
would say, heteronymous motivation:
'Die vernünftige Natur nimmt sich dadurch vor den übrigen aus, daß sie ihr 
selbst einen Zweck setzt. Dieser würde die Materie eines jeden guten Willens 
sein. Da aber in der Idee eines ohne einschränkende Bedingung (der 
Erreichung dieses oder jenes Zwecks) schlechterdings guten Willens durchaus 
von allem zu bewirkenden Zwecke abstrahirt werden muß (als der jeden 
Willen nur relativ gut machen würde), so wird der Zweck hier nicht als ein zu 
bewirkender, sondern selbstständiger Zweck, mithin nur negativ gedacht 
werden müssen [...].'69
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In this passage Kant concludes from the peculiar nature of the 
value he was looking for that the adequate reaction to this value can 
'only be thought negatively' without any implications concerning its 
future states. All adequate reactions that fulfil this condition are 
grouped together by Kant under the comprehensive name 'respect'. 
The reasons for action that rational nature provides are thus reasons 
to respect rather than to reproduce or to promote it.
To better explain the distinction between respect and other 
reactions to existing valuable entities Kant introduces the further 
distinction between dignity and price. This distinction is based on 
the idea that not every existing object that has value is an end in 
itself that can ground a categorical imperative. Existing entities that 
have a price do not differ much from future states that can be 
brought about because the adequate reactions to them are, as we 
have seen, defined by their results. But Kant offers us a new 
criterion to determine the difference between these reactions and 
the respect that we owe to ends in themselves:
'Im Reiche der Zwecke hat alles entweder einen Preis, oder eine Würde. Was 
einen Preis hat, an dessen Stelle kann auch etwas anderes als Äquivalent 
gesetzt werden; was dagegen über allen Preis erhaben ist, mithin kein 
Äquivalent verstattet, das hat eine Würde. […] Diese Schätzung [durch 
Achtung] giebt also den Werth einer solchen Denkungsart als Würde zu 
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erkennen und setzt sie über allen Preis unendlich weg, mit dem sie gar nicht in 
Anschlag und Vergleichung gebracht werden kann, ohne sich gleichsam an der 
Heiligkeit derselben zu vergreifen.'70
Kant makes it clear in this passage that existing entities that should 
be maintained, reproduced or promoted are comparable in value 
and thus, in principle, replaceable. A useful tool, for example, has 
value in comparison to other tools. If we can replace it by another 
tool that fulfils its function even better than the first one, then it 
significantly loses value and maybe forfeits it entirely. Whatever 
has dignity, in contrast, does not have value in comparison to other 
valuable things, but is, in other words, valuable in itself. To respect 
this kind of value means first of all, to acknowledge that the entity 
has value in itself. We thus have to appreciate that its value does 
not depend on its relation to anything else and that it cannot be 
compared and weighed up against any other valuable state or 
object:
'Achtung, die ich für andere trage, oder die ein Anderer von mir fordern kann 
(observantia aliis praestanda), ist also die Anerkennung einer Würde 
(dignitas) an anderen Menschen, d. i. eines Werths, der keinen Preis hat, 
kein Äquivalent, wogegen das Object der Werthschätzung (aestimii) 
ausgetauscht werden könnte.'71
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For Kant, respect is thus, first of all, an inner act of recognition. 
But once we recognize entities as having the special value called 
'dignity', we will also treat them accordingly. This implies that we 
do not act in ways that somehow imply that these entities have only 
a price that can be compared and weighed up against the value of 
other things. This is typically done, if we do not treat rational 
nature as an end in itself, but only as a means that achieves value 
from its relation to something else. Dignity is thus directly 
connected to the Formula of Humanity:
'Denn der Mensch kann von keinem Menschen (weder von Anderen noch sogar 
von sich selbst) blos als Mittel, sondern muß jederzeit zugleich als Zweck 
gebraucht werden, und darin besteht eben seine Würde.'72
The adequate reaction to the special value that Kant calls 'dignity' is 
thus to refrain from using the bearer of the value as a mere means 
and to treat him always as an end in itself instead. By this 
connection Kant got from his theory of value to one specific variant 
of the categorical imperative, namely the Formula of Humanity. 
To sum up Kant's complex justification of the prohibition against 
using people merely as means, we can distinguish six steps: 1. Kant 
begins his argument by noticing that we presuppose that there is 
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indeed a categorical imperative. 2. He then asks what is necessary 
for such a categorical imperative to exist and concludes that we 
need to have an end that is an end in every situation, an end for 
everybody and an end that can be known a priori. 3. He 
furthermore argues that such an end cannot be a future state, but 
must be an existent object. 4. He believes that there is only one 
such end, namely rational nature. 5. The adequate reaction to this 
existent end is respect and this means that rational nature must be 
recognized as having a value that does not depend on the value of 
anything else and that cannot be estimated by comparing it to the 
value of other valuable states or objects. 6. To treat something as a 
means implies seeing its value as depending on the value of 
something else and respect therefore forces us to treat rational 
nature not merely as a means, but always as an end in itself.
4. Open questions
I have tried to present Kant's justification in a plausible way and I 
think that many of his ideas – his axiological distinctions and the 
idea of dignity, for example – do have a strong intuitive appeal. 
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One might criticise, however, that they do no more than to raise 'an 
obscure feeling of sublimity'73. Although I think that this criticism is 
inadequate, it is indeed true that Kant's remarks leave one puzzled 
about how we get from the idea of humanity as an end in itself to 
concrete moral duties. Generally speaking, we may wonder how 
Kant's justification for the prohibition against using people is 
connected to its scope.
This problem about the justification offered by Kant is also related 
to two problems that I already mentioned. With regard to Kant's 
considerations about the role of the prohibition against using 
people I asked whether it is a misleading feature of Kant's 
terminology that it contains expressions that are ambivalent with 
regard to their moral function or if there is an underlying rationale 
in employing the same expressions in both these roles. Kant's 
justification again points to the importance of our attitudes when he 
says that the fundamental moral value requires us first of all to 
recognize what particular a value it is. Here again we want to 
know, though, how this attitude is connected to the actions that are 
presumed to be forbidden by the prohibition against using people 
merely as means.
At the end of the first section about the scope of Kant's prohibition 
I argued that Kant does not offer us a criterion to tell whether an act 
falls under the prohibition against using people or not. We now see 
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that this problem remains after we have come to know what role 
Kant assigns to this prohibition and how he believes it to be 
justified. I therefore move now to contemporary accounts of using 
people that try to give answers to these questions left open by 
Kant's account of using people.
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IV A Procedural Account of Using People
Although Kant's Formula of Humanity always had its admirers1, it 
did not start to occupy a central position in the theoretical debates of 
Anglo-American philosophy until the 1980s. One of the factors that 
gave rise to a new interest in this part of Kant's philosophy was John 
Rawl's reference to the idea in his arguments against utilitarianism.2 
The idea was taken up in this same role by many other authors, like 
Thomas Nagel, Bernard Williams, Robert Nozick and Ronald 
Dworkin.3 These pioneers did not present their own accounts of what 
it means to use a person, though, but merely alluded to the concept's 
intuitive appeal. The first moral philosophers to present Kant-
inspired, but significantly revised accounts were Onora O'Neill and 
Christine Korsgaard.4 I will therefore present their accounts at some 
length and concentrate again on the scope, the role and the 
justification they assign to the prohibition against using people 
merely as means.
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1. The scope of possible consent
1.1 O'Neill on maxims and valid consent
Onora O'Neill starts her investigation of the notion of using people 
with a general interpretation of the Formula of Humanity and its 
parts. O'Neill complains that the two parts of the Formula – the 
prohibition against using people merely as means and the command 
to treat them as ends in themselves – are often employed with 'little 
distinction between the two'.5 She believes that they differ in content 
and generality. According to her interpretation, we never violate the 
prohibition as long as we comply with the command, but we do not 
necessarily comply with the command if we only take care not to 
violate the prohibition. The command to treat people as ends in 
themselves is thus wider and also more ambitious than the 
prohibition against using people merely as means. O'Neill 
furthermore introduces three classes of duties: those of justice, of 
respect and of love. According to her interpretation, the prohibition 
against using people merely as means covers all duties of justice, i.e. 
all constraints on our interactions with other people. The command 
to treat everybody as an end in itself covers these duties of justice 
plus all duties of respect and all duties of love. Both duties of respect 
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and duties of love differ from duties of justice because to fulfil them 
we cannot abstract from the particular features of our interaction 
partners and 'must take into account “humanity in their person”, i.e., 
their particular capacities for rational and autonomous action'.6 To 
respect other people we must keep ourselves at a distance from them 
and 'recognize that others’ maxims and projects are their maxims 
and projects'. To love each other we must come closer together and 
'recognize the needs particular others have for assistance'.7 These two 
kinds of duties are not covered by the prohibition against using 
people, though, because this prohibition only comprises duties of 
justice and thus 'introduces minimal, but indispensable, requirements 
for coordinating action in a world shared by autonomous beings'.8 
Duties of justice are what Kant calls 'Rechtspflichten' and are 
opposed to the so-called duties of virtue. While duties of virtue 
command that agents adopt ends or act according to maxims that are 
compatible with these ends, duties of justice only prescribe the 
performance or omission of certain types of actions. This distinction 
between duties of justice – or 'duties of right' as I called them – 
differs from Kant's further distinction between perfect and imperfect 
duties. Duties of justice form only a part of the wider category of 
perfect duties.9 O'Neill therefore departs from Kant's understanding 
of the prohibition against using people merely as means as 
comprising all perfect duties. The scope of her prohibition is a little 
narrower and excludes duties towards oneself and duties of respect.
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O'Neill explains her interpretation of the scope of the respective 
parts of the Formula of Humanity by pointing to the following 
passage from Kant's Groundwork:
'The man whom I seek to use for my purpose by such a (false) promise cannot 
possibly agree with my way of behaving to him, and so cannot himself share 
the end of action.'10 (4:429)
It is the first part of this explanation of the wrongness of insincere 
promises, i.e. the idea of possible agreement, that helps O'Neill to 
define what it means to use somebody. The second part of the 
sentence – 'and so cannot himself share the end of action' – on the 
other hand, defines what it means to fail to treat someone as an end 
in itself. Whenever we violate a moral duty, be it one of justice, 
respect or love, we thus pursue a goal that our interaction partner 
cannot share. When we also treat him in a way with which he cannot 
agree, then we violate a duty of a specific class, namely a duty of 
justice, and thereby use him merely as a means. O'Neill therefore 
has a different understanding of Kant's remarks on consent than I did 
in the preceding chapter. She does not employ the idea of consent to 
show how we can legitimize the use of a person, but to define what 
it means to do so. 
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O'Neill does not need a device to distinguish between the 
permissible use and the impermissible use of people because for her 
it is always wrong to use another person. O'Neill does not follow 
Kant in his distinction between using and merely using a person and 
understands the concept of using people to be evaluative in all 
contexts. To use another person means to treat someone in a way she 
cannot agree with and this in itself makes the act wrong. This does 
not mean, of course, that it is wrong in O'Neill's eyes to use a taxi. It 
simply shows that she would not talk of 'using' with regard to such 
interactions, a hesitation that we also found in our common sense 
discourse. 
According to O'Neill, the impossibility of consent is the defining 
feature of using a person. She is therefore very careful about how to 
understand the notion of consent and rules out two possible 
misunderstandings. One might understand the need for consent to 
require no more than asking our partner to say 'yes' or 'no' to the 
proposed interaction. But O'Neill sees two big problems in this naïve 
approach to the requirement for possible consent: First, it is unclear 
what can count as valid consent. In our culture the giving of consent 
is connected to certain forms of external behaviour such as signing a 
contract or saying 'yes' at some point in a ceremony. But not even all 
acts belonging to these clear and conventionalised categories can be 
counted as genuine or valid consent because the agent might not 
understand what he is doing, he might have been deceived about 
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what he is agreeing to or he might act involuntarily because he is 
coerced or threatened. Requiring morally significant consent must 
thus be more than asking for someone to nod or say 'yes'.
O'Neill's second problem is that we have to clarify what we must 
consent to. Every event can be correctly characterised by many 
different descriptions and it is impossible to require that our 
interaction partner must agree to all of them. Some aspects of an 
interaction seem to be generally irrelevant for morally significant 
consent as, for example, the exact time of the interaction, while 
others must surely be included. Imagine the following example:
Drug Dealer: A drug dealer wants to smuggle a bag full of drugs 
over the border. For this purpose he asks a tourist to carry the bag 
over the border for him and tells him that the bag contains pills for 
his sick mother.
This drug dealer cannot claim to have received the tourist's valid 
consent, for example, if he does not tell him that the bag contains 
illegal drugs. To tell him that he would be transporting illegal and 
harmful material is surely a relevant description of the proposed 
interaction. O'Neill therefore asks how we can determine which 
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descriptions are relevant and must be given when asking for consent.
To tackle the problem of the relevant act description O'Neill goes 
back to an idea she proposed ten years earlier with regard to a 
problem in applying the first formula of the Categorical Imperative. 
Kant's Formula of Universal Law requires that we act only in ways 
that can be thought of and wanted as universal laws. But to apply 
this Formula we have to refer to an act with some description and it 
is relevant for its universalizability which of these descriptions we 
choose. If we say, for example, that the protagonist of Nabokov's 
novella The Enchanter marries and cares for the mother in the story, 
we would expect the Categorical Imperative to render his action 
universalizable. If we say that he was treating her merely as a 
means, in contrast, we would all agree that the CI test procedure 
should prohibit his action. But how can we decide which of these 
different descriptions of the same action is relevant? O'Neill's 
answer to this question makes use of the concept of a maxim: It is 
the agent's maxim that is relevant to give a morally significant 
description of his behaviour. In O'Neill's interpretation, maxims are 
'underlying principles, by which subsidiary aspects of action are 
governed and orchestrated'.11 What is relevant for the evaluation of 
an act is thus not any possible description of the act we have to 
decide upon, but the description that guides us if we choose it. 
According to Kant, we think of all our real or potential acts in 
general terms that characterise them as an act of a certain type that I 
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perform with a certain end. We act according to subjective 
principles, i.e. according to what Kant calls a 'maxim'. O'Neill's 
solution to the problem of the relevant act description is therefore to 
suppose that the act description we have to consider is the 
description under which the agent thinks of the act himself. To apply 
the Formula of Universal Law we thus have to try to universalize the 
agent's maxim. And if we ask for the consent of our interaction 
partner to avoid the charge of using him merely as a means, we 
equally have to ask if he can agree to our maxim. 
The second problem that O'Neill discussed with regard to the 
requirement for our interaction partner's consent was the question of 
what conditions have to be fulfilled for her consent to be valid. She 
might say 'Yes' to my offer without giving significant consent to our 
interaction because she did not know what she was agreeing to or 
because she was forced to do so. O'Neill answers the challenge of 
invalid consent by pointing to Kant's characterization of such 
examples as cases where our partner 'cannot possibly agree with my 
way of behaving to him'12. O'Neill emphasises that Kant speaks here 
about possible agreement and not only about the actual performance 
of some external behaviour that is usually associated with the giving 
of consent in our culture. Behaviour like nodding or saying 'Yes' 
only achieves moral relevance if it can express a genuine attitude 
towards the relevant act description, i.e. towards the agent's maxim. 
We thus have to determine under what circumstances an affirmative 
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act can be taken to express an affirmative attitude, i.e. under what 
circumstances genuine consent is possible and valid.
Before O'Neill presents her own solution to this question she rules 
out one misinterpretation of the idea of 'possible consent'. One 
problem with the naïve view that takes every actual sign of consent 
to have the 'magic' to transform a normative relationship is that it is 
insensitive to human agents' vulnerability. People who let a proposal 
through on the nod may be ignorant or confused; they may have 
been deceived or coerced. It thus seems plausible to understand valid 
consent to be the consent of an ideal being that is not vulnerable in 
the same ways. One can then understand the phrase 'it is possible to 
agree to her proposal' to mean that a fully informed and completely 
rational agent would indeed agree to it. This proposal has the merit 
of ruling out many problematic cases of solely deceptive or coercive 
agreements. A fully informed and rational tourist, for example, 
would not consent to the drug dealer's proposal. But this solution 
comes along with significant problems of its own. First, it would 
give us a justification for ignoring someone's actual consent 'in the 
name of higher and more rational selves'.13 I might go around and 
tear cigarettes out of people's mouths, for example, and justify my 
rude interference by saying that rational people would not smoke.14 It 
is also not clear how much a 'fully informed' person must know and 
how 'rational' she has to be for her consent to count as valid. Does 
she have to know all the details of an act and be able to reflect on all 
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possible act descriptions that follow? This omniscience is not only 
impossible among human beings; it is even hard for us to imagine 
how such an ideal agent would decide upon his actions. We thus 
have to construe our ideal agent a bit less ideal and to say what such 
an agent would look like just seems to be our original problem of 
fixing the circumstances for valid consent in a new form. The idea of 
rational consent therefore does not solve our problem.15
O'Neill offers a different interpretation of possible consent. The 
main condition for the genuine and valid consent of our interaction 
partners lies, according to her, in 'making their consent or dissent 
possible, rather than in what they actually consent to or would 
hypothetically consent to if fully rational'.16 To avoid the problem of 
overriding people's actual decisions in the name of ideal agents, 
O'Neill suggests that we understand valid consent to be independent 
of its content. She suggests instead that if somebody needs another 
person's genuine agreement he has to provide the circumstances for 
it. He must ask for consent, of course, but he also has to make sure 
that 'those closely involved or affected by a proposal […] can avert 
or modify the action by withholding consent and collaboration'.17 In 
other words, he must go through a procedure that makes consent 
possible.
There are basically two disturbing factors that can undermine any 
procedure that pretends to achieve another person's agreement and 
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rob it of its morally transformative power:
'The victim of deceit cannot agree to the initiator's maxim, so is used [...]. 
Similarly with a maxim of coercion: victims cannot agree with a coercer's 
fundamental principle or maxim.'18
According to O'Neill, deception and coercion are methods of a kind 
that make it in principle impossible to consent to them. An agent 
who tries to achieve another person's valid consent must make sure 
that he gets to know this person's genuine attitude towards the 
proposed interaction and must therefore dispense with any deceptive 
or coercive means.
With these two solutions in mind we now get a full picture of 
O'Neill's understanding of using people: A uses B, in her account, 
whenever A treats B in a way that makes it impossible for B to 
consent to the maxim that A pursues in his interaction with B.
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1.2 Korsgaard on possible consent
Although Christine Korsgaard developed her account of using 
people independently of Onora O'Neill, both accounts have much in 
common. They actually complement each other as both of them 
make explicit or clearer what has not been said in the other. While 
O'Neill is very careful in distinguishing different forms of consent 
and in elaborating the idea of a maxim that must be consented to, 
Korsgaard develops more clearly the idea of act types that make 
consent impossible.19 Both fundamentally agree, though, that to use a 
person means to treat that person in a way that she cannot consent 
to. This impossibility of consent should not be understood in the 
sense that it would be irrational to agree to the interaction in 
question20, but that the agent did not give his interaction partner a 
chance to express his genuine attitude. O'Neill and Korsgaard can 
thus both be said to defend a procedural account of using people21 
because they argue that to use a person means to fail to provide a 
fair procedure by which that person can shape her interactions with 
others.
Korsgaard and O'Neill furthermore agree that there are basically two 
kinds of action that interfere with the requirement to give people a 
chance to consent to a proposed interaction, namely coercion and 
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deception. Korsgaard makes it very clear in what sense it is 
impossible to consent to coercive and deceptive maxims:
'People cannot assent to a way of acting when they are given no chance to do 
so. The most obvious instance of this is when coercion is used. But it is also 
true of deception: the victim of the false promise cannot assent to it because he 
doesn't know it is what he is being offered. But even when the victim of such 
conduct does happen to know what is going on, there is a sense in which he 
cannot assent to it. Suppose, for example, that you come to me and ask to 
borrow some money, falsely promising to pay it back next week, and suppose 
that by some chance I know perfectly well that your promise is a lie. Suppose 
also that I have the same end you do, in the sense that I want you to have the 
money, so that I turn the money over to you anyway. Now here I have the 
same end that you do, and I tolerate your attempts to deceive me to the extent 
that they do not prevent my giving you the money. Even in this case I cannot 
really assent to the transaction that you propose. […] The nature of the 
transaction is changed. […] My knowledge of what is going on makes it 
impossible for me to accept the deceitful promise in the ordinary way.'22
Korsgaard argues here that it is impossible for a person to agree to a 
maxim of deception for conceptual reasons. If the plan that 
structures your behaviour is to deceive me to get some money, then 
it is conceptually impossible that I agree to it, because if I agree then 
I will not be deceived. The same is true for coercion. If I plan to get 
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rid of my debts by threatening the bank clerk with my gun to give 
me all the money from his cash-box, then he cannot consent to my 
coercive maxim, because I would not be coercing him if he agreed 
to it. Coercion and deception are thus act types that can never be 
consented to, because it is part of their meaning to circumvent the 
interaction partner's will.
Korsgaard's characterization helps her and O'Neill to ward off a 
criticism that has sometimes been levelled against their idea of 
possible consent. These critics argue that it is not only impossible 
for a deceived or a coerced agent to consent to a proposed 
interaction, but equally impossible for a comatose or unconscious 
person to agree to medical treatment. Korsgaard's and O'Neill's 
interpretation of the Formula of Humanity thus seems to imply the 
wrongness of helping unconscious people and this would certainly 
render their account implausible. But Korsgaard can easily reply to 
this objection that, whereas coercion and deception are methods that 
rule out consent conceptually, treating an unconscious person is 
neither a method to bring about an interaction nor is it incompatible 
with the unconscious person's agreement.23 Korsgaard – and, I 
suspect, O'Neill – would argue that it is this conceptual impossibility 
that shows that something is fundamentally wrong with coercive and 
deceptive behaviour and renders any act of consent invalid. A 
person's consent can thus only be morally significant if the agent 
looks for this consent in a way that does not involve any means that 
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is conceptually incompatible with that person's genuine agreement.
Korsgaard also joins O'Neill in her thesis that Kant's prohibition 
against using people covers the class of all duties of justice. She 
argues that all perfect duties arise from our fundamental duty to 
recognize the value of each human being's capacity for autonomous 
choice. This duty has two aspects:
'We are not only forbidden to use another as mere means to our private 
purposes. We are also forbidden to take attitudes toward her which involve 
regarding her as not in control of herself, which is to say, as not using her 
reasons. This latter is the basis of the duties of respect. Respect is violated by 
the vices of calumny and mockery.'24
Whereas the perfect duties of the first kind, i.e. all duties not to use 
another person, belong to the realm of duties of justice, all duties of 
respect are duties of virtue. Korsgaard furthermore agrees that the 
second half of the class of duties of virtue is constituted by our 
imperfect duties of mutual aid and we thus again get a picture of 
morality as consisting of duties of justice, duties of respect and 
duties of love.25 The prohibition against using people covers the first 
section of morality, i.e. all duties of justice. Its scope is thus 
significantly smaller in O'Neill's and Korsgaard's account than it is 
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in Kant's theory. It leaves out all duties of respect such as the 
prohibition of calumny and mockery.26 Their proposal is therefore 
closer to the common sense notion that equally does not consider 
mockery, for example, to be a case of using people. It is still broader 
than the common sense notion, though, because I would be using a 
person, according to O'Neill and Korsgaard, if I insulted her out of 
jealousy and thereby violated a duty of justice. With regard to its 
scope, their revised account is thus in the middle between the 
original Kantian concept and our common sense notion.
2. The prohibition's roles
Kant's Formula of Humanity is intended to be the supreme principle 
of morality. We have already seen that Kant believes it to provide a 
decision-procedure, the reasons for which we should act and a 
scheme for the nature of moral obligation. In addition, the 
Categorical Imperative not only covers the categories of right and 
wrong, but also provides an ideal for individuals as well as for 
human society as a whole.
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Onora O'Neill and Christine Korsgaard generally adopt Kant's 
ambitions, but sometimes lower them and sometimes give them a 
new form. Both stress that moral principles have to be action-
guiding and believe the Formula of Humanity to be successful in 
playing this role. In her early book about the Formula of Universal 
Law O'Neill expresses her opinion, though, that Kant's theory of 
moral worth is very convincing, but that his theory of right is 
contestable.27 In her paper on using people O'Neill changes her 
opinion and now argues that Kant's theory is primarily a theory of 
moral worth and that all judgements about what is right or wrong are 
only derivative.28 The Categorical Imperative therefore does not 
provide a decision-procedure that leads directly to verdicts about the 
permissibility of outwardly characterised act-types, but can only be 
employed indirectly by adding information about the concrete 
context. As we have seen in the preceding chapter, the Formula of 
Universal Law as well as the Formula of Humanity prohibit and 
prescribe only maxims and not acts, so that 'judgements of what is 
obligatory (or merely permissible or forbidden) are made by 
reference to the outward aspects of action that would have been 
required (or compatible or ruled out) by acting on a morally worthy 
maxim in that situation.'29 O'Neill believes, nevertheless, that Kant's 
Formulas can be very helpful in arriving at moral judgements in 
concrete situations and illustrates her claim with regard to examples 
from the areas of sexual relationships and employment conditions.
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The prohibition against using people merely as means is understood 
by O'Neill and Korsgaard to include a special class of duties. The 
so-called duties of justice negatively constrain our behaviour 
towards others and determine the minimal requirements for living 
together in a shared world. But the role of the prohibition is not 
limited to marking the borders between one class of duties and the 
rest of morality in O'Neill's and Korsgaard's eyes. The prohibition 
actually has this limited role in the interpretation of Jens 
Timmermann, for example, who defines 'using persons merely as 
means' as 'violating their rights and interests'.30 The prohibition 
against using people does not give us any reasons for action 
according to this interpretation, because the reasons are provided by 
the rights and the interests of persons. The prohibition only puts the 
duties that flow from these reasons together and provides a label for 
a special class of duties. This class is not held together by the same 
reasons for action, but by the particular strength of the duties it 
includes. O'Neill and Korsgaard, in contrast, believe that the 
prohibition against using people gives us the normative reasons that 
we should follow in action. They would argue that we shall not 
deceive and coerce other people because we would thereby use them 
merely as means. The prohibition thus has not merely a criterial, but 
also a justificatory role in the derivation of concrete duties. This 
does not mean, of course, that the prohibition does not also play the 
roles that Timmermann ascribes to it. It does indeed encompass a 
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class of duties and these duties are special for being stricter than 
other moral duties in O'Neill's and Korsgaard's eyes. They consider 
the prohibition to be absolute, as spelling out 'indispensable'31 
requirements, 'it must never be acted against'32. But the requirements 
have this strength for a uniform reason, namely because their 
violation makes the consent of interaction partners impossible.
Besides showing and justifying a class of strict duties, the 
prohibition against using people merely as means also has a role as a 
normative ideal in Kant's eyes. Although O'Neill and Korsgaard do 
not consider the cases that Kant discusses – rhetorics and selling 
one's hair – they agree that the prohibition provides an 'ideal'.33 They 
understand this ideal function quite differently, though. O'Neill calls 
the prohibition an ideal, but she states at the same time that it 
introduces 'minimal' and 'negative' requirements34 and thereby seems 
to transfer all more ambitious demands to the second part of the 
Formula of Humanity, the command to treat persons as ends in 
themselves. She still has some place for ideals and perfection with 
regard to the formula's first part, though, because she introduces the 
idea that not only individual agents but also social institutions can 
have maxims. Prostitution, for example, cannot be seen as a free 
interaction between consenting adults in our society because there 
are coercive maxims in the institutional context that often involves 
pimping and brothel-keeping.35 Similarly there is often deception 
involved in employment relations, though it is 'deception without an 
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individual deceiver'.36 Getting rid of these institutional forms of 
coercion and deception is not a duty of particular individuals, but a 
common task for society, and the progress in the abolition of such 
institutions will often be gradual. The aim of changing the 
institutions that follow objectionable maxims can thus be understood 
to be an ideal that follows from the prohibition against using people.
Korsgaard argues, in contrast, that the prohibition against using 
people merely as means is a moral principle that clearly sorts out 
certain forms of behaviour. It is even stricter than the Formula of 
Universal Law as it absolutely prohibits lying and suicide, for 
example.37 O'Neill seems to understand 'ideals' to be aims that are 
morally desirable, but that cannot be reduced to individual duties of 
individual agents. The 'rigorism' that the prohibition against using 
people has in Korsgaard's eyes prevents it being understood as an 
ideal in this sense. Korsgaard says, nevertheless, that the prohibition 
is based on an 'attractive ideal of human relations'38 because she 
understands it to be an ideal in the sense that we can only expect 
agents to comply with it under ideal circumstances, i.e. in a world 
where we do not have to deal with evil brought about by other 
agents.
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3. Justifying the prohibition
Onora O'Neill does not tell us much about a possible justification for 
the prohibition against using people merely as means. She makes it 
clear, however, that she shares Kant's conviction that it is the 
autonomy of persons that lies at the heart of morality and points to 
the connection between autonomy and the prohibition against using 
people:
'Not to treat others as means introduces minimal, but indispensable, 
requirements for coordinating action in a world shared by autonomous beings, 
namely that nobody act in ways others cannot possibly consent to, so in 
principle precluding their autonomous action.'39
It is thus wrong to use a person because we thereby prevent or 
interfere with her acting autonomously. Korsgaard agrees with this 
strategy of justification, but is far more explicit about it. She 
analyses Kant's argument for the Formula of Humanity and provides 
a very influential constructivist interpretation of it. In contrast to 
O'Neill, Korsgaard refers directly to Kant's theory of value and looks 
there for a justification of the prohibition against using people.
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What Korsgaard stresses most about Kant's theory of value is the 
discovery of the conditionality of most value. Many of the things 
that people deem valuable owe their value to something else. But not 
all value can be conditional and there must be something with 
unconditional or absolute value that is the source of all the 
conditional value in the world. This unconditional value can be 
detected in Korsgaard's eyes by Kant's analytic or regressive 
method, according to which an inquiry into the conditions of 
conditional value 'should lead us eventually to what is 
unconditioned'.40
The starting points for the search for unconditional value are usually 
things that we like or want. But if we reflect upon whether these 
things are absolutely valuable, we detect that their value depends on 
our valuing them:
'The objects of inclination are in themselves neutral: we are not attracted to 
them by their goodness; rather their goodness consists in their being the 
objects of human inclination.'41
The value of our objects of inclination is conditional as it depends 
on our liking or wanting them. But what about our inclinations 
themselves, can't they be seen as absolutely valuable? Korsgaard 
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argues that this cannot be true. Although she does not agree with 
Kant's statement that our inclinations are 'so lacking in absolute 
value that the universal wish of every rational being must be indeed 
to free himself completely from them'42 (4:428), she sticks to the 
weaker thesis that some of our inclinations are even seen by 
ourselves as tiresome and odd. We only have to remember 
Frankfurt's clear-sighted drug-addict who hates himself for being 
drawn to drugs to confirm this line of argument.43 What distinguishes 
habitual cravings from our 'good' inclinations is that we choose to 
act on the latter ones. The value of inclinations is therefore 
conditional too, because it depends on our choice to accept them as 
motives of action.
We have now arrived at the step that Korsgaard considers to be 
crucial. If we were asked what we consider valuable, we would give 
a list of our objects of desire and when asked what is valuable about 
them many of us will answer that they are valuable because we 
desire them. Korsgaard's considerations have shown, though, that we 
can take neither our objects of desire nor our desire itself as 
unconditional sources of value. The same considerations have 
shown, on the other hand, that there is one candidate left for the 
source of value:
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'Since we still do make choices and have the attitude that what we choose is 
good in spite of our incapacity to find the unconditioned condition of the 
object's goodness [...], it must be that we are supposing that rational choice 
itself makes its object good. […] Rational choice has what I will call value-
conferring status.'44
According to Korsgaard, all value in the world comes about by the 
transferral of value from rational choices to objects and events. 
People do not, in general, reflect upon this conferral of value, but we 
all act as if our rational choice had this power. The attitude that our 
choices are sources of value is 'built into rational action'.45
In his Formula of Humanity Kant demands that we treat humanity as 
an end in itself and never merely as a means. As I mentioned in the 
preceding chapter it is natural to understand 'humanity' to refer to the 
class of all human beings in this context. But Korsgaard points to 
Kant's remark that 'the power to set an end – any end whatsoever – is 
the characteristic of humanity'46 and understands him to mean that we 
should treat our capacity to set ends 47as an end in itself and never 
merely as a means.48 With this interpretation in mind, we can see 
how Korsgaard links her understanding of the prohibition against 
using people with her justification of Kant's formula: Rational 
choice is the source of all value and it would therefore be irrational 
to undermine this source of value by employing methods to secure 
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interaction with other rational beings that are incompatible with the 
use of this capacity. One fundamental way of using our capacity to 
set ends is to consent to the interactions that others propose to us. 
Deception and coercion prevent us from consenting as they are 
conceptually incompatible with consent. This consideration 
therefore prohibits all kinds of deception and coercion as these 
forms of interaction pursue conditionally valuable goals by 
preventing the use of a capacity that is the source of these very 
goals.
Korsgaard thus offers a solution to the problem that we detected in 
Kant's account, namely of determining how we get from the idea of 
humanity as an end in itself to concrete moral duties. She 
understands 'humanity' as referring to our rational capacities and 
thus interprets the Formula of Humanity as prohibiting the 
obstruction of these capacities. Our rationality manifests 
fundamentally through determining the course of events by 
assenting to other people's proposals for interaction. All methods 
that try to bring about an interaction by circumventing this capacity 
to consent are thus wrong according to Korsgaard's account. But this 
attractive solution comes with significant problems of its own.
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4. Problems
A first problem for O'Neill's and Korsgaard's account becomes 
obvious when we compare their definition of the prohibition against 
using people with their claim that it covers all duties of justice. They 
understand all interactions that come about through methods that are 
conceptually incompatible with the free consent of their interaction 
partners to be cases of using people. This reading of the prohibition 
is neatly illustrated with regard to coercion and deception. A person 
who is deceived or coerced cannot assent to the interaction, because 
a maxim such as 'I will deceive you to get some money' cannot be 
realised when the interaction partner consents to it. It remains 
unclear, however, if there are any more methods that similarly rule 
out consent conceptually. I think one more such method can be seen 
in how the protagonist of Nabokov's novella The Enchanter plans to 
abuse the girl: 
'We shall live far away, now in the hills, now by the sea, in a hothouse warmth 
where savage-like nudity will automatically become habitual, perfectly alone 
(no servants!), seeing no one, just the two of us in an eternal nursery, and thus 
any remaining sense of shame will be dealt its final blow. There will be 
constant merriment, pranks, morning kisses, tussles on the shared bed 
[…].Yet, precisely because during the first two years or so the captive would 
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be ignorant of the temporarily noxious nexus between the puppet in her hands 
and the puppet-master's panting, between the plum in her mouth and the 
rapture of the distant tree, he would have to be particularly cautious, not to let 
her go anywhere alone, make frequent changes of domicile (the ideal would be 
a mini-villa in a blind garden), keep a sharp eye out lest she make friends with 
other children or have occasion to start chatting with the woman from the 
greengrocer's.'49
The enchanter does not really try to coerce or deceive the girl, but 
his disgusting method seems equally incompatible with the girl's 
free consent. Manipulation might be a good name for this kind of 
forming people for one's own ends. Manipulation makes consent 
impossible and can therefore be easily integrated into O'Neill's and 
Korsgaard's framework. But are there any more methods? If not, 
then O'Neill and Korsgaard have to be able to describe all duties of 
justice as cases of coercion, deception or manipulation. Some cases 
raise a problem for this project: Imagine a husband who kills his 
wife out of jealousy, remember the car driver who shouts abuse at a 
cyclist or think of a sniper who randomly shoots at a crowd. I think 
it is clear that these agents violate moral constraints on how we 
interact with other people and thus violate duties of justice. It seems 
implausible, though, to describe their wrongs as coercion, deception 
or manipulation. O'Neill and Korsgaard therefore cannot satisfy their 
claim of characterising all duties of justice.
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The following reply might seem to be open to O'Neill and 
Korsgaard: Although it is not usual to call examples like those 
described above cases of coercion, it is not too great a widening of 
natural language to say that these cases all involve some form of 
brute force and are therefore coercive in character. This not unusual 
widening of natural language50 is not available to O'Neill and 
Korsgaard, though. To kill a person intentionally or to shoot 
randomly at a crowd can be described as coercive actions, perhaps, 
but such use of brute force is not conceptually incompatible with the 
consent of the interaction partners. When O'Neill and Korsgaard 
argue that coercion follows maxims that cannot be assented to, they 
have coercive proposals in mind and their analysis only works with 
this form of coercion. If they expand the notion of coercion to 
comprise the use of brute force as well, then they can no longer 
claim that coercion is generally incompatible with the consent of 
their interaction partners. It is unlikely that my wife will agree to my 
killing her out of jealousy, but it is not conceptually ruled out.51
A second problem results from O'Neill's and Korsgaard's absolute 
understanding of the prohibition against using people merely as 
means. It is always wrong, according to this understanding, to coerce 
or deceive other people, but this leads us to the notorious murderer 
at the door: In his short essay On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from 
Benevolent Motives Kant defended the view that we never have a 
right to lie to others even if we know that the person we lie to wants 
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to kill one of our friends and knocks at our door asking where this 
friend is. The implausible verdict that even here it is wrong to 
deceive intentionally seems to be a consequence of O'Neill's and 
Korsgaard's account and, arguably, also of Kant's own theory. 
Korsgaard will answer this objection, though, by pointing to her 
interpretation of Kantian ethics as a 'double-level theory': Kant 
provides rules for an ideal and for a non-ideal world simultaneously, 
according to this interpretation, and Korsgaard considers the 
prohibition against using people merely as means as belonging to the 
ideal part of the theory. This implies that it would always be wrong 
to lie in an ideal world, but that it is allowed in our world, because in 
this world we have to deal with 'circumstances of very great natural 
or moral evil'52 such as murderers at our doors.
This interesting reply does not solve the problem entirely for 
Korsgaard, though, as there are also benevolent lies of the following 
sort:
Christmas: In December Ron and Jill are doing some shopping. Jill 
gets enthusiastic about a scarf but doesn’t buy it. Half an hour later 
Ron pretends that he forgot something. But in fact he goes back to 
the shop and buys the scarf as a Christmas present for Jill.
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Ron deceives Jill by telling her that he forgot something, but he is 
clearly not doing anything wrong. Moreover, it is not convincing to 
argue that Ron's deception is only a means to deal with evil in a non-
ideal world. Even an ideal world may contain Christmas presents.
Korsgaard might reply to this objection that it is bad philosophy to 
try to argue against an otherwise plausible theory by pointing to one 
isolated example that it is not compatible with it. Some examples are 
easily recognizable as exceptions and should not be used as 
arguments. This methodological consideration may seem to be 
correct with regard to surprises such as presents or parties that can 
be regarded as mere exceptions from otherwise valid rules. I am 
very sympathetic to this kind of argument, but it does not save 
O'Neill and Korsgaard. Look at the following case, similar to one 
presented by Derek Parfit53:
Sacrifice: You are diving with a friend under water at considerable 
depth and you notice that your friend's oxygen cylinder is leaking. 
You know that the oxygen that is left in your cylinder will only 
suffice for one person. You therefore swap the cylinder with your 
friend and tell him that you want to stay a little longer and that he 
should return to the boat first. You stay with his almost empty bottle 
and await death.
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This is another example of a benevolent lie, but this example does 
not involve any special social institution such as gift-giving or 
surprise parties. It therefore shows that the plausibility of Christmas 
and other such examples does not merely hinge on rare and special 
circumstances. There are diverse cases of benevolent deceptions and 
a moral theory should avoid the implication that all deceptions are 
morally wrong.
My third objection is aimed at Korsgaard's strategy of justifying the 
categorical imperative. Korsgaard managed to establish a relation 
between the scope of the prohibition against using people – at least 
if we take this scope to comprise coercion and deception and nothing 
else – but this relation does not sound plausible to me. If the mother 
in Nabokov's novella The Enchanter were to find out what the 
enchanter was planning to do with her, she would complain, 
according to Korsgaard's account, that he did not recognize the value 
of rationality and thus undermines the source of all value. But it does 
not seem likely that this is what she will criticise. It is much more 
likely that she will be disgusted about his disrespecting her – not to 
mention his plans with regard to her daughter. Korsgaard does not 
seem to be able to take this kind of indignation into account. To be 
sure, the justification that a moral theory offers for its principles will 
very often differ from the justifications that people would give when 
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asked why they are angry or indignant. But Korsgaard's justification 
seems to differ in kind from anything that people might consider as a 
possible rationale for their moral feelings. The wronged party in 
Korsgaard's justification is ultimately rationality as an abstract 
entity. She cannot be talking about the rational capacities of 
individual persons, because nobody's individual capacities are the 
source of value of all other things. Korsgaard's argument for the 
value of humanity only works with regard to rationality per se and I 
cannot see how we get from this abstract entity to the reasons that 
we come up with when we criticise the wrongs done to individual 
persons.
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V An Attitudinal Account of Using People
Attitudinal accounts of using people do not simply argue that to use 
a person is to have an attitude. They assume, though, that to have 
some kind of attitude is part of the meaning of this expression. 
Furthermore, they believe that this relation with an agent's attitude 
prevents the expression being thought of as providing a reason for 
the wrongness of acts. The accounts that understand the expression 
as the ascription of an attitude are therefore mostly negative in 
character. Its main representatives, Derek Parfit and Thomas 
Scanlon, primarily present arguments against the procedural account 
of using people. Their positive statements about the attitude they 
believe to be expressed give a direction but still await elaboration.
1. Parfit on means and attitudes
Derek Parfit rejects O'Neill's and Korsgaard's account of using 
people, partly for the reasons presented in the following chapter. He 
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adds the further and more general objection that their account 
misrepresents the role that the idea of merely using people actually 
has. He believes that the phrase 'merely as a means' has an ordinary 
sense 'that is fairly clear and, morally significant'1 and that Kant 
aimed to capture this ordinary sense in his moral theory. O'Neill and 
Korsgaard fail to do justice to the notion's ordinary sense, because 
they employ it to spell out an absolute side-constraint on human 
actions. The common concept of using people is not able to fulfil 
this role and therefore does a bad job when employed in this way. 
According to Parfit, the concept itself is a good actor, but O'Neill 
and Korsgaard cast it badly. 
For a sentence of the form 'A uses B merely as a means' to be true, 
two conditions must be fulfilled in Parfit's analyses. First, A must 
use B, i.e. A must make any use of B's abilities, activities, or other 
features to help him to achieve some aim.2 Second, A must regard B 
as a mere tool, i.e. he ignores B's wellbeing and moral claims and 
would treat B in whatever ways would best achieve his ends. 
Sentences of the above type thus express hybrid assertions reporting 
an act and ascribing an attitude at the same time. Parfit then asks if 
an act that fits this definition can be said to be morally 
impermissible because it fits it. He thus asks if the concept of using 
people as he understands it can fulfil the role it was suggested to 
play by O'Neill and Korsgaard. He comes to a negative conclusion. 
As a first step in his argument Parfit looks at his own definition of 
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the expression 'A uses B merely as a means'. An utterance of this 
expression reports an act and ascribes an attitude at the same time. If 
we look at the act description alone – 'A uses B' – we see that it 
cannot provide a reason for this act's wrongness because many uses 
are morally permissible, as, for example, when I use you as a ladder 
by standing on your shoulders.3 If we then turn to the attitude – 'A 
regards B as a tool' – we equally have to conclude that it does not 
render any act wrong. A gangster, for example, might regard most 
other people as mere tools and be willing to injure them whenever it 
benefits him. But when a gangster with this attitude enters a coffee 
shop and buys a cup of coffee in the way most of us do because 
stealing is not worth the trouble this time, he may regard the coffee 
seller merely as a means, but he does not act wrongly.4 Both 
conditions of Parfit's analysis of the expression 'A uses B merely as 
a means' therefore do not give us reasons that explain the wrongness 
of acts. Neither do both conditions taken together, i.e. when a person 
is used merely as a means, as the following somewhat artificial 
example is meant to illustrate:
Gangster in wreckage: The gangster and his child are trapped in 
slowly collapsing wreckage, which threatens both their lives. The 
child is the only being the gangster really cares about. He cannot 
save the child's life except by using another person's body as a shield 
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in a way that will hurt the other person slightly. The gangster has, of 
course, no problem with using this person. He does so and thereby 
saves his child. The other person is fine except for a few scratches.5
The gangster in this example fulfils all the conditions for using a 
person merely as a means: He uses the other person and he regards 
him as a mere tool. Parfit argues, though, that intuitively speaking 
the gangster does nothing wrong. We actually have to accept this 
verdict, it seems, if we agree that we would not blame a mother who 
is morally “normal” and does the same for her child. If we share 
Parfit's intuitions, we then have a case where a person is used merely 
as a means, but the agent does nothing wrong. The fact that anyone 
uses another person merely as a means therefore cannot be the 
reason for the act's wrongness.
Parfit's argument and his examples invite many further questions. 
Above all, one may suspect that Parfit's conclusion hinges on his 
particular definition of what it means to use a person merely as a 
means. It is not obvious that using people always involves the 
attitude that Parfit calls 'to regard a person as a tool'. But Parfit can 
actually admit that there may be better definitions of the phrase 'to 
use someone merely as a means'. He has to insist, though, that all 
definitions of the phrase will involve a reference to some attitude. 
Parfit argues for this conclusion by pointing to two features of our 
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common sense concept. First, the relation between saying that A 
uses B merely as a means and the wrongness of acts is a gradual one. 
Parfit discusses the example of a slave-owner who allows his slaves 
to rest during the hottest hour of the day.6 Such a person certainly 
uses his slaves merely as means, but he cannot be said to ignore his 
slaves’ wellbeing completely. Other slave owners may be even more 
'generous' and grant their slaves two hours of rest or care about 
decent food and shelter. All these people merely use their slaves, but 
they do so in different degrees. According to Parfit this is due to the 
fact that they all have the same attitude and differ only in its 
strictness.
That the mere use of a person is always related to an agent's attitude 
can furthermore be seen in the fact that the sentence 'On this 
occasion, in acting as he did, he treated her merely as a means' 
sounds unnatural and its content is unclear.7 The unnatural air of this 
sentence reveals that the expression 'he treats her merely as a means' 
does not refer solely to a single act, but is made true partly by how 
the agent would act in counterfactual situations. Parfit makes this 
clear by comparing two scientists, both of whom use laboratory 
animals in their research and employ the method that is most 
effective with regard to the knowledge they wish to acquire. As a 
matter of fact this method causes their animals no pain. But whereas 
the first scientist would use another method, if the first method did 
cause pain, the second would use it whatever happened to the 
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animals. Parfit argues that we would say that the second scientist, 
but not the first one uses the animals merely as means. As both 
scientists in fact perform the same acts our use of the expression 
must depend on counterfactual features and thus expresses 'our 
underlying attitudes and policies'.8
Parfit tries to show by his examples that the particular attitude that 
he calls 'to regard a person as a mere tool' cannot render an act 
wrong. But he thereby also suggests two general arguments against 
the thesis that attitudes can be relevant to the wrongness of acts. The 
first one refers to the notion of degrees of use. All the slave-owners 
mentioned above seem to come sufficiently close to a strict attitude 
to deserve our blame. In many other cases of using people it will be 
unclear, though, if the act in question is wrong because it is unclear 
how close is close enough to the mere use of a person. It follows that 
when we call someone's behaviour 'wrong' for being the mere use of 
a person 'this kind of wrongness is a matter of degree'9. But then it is 
a peculiar kind of wrongness and is not the kind of wrongness we 
are talking about when we ask if someone's behaviour is 
permissible. Permissibility cannot be a matter of degree, because 
'permissible' and 'impermissible' form a pair of contradictory 
opposites without a grey area in between.10 Parfit concludes that the 
statement 'A uses B merely as a means' does not give a reason for 
the wrongness of acts in the relevant sense.
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Parfit's second argument refers to the counterfactual implications of 
the statement that A uses B merely as a means. He argues that if we 
ascribe an attitude to a person, we make a dispositional statement in 
the form that if an event of a certain kind takes place, this person 
will react in a certain way under adequate circumstances. We may 
sometimes justify this statement with regard to one particular event, 
but we believe that we are making a claim about other future or 
merely possible situations as well. All attitude ascriptions imply 
counterfactual assumptions. But the question of whether an act is 
wrong, must depend on how we really act in this particular situation 
and cannot depend on how we would act in some future or merely 
possible situation. The wrongness of an act therefore cannot depend 
on the attitude of the agent.
If we follow Parfit's arguments thus far, he has already shown what 
he wanted, namely that the fact that A uses B merely as a means 
cannot explain the wrongness of A's act. But Parfit considers a 
further objection to his account. He admits that one may criticise 
that his account cannot be right and point to examples such as the 
following one:
Bridge: A driverless, runaway train is heading for a tunnel. In the 
tunnel five people are working who will be killed if the train runs 
on. Person A is a bystander and has only one chance to stop the 
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train: There is one other person B standing on a bridge above the 
track. A opens a trap-door, so that B falls in front of the train and 
triggers its automatic brake.
Parfit's critics may argue that A clearly uses B merely as a means 
and that this would still be the case if A were willing to jump in 
front of the train himself if he were in a position to do so. The 
question of whether A uses B merely as a means therefore must be 
independent of A's attitude. Parfit answers these critics by saying 
that they confuse two different moral principles: The Mere Means 
Principle claims that it is wrong to treat anyone merely as a means 
or come close to doing that. Parfit has already tried to show that this 
principle is false. The principle that we are actually applying in 
judging cases like Bridge is the Harmful Means Principle according 
to which it is wrong to impose harm on someone as a means of 
achieving some aim. Parfit does not seem to reject this second 
principle. The confusion of the two principles is possible because of 
the double meaning of the word 'means' that I mentioned in the third 
chapter. The word 'means' can be used with regard to events or with 
regard to individual objects. Our studying law can be our means of 
becoming a lawyer or a racket can be our means of playing tennis. 
When we say 'A uses B merely as a means' we might mean that A 
really treats the other person B merely as a means or we might want 
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to say that A's interaction with B is a means to achieve some further 
aim. The sentence in the first sense ascribes an attitude to A and is 
the basis of the Mere Means Principle. The sentence in the second 
sense becomes relevant when the interaction is harmful and we ask 
ourselves if A's end justifies the harmful means. This idea is the 
basis of the Harmful Means Principle and is independent of the 
agent's attitude. When people say that in Bridge A uses B merely as 
a means they really mean that A's interaction with B is a means – 
arguably an unjustified one – to save the five workers. They do not 
mean that A treats the other person B merely as a means as this 
would always involve a statement about A's attitude towards B.
Parfit rejects O'Neill's and Korsgaard's claim that Kant's prohibition 
against using people merely as means plays a criterial and 
explanatory role in our judgements about the wrongness of acts. 
Parfit believes instead that Kant's prohibition is a prohibition of 
attitudes that guides our judgements about the moral quality of 
agents or the moral worth of their acts, but not about any act's 
wrongness. That does not mean that Parfit finds Kant's theory 
useless as a theory of right and wrong.11 Parfit accepts a principle 
from Kant that is not really part of the Formula of Humanity, but 
taken from remarks that Kant makes about the application of the 
Formula, actually the same remarks that O'Neill and Korsgaard find 
most important:
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'He whom I want to use for my own purposes with such a promise cannot 
possibly agree to my way of treating him' (4:429-430)
We have seen already that O'Neill and Korsgaard understand this 
passage to say that we should not employ methods in our interaction 
with others that conceptually preclude their agreement. Both argue 
that we shall not understand the words 'possibly agree' in the sense 
of 'could agree if perfectly informed and rational' as this would 
legitimize our ignoring the autonomous will of concrete individuals. 
Parfit proposes an interpretation of the term that comes close to the 
understanding that O'Neill and Korsgaard reject:
'It is wrong to treat people in any way to which they could not rationally 
consent in the act-affecting sense, if these people knew the relevant facts, and 
we gave them the power to choose how we treat them.'12
Parfit believes this principle to play the same roles that O'Neill and 
Korsgaard ascribe to the Formula of Humanity: It plays a criterial 
and an explanatory role in determining the wrongness of acts and it 
furthermore provides an ideal for our relations with other human 
beings.13
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2. Scanlon's development of Parfit's account
Even if we accept all of Parfit's manoeuvres to defend his account, 
some serious problems remain. Thomas Scanlon's theory of using 
people refers to Parfit's account at several points and improves some 
of its shortcomings. I therefore want to present it by considering 
various objections to Parfit and by showing how Scanlon tries to 
solve them.
2.1 Kant and common sense
Parfit claims to present an idea of using people that we can find in 
common sense as well as in Kant's moral theory. This claim is very 
ambitious, especially in view of the fact that the common sense 
account and Kant's account differ significantly, as we have seen. But 
Kant does indeed accept various elements from common sense and 
claims to present an account that reflects the 'popular moral 
wisdom'14 and is close to 'sensation and emotion'15. O'Neill and 
Korsgaard similarly believe that they present an intuitive and 
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Kantian account and it does not come as a surprise that Parfit makes 
this claim as well. But whereas common sense, Kant, O'Neill and 
Korsgaard all believe that the idea of using people can help us to 
explain the wrongness of acts, it is this very role that Parfit says it 
cannot play. He argues instead that the idea of using people provides 
us with an ideal of how human beings should regard one another. 
The ascription of this new role makes it very hard for Parfit to 
continue to claim that he presents an account that fits both common 
sense and Kant's Formula of Humanity. Scanlon, in contrast, 
distinguishes quite clearly between Kant's account and the common 
sense concept of using people. He stresses that Kant considers his 
Formula of Humanity as stating the fundamental principle of 
morality, whereas 'the charge, “You were just using me!” has 
particular moral force, and it seems appropriate in response to some 
wrongs but not to others.'16
Although Scanlon criticises several aspects of Kant's moral theory – 
especially the idea of the value-conferring status of rational choice 
that Korsgaard ascribes to Kant17 – he nevertheless believes that 
Kant's Formula of Humanity can be read as a plausible, very general 
moral principle. Scanlon adapts Kant's distinction between 
conditional and unconditional value and argues that it can be 
understood as mainly distinguishing between derivative and non-
derivative reasons. Some entities in the world are genuine sources of 
reason, i.e. they provide us directly with reasons for action. Some 
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other entities provide us with reasons only derivatively, 'that is to 
say only insofar as the reasons are provided by something else'18. 
Rational beings are non-derivative sources of reasons, but not in the 
sense that they create reasons through their rational choices, 
according to Scanlon, but in the sense that they give us reasons to 
restrict our behaviour towards them. We have to see rational beings 
as genuine sources of such reasons and we have to avoid all actions 
that are 'incompatible with the idea of rational beings as ends in 
themselves'19. Scanlon does not present an argument, but he tells us 
that this restriction basically means that we should 'act only in ways 
that others could not reasonably refuse to authorize'. He believes that 
this general idea plays 'a fundamental role in our moral thinking' and 
is the common basis of the moral principles proposed by Kant, by 
Derek Parfit and by Scanlon himself.20
So far Scanlon's proposal does not seem to differ much from 
O'Neill's and Korsgaard's general interpretation of Kant's Formula of 
Humanity. All three believe that Kant offers an attractive moral 
principle that is based on a distinction between different kinds of 
values and that requires respect for another person's authority to 
refuse an interaction. One first difference consists in Scanlon's 
understanding of this authority. Whereas O'Neill and Korsgaard 
stress the authority of the individual and imperfect person, Scanlon 
joins Parfit in requiring rational consent for an interaction to be 
legitimate. A second difference becomes apparent if we look at the 
Paulus Kaufmann – Using People       188
roles that the general moral principle is meant to play. Scanlon 
characterizes this role in the following way:
'The various formulas I have just mentioned characterize, in a very abstract 
way, the distinction between permissible and impermissible action.'21
Kant's Formula of Humanity, Parfit's Consent Principle and 
Scanlon's Contractualist Formula thus tell us what it is to say that an 
act is wrong or impermissible. This sounds like they are aiming at a 
definition of the word 'wrong'. But Scanlon makes it clear in his 
earlier book What we owe to each other that this is not what he 
means:
'People who hold noncontractualist views about moral wrongness would agree 
with contractualists that to call an action morally wrong is to say that it 
violates important standards of conduct and is therefore open to serious 
criticism. Perhaps this much is part of the meaning of these terms. But holders 
of these different views disagree about what these standards are and about 
what it is that makes them authoritative.'22
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Scanlon expects a moral theory to characterize the property of moral 
wrongness, but not as a definition of the word 'wrong'. A common 
meaning of the word must be presupposed to understand all these 
theories as theories of the same thing. What the theories quarrel 
about is the 'sense', 'nature' or 'essence' of wrongness.23 This essence 
comprises the standards of wrongness and their authority. Now, the 
expression 'standards of wrongness' might be understood as looking 
for the properties that make acts wrong. The general accounts of 
morality would thus presuppose a common meaning of 'wrong', but 
they would differ with regard to the conditions under which actions 
have that property. But this is also not what Scanlon is expecting of 
a general account of morality:
'While one aim of my contractualist account is to give a general criterion of 
wrongness that explains and links these more specific wrong-making 
properties, this is not the only, or even its chief, aim. It also aims to 
characterize wrongness in a way that makes clear what reasons wrongness 
provides, and this aim goes beyond saying ‚what makes acts wrong,’ at least 
on the most natural reading of these words. [...] It therefore seems to me that 
contractualism and these other views are better described as rival accounts of 
the property of moral wrongness itself, rather than as differing accounts of the 
conditions under which actions have that property.'24
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Scanlon sees himself as being in disagreement with other moral 
theories with regard to the question of how wrongness provides 
reasons for action and what kinds of reasons these are. He does not 
believe that these theories give a list or a procedure to detect the 
reasons that make acts wrong and he does not offer such a list or 
procedure himself. The roles of moral theory considered by Scanlon 
are rather similar to the roles that I have so far called the 'criterial' 
and the 'transcendental' role of moral principles. He thus offers – and 
believes Kant and Parfit to offer – 'a characterization of certain 
standards by which […] the rightness and wrongness of actions 
should be judged'25 and an explanation of why the property of being 
wrong provides a reason for omitting certain acts. A general moral 
principle does not directly offer us the properties that make acts 
wrong and therefore plays no direct explanatory role. But such a 
principle 'explains and links these more specific wrong-making 
properties' and thereby indirectly influences our view of what makes 
our actions right or wrong.
With the help of these considerations we now see a further point of 
disagreement between Scanlon and Parfit on the one hand and 
O'Neill and Korsgaard on the other. Whereas O'Neill and Korsgaard 
believe Kant's Formula of Humanity to provide reasons for action 
directly, Scanlon and Parfit deny that this formula can play such an 
explanatory role. Scanlon is more generous in his judgement about 
the possible tasks for Kant's Formula, though, when he argues that it 
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can play a criterial and a transcendental role. 
2.2 Attitudes and reasons
I have defended Parfit against the charge that his arguments depend 
entirely on his particular definition of the phrase 'to treat someone 
merely as a means'. His arguments have some force against all 
accounts that take this phrase to express an attitude. But it is not 
clear that attitudinal interpretations of this phrase and related 
expressions are the most convincing ones. Parfit's evidence for the 
attitudinal interpretation is the presumed observation that it is 
unnatural to say 'On this occasion, in acting as he did, he treated her 
merely as a means'26. This hypothesis about natural language has 
some plausibility if we take into account the further observation that 
using people typically takes place within relationships of some 
length and not only through singular interactions, as is the case with 
the enchanter who marries the woman to obtain custody over her 
daughter or with the young woman who dates a man in order to 
become pregnant by him. But Parfit's general thesis is nevertheless 
wrong. Imagine the following example:
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Drug Dealer: A drug dealer wants to smuggle a bag full of drugs 
over the border. For this purpose he asks a tourist to carry the bag 
over the border for him and tells him that the bag contains pills for 
his sick mother.
It seems clear to me that it is not unnatural to say that the drug dealer 
uses the tourist. Moreover, Parfit cannot argue with regard to this 
example that the intuition that the drug dealer merely uses the tourist 
as a means is due to a confusion of means as events with means as 
individual objects. The drug dealer does not harm the tourist as a 
means to achieve a goal because he does not harm the tourist at all. 
He rather seems to treat him as a means. We therefore use the 
expression 'to merely use a person' and its relatives in singular 
situations and not (only) to denote an attitude.27
The phrase 'to use somebody' is a thick description, though, i.e. it 
always contains reference to some intention. An intention is not an 
attitude28, but it is a mental state that seems to be related to attitudes 
somehow. One could therefore try to adapt Parfit's argumentation 
strategy and look for similar arguments with regard to intentions. 
Scanlon indeed seems to make this attempt. He speaks about an 
agent's intentions or reasons for action and tries to show that the 
wrongness of acts cannot depend on the actual reasons for which the 
agent acts.
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Scanlon dedicates his whole book Moral Dimensions to the rejection 
of the popular claim that it is (often) an agent's intention that makes 
an act wrong. Scanlon does not offer one straight argument against 
this claim, but instead discusses various examples and some general 
considerations that seem to speak in favour of the claim and tries to 
show that he can offer a better explanation of the intuitions behind 
them.29 The idea that A's using B merely as a means makes his act 
wrong is one of the examples he discusses.
Scanlon also refers primarily to Korsgaard's understanding of using 
people and agrees with Parfit that one problem with her account is 
that it seems to prohibit deception and coercion under all 
circumstances, although there are cases where deception and 
coercion are clearly permissible. Scanlon analyses a possible reply 
by Korsgaard, though, that Parfit did not consider and that prevents 
this implausible consequence. Korsgaard could argue that it is not 
always wrong to deceive or coerce a person, but only if we use that 
person. We would thus understand her as saying that if you are 
trying to gain from another person's presence or participation30 then 
you are not allowed to do so by deceiving or coercing that person.31 
This reply rules out all the examples of benevolent deception that 
have been presented against O'Neill's and Korsgaard's account 
because in these cases the deceived person is not used in the relevant 
sense.
Paulus Kaufmann – Using People       194
What seems plausible about Korsgaard's reply is that there are 
situations where we cannot be content with our interaction partner's 
rational or hypothetical consent. Parfit argues, for example, that a 
rapist might say that his victim could have rationally consented to 
having sexual intercourse with him and that we cannot, of course, 
accept this as a possible justification. Sexual activities certainly 
require both partners’ actual consent. We are thus led to the question 
of what other situations require this momentary and individual 
agreement. Korsgaard is prepared to give an answer to this question 
as she can point to all situations of one person using another as 
requiring the actual consent of the person that is used.
Scanlon, who tries to reject the general thesis that it may be an 
agent's intention that makes an act wrong, cannot accept this reply. 
Trying to gain from another person's presence or participation is a 
condition that depends on the agent's intention and therefore cannot 
appear in a characterization of the properties that make acts wrong. 
He therefore has to reject Korsgaard's imaginary reply. Scanlon's 
first step in refusing Korsgaard's answer is to offer an alternative. He 
says that the idea of rational consent can also help us in determining 
which situations require the actual consent of the parties involved. 
We only have to ask 'whether B could rationally will a principle 
permitting A to act without her actual consent in such a case'32. This 
solution is elegant as it works with a minimal repertoire of concepts 
and derives all judgements about particular cases with the help of 
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one central notion, namely the idea of a rational will.
Scanlon's second step consists in analysing what makes Korsgaard's 
argument for the wrongness of using people intuitively plausible and 
to give a better account of these intuitions.
Korsgaard argued that coercion and deception are the most 
fundamental moral wrongs because we put our interaction partner in 
a position that precludes his assenting to the interaction. What is 
wrong with this, we can argue, is that we thereby subvert this 
person's will. Scanlon admits that this justification sounds plausible, 
but he presents an example that shows that subverting someone's 
will in itself is not always impermissible:
Conference in Paris: A is planning to attend a conference in Paris. A 
knows that B will want to go to the conference as well, if he learns 
that A is going there. But the conference will be a lot less enjoyable 
for A if B attends it too. A therefore sees to it that B does not learn 
of his trip, but without directly lying to B.33
A knows of B's wishes, and as these conflict with his own, he tries to 
prevent B's wishes from becoming reality, not by convincing B or by 
an open competition, but by concealing certain information from B. 
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We might thus say that A is indeed subverting B's will. But A is not, 
under most circumstances, acting wrongly. B has no claim on A that 
he let B know what he is doing. Korsgaard therefore has to say more 
about why it is wrong to coerce or deceive a person.
Here we are suggesting that Korsgaard limits her verdict about the 
wrongness of coercion and deception to situations of use. It is thus 
only absolutely wrong to coerce or deceive a person when we are 
trying to gain from this person's presence or participation. Within 
this line of argument Korsgaard would answer Conference in Paris 
by saying that A is not using B in that example and that A's act is not 
wrong for this reason.34 And indeed it seems that we have a special 
and legitimate interest to be informed about another person's ends if 
we are supposed to contribute to these ends as we always are when 
somebody uses us. In Conference in Paris A does not try to reach 
his end by using B and is therefore not wronging B when he 
conceals his ends from B. But this is, arguably, different in Scanlon's 
following example:
Possible appointment: A and B are both planning to attend a 
conference. B is an important person in the field and A wants B to 
attend his lecture. A tells B that he would be glad to see him in the 
audience. He does not tell B, though, that he has a special interest in 
B's presence because a third person C will be in the room as well. C 
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is considering A for a possible appointment and he will take B's 
presence as a sign that B thinks well of A's work. 
Scanlon agrees that in this case B has a legitimate claim to be 
informed about A's ends. Nevertheless he rejects Korsgaard's 
presumed argument that such examples show that A's act is wrong 
because in using B A subverts B's will. Scanlon admits that using 
another person is a special situation, because we generally have a 
legitimate claim to be informed about the other's ends in these 
situations and have to give our actual consent to render the 
interaction permissible. But Scanlon insists that this is not because 
of A's intention to profit from B's presence or participation, but 
because B serves another person's will. It does not matter if this will 
is the agent's will, as the following example is meant to show:
Reducing sessions: A and B are, again, both planning to attend a 
conference. A wants B to attend his lecture because B is a friend. A 
also knows that some members of the executive committee of the 
conference will attend his lecture because they have agreed to 
reduce the number of sessions and want to see which sessions are of 
special interest in order to decide which sessions to discontinue. A 
suspects that B's presence will be taken as a sign of the special 
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interest of the session his lecture is a part of. He does not care at all 
about the continuance of his session, but he knows that B will care 
about not influencing the decision of the committee members. 
Nevertheless, A does not tell B about it.
Scanlon argues that A wrongs B in this example as he wrongs B in 
the preceding example Possible Appointment. This shows that the 
wrong done to B in both cases does not depend on A's intention and 
therefore does not depend on A's using B, but on B's legitimate 
interest in being informed about the ends that B is serving.
Scanlon admits that we consider A's act in Possible Appointment to 
be more objectionable than his behaviour in Reducing Sessions. But 
he argues that this is so because A's behaviour differs in meaning in 
both examples and not because there are different reasons that make 
A's acts wrong.
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2.3 Moral worth and meaning
Parfit argues that if we say something like 'It is wrong to regard a 
person as a tool' then the word 'wrong' cannot be meant in a strict 
moral sense. We are not thereby saying that some act is 
impermissible, but that some agent has a bad or objectionable 
attitude towards another person. When we say, instead, that A uses 
B merely as a means we report an act – A is using B – and ascribe an 
attitude – A regards B as a mere tool –, according to Parfit's 
analysis. Parfit has tried to show that such acts are not necessarily 
wrong. They are, nevertheless, morally objectionable in a way. To 
be able to express our moral indignation with regard to such acts 
without having to use the misleading expression 'wrong', that should 
be reserved for impermissible actions, we need another evaluative 
category. Parfit therefore proposes to use the Kantian expression 
'without moral worth' to criticise the mere use of persons.35 Parfit 
does not present an account of moral worth, though, and only offers 
us a terminology. Scanlon takes up this loose end of Parfit's 
considerations and develops his own account of moral worth, or of 
meaning, as he prefers to say. 
It is instructive to introduce Scanlon's notion of meaning with the 
help of an example. Michael Stocker asks us in his famous paper 
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The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories to imagine a person 
called Smith who visits you in the hospital. You have been 
recovering there for a long time already and are bored by the 
hospital's routine. You consider Smith to be a 'real friend' and thank 
him euphorically for visiting you. But Smith answers your praise by 
saying that he did not visit you to cheer you up, but simply because 
he considers it to be his duty. He did not come for you, but because 
it is commanded by the moral law.36 If you find out that Smith 
literally means what he is saying you will probably be disappointed. 
This disappointment is not due to Smith doing something wrong – 
after all he visited you in the hospital – but due to the reasons that 
motivated Smith to act. Scanlon describes similar cases by saying 
that you are not disappointed about the impermissibility of the act, 
but about its meaning. You believed Smith to be a friend and have 
certain expectations with regard to the motivation of a friend who 
visits you in the hospital. To find out about his actual motivation is 
therefore significant for you because it reveals to you the nature of 
your relationship. Scanlon thus defines the 'meaning of an act' as 'the 
significance, for the agent and others, of the agent's willingness to 
perform that action for the reasons he or she does'37. The meaning of 
an act in this sense depends on the agent's actual reasons for acting 
and on the kind of relationship between the interaction partners. If 
Smith visits a complete stranger in the hospital because he believes 
it to be his duty, his act would therefore have a different meaning.
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Scanlon uses his distinction between the two 'moral dimensions' of 
permissibility and meaning to explain our complex intuitions 
towards concrete examples. Recall the example of the “Friendly” 
Neighbour that I mentioned in chapter 2:
“Friendly” neighbour: A young man meets his neighbour, a woman 
in her 60s, at the supermarket. He offers to carry her bags back 
home, because he hopes that out of gratitude she will invite him in 
for a cup of tea and so he will have a chance to meet her attractive 
daughter.
I have argued that we find something wrong with the young man's 
behaviour but that we are not willing to say that he does something 
morally wrong in a strict sense. Scanlon can describe this case by 
saying that the young man is acting permissibly, but that the old 
woman would probably be disappointed to find out about the real 
meaning of his behaviour because she would wish him to act for 
different reasons.
Scanlon argues that in many cases where we say that one person 
merely uses another we are actually talking about the meaning of 
this person's acts. We can speak of 'using people' in this sense with 
regard to permissible actions – as is the case with the above example 
– or with regard to impermissible behaviour. In the latter case the 
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fact that A uses B merely as a means is never a reason for A's act 
being wrong. It can raise the intuition, though, that behaviour 
involving the use of a person is more objectionable than behaviour 
that does not involve a person in that way. Scanlon argues that this is 
true with regard to the two examples Possible Appointment and 
Reducing Sessions. In both cases the agent A fails to inform the 
other person B about what ends B is going to contribute to. B has a 
legitimate interest in being informed about her contribution to other 
person's ends and is thus wronged by A's failure. But in Possible 
Appointment A is involving B in the pursuit of his own ends and is 
thus using B. This seems to be worse than the failure to inform B out 
of negligence. Scanlon stresses that we cannot conclude from our 
intuitions about a difference in strength with regard to the two 
examples that the source of wrongness must differ as well. It is 
rather a difference in meaning that explains our intuition that A's 
behaviour is worse when he involves B to serve his own ends. 
Scanlon believes his distinction between permissibility and meaning 
to resemble Kant's distinction between acting in accordance with 
duty and acting from duty. According to Kant we only act from duty 
if we act from a moral motive. If we act for other reasons our act 
may be permissible, but it cannot have what Kant calls 'moral 
worth'. Scanlon similarly says that besides our acting permissibly 
our acts can have a positive meaning if we act for the right moral 
reasons.
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3. Problems
Parfit's and Scanlon's accounts certainly have several problems of 
their own. It is unclear, for example, how to judge if a person can 
rationally consent to my interaction with her and why the consent of 
everybody involved in an interaction is necessary. But here I only 
want to criticise Parfit and Scanlon with regard to their arguments 
against the alternative accounts of using people.
First of all, there seems to be a further reply open to O'Neill and 
Korsgaard. Parfit suggested that O'Neill and Korsgaard may restrict 
their argument to methods that are conceptually incompatible with 
the consent of the interaction partner. Scanlon suggested that O'Neill 
and Korsgaard could constrain their claims to the context of using 
people. Both, Parfit and Scanlon, offer arguments against these 
strategies separately, but they do not consider a combination of both. 
O'Neill and Korsgaard might say that it is wrong to use a method 
that is conceptually incompatible with the interaction partner's 
consent, if we are using that person. I do not find this solution 
completely convincing, but it has some prima facie plausibility and 
deserves consideration. It has some similarities with the account that 
I want to propose in the last chapter.
Second, Parfit and Scanlon believe the evaluation of attitudes to 
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depend on the evaluation of acts. Scanlon, for example, stresses that 
the moral value of an attitude depends on our acting for the reasons 
that make our acts obligatory or impermissible, but first we have to 
know what we have to do, then we can know what we should take as 
reasons for action. Kant, in contrast, seems to believe that first of all 
we are obliged to have a certain attitude and from this attitude we 
can deduce what we have to do.38 Parfit and Scanlon do not consider 
this different model of morality. It is taken up by the value-based 
account of using people that I will discuss in the next chapter.
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VI A Value-based Account of Using People
One of the central problems of Kant's account of using people was 
the question of how he gets from his theory of value to principles 
that prescribe particular acts and omissions. In Kant's eyes, the 
value of rational nature gives us reasons for action insofar as we are 
obliged to acknowledge this value as the value it is, and to act in 
accordance with this value. It is not evident, however, what it 
actually means to act in accordance with absolute value or dignity, 
and it is even less clear how Kant wants to get from his abstract 
formula to all perfect duties that he believes to be covered by the 
prohibition against using people merely as means. The procedural 
account of using people tries to solve this problem with the help of 
the insight that the capacity to set ends is manifested – among other 
things – through our giving consent to interactions with other 
people. Respect for the value of this capacity therefore demands 
our respect for the consent of others and prohibits all forms of 
coercion and deception as these modes of interaction conceptually 
preclude our partner's consent. The attitudinal account of using 
people agrees with Korsgaard and O'Neill that consent is the 
central criterion for the wrongness of acts. They reject the 
procedural account of using people, though, because they believe 
that the wrongness of acts has no direct relation with the use of 
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people. The notion of treating people merely as means should 
instead be understood as an ideal for how to regard other people. 
Parfit and Scanlon thus argue that Kant's theory of value is 
interesting as a theory of moral worth and provides an ideal for our 
attitude towards others, but that it does not lead to a plausible 
theory of how to act. The value-based account1 of using people 
opposes this critique of Kant. They argue instead that Kant's theory 
of value not only provides some ideas that can help us to derive a 
catalogue of duties, but emphasize that the idea of absolute value 
directly provides us with reasons for performing or omitting certain 
acts. The value-based account thus differs from the procedural 
account in believing that the notion of consent is not necessary to 
derive concrete duties from Kant's theory of value.
1. The value of reason
Thomas Hill's text Humanity as an End in Itself can be seen as an 
early source of a value-based account of using people. It is not 
clear if Hill's interpretation of Kant also displays his own views on 
the matter, but he certainly has great sympathies with Kant's 
general approach.2 Hill starts his interpretation of Kant's Formula of 
Humanity with the observation that Kant does not prohibit the use 
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of persons, but the use of humanity. As Korsgaard and O'Neill after 
him, Hill also understands 'humanity' to mean rational nature and 
interprets 'rational nature' as referring to our rational capacities.3 
The Formula thus commands that we shall not use our rational 
capacities merely as means, but have to treat them as ends in 
themselves.
Hill suggests that this command must be understood with the help 
of Kant's views about the special value of our rational capacities.4 
He therefore links his reading of the Formula of Humanity to 
Kant's theory of value and to the idea of dignity in particular. He 
stresses accordingly that we must suppose our rational capacities to 
possess dignity, i.e. 'an unconditional and incomparable worth'5. 
When Kant says that an entity has unconditional worth Hill takes 
him to mean that it has the worth 'independently of any effects, 
profit, or advantage which it might produce.'6 A value is 
incomparable, on the other hand, when 'no amount of price, or 
value dependent on contingent needs and tastes', can justify its 
sacrifice.7
It is Hill's central idea that the assumption that our rational 
capacities have this kind of unconditional and incomparable value 
already precludes certain forms of behaviour with regard to all 
entities that possess this kind of value. Above all, we must not treat 
an entity that has such value as if it did not have it. We must 
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instead acknowledge the value as the value it is and react 
accordingly in our thinking and our behaviour.
To show the direct 'practical implications'8 from Kant's theory of 
value Hill points to Kant's remark that dignity 'admits of no 
equivalent'9 and stresses that this implies already that 'what has 
dignity cannot morally or reasonably be exchanged for anything of 
greater value, whether the value is dignity or price'.10 This 
prohibition has two direct consequences. First, we can never justify 
the impairment of rational capacities by pointing to the relative 
value of anything else, no matter how great this relative value is. 
As Sam Kerstein puts it: 'Not even all the gold in Fort Knox would 
truly compensate for the killing of one rational agent.' Second, 
neither are we allowed to sacrifice someone's rational capacities for 
the rational capacities of anybody else, even if these latter 
capacities have dignity themselves. Hill stresses that this does not 
mean that rational capacities cannot be impaired under any 
circumstances whatsoever, but only that such an impairment 
cannot be justified by the value that we achieve instead. He thus 
writes that 'if the sacrifice of something with dignity is ever 
justified, the ground for this cannot be “this is more than that” or “a 
greater quantity of value is produced by doing so”.'11 Hill does not 
make it clear what other form of justification he has in mind, but 
such a justification will, anyway, only become relevant in rare and 
extreme situations. Generally speaking, our rational nature's 
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absolute value implies that we are not allowed to destroy or impede 
our rational capacities and that we must not accept any trade-off so 
that 'even if neglecting, impairing, or dishonoring a person's 
humanity were to cause people pleasure, this would not be a 
rational exchange'12. Paradigmatic violations of Kant's Formula of 
Humanity are therefore surgical treatments, such as lobotomy, that 
irreversibly rob a person of his rational powers.13 Further examples 
are provided by Kant's arguments against drug abuse and his 
condemnation of gluttony because it leaves one 'temporarily 
incapacitated for activities which acquire adroitness and 
deliberation in the use of one's powers'14. Hill argues furthermore 
that the value of these powers gives us reason not to kill rational 
beings – which includes a prohibition of most forms of suicide –, to 
provide others opportunities for rational development, to avoid 
one's own pain and misery as obstacles in the use of one's rational 
powers, to influence others only by appeal to their reason, to give 
others room to set and pursue their own ends and to refrain from 
mockery and servility.15 At least the following three features of 
Hill's assumptions about the scope of Kant's Formula of Humanity 
are noteworthy: First, Hill believes that the Formula covers a huge 
range of cases. Second, he does not include duties to promote the 
wellbeing of other people in the list.16 Third, the prohibition against 
using people does not play any role in the derivation of duties and 
does not even serve to pick out one special class of duties.17
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In his remarks about the practical implications of the assumption 
that rational capacities possess dignity Hill often says that it is 
'obvious' or 'natural to suppose' that valuing these capacities will 
lead to certain forms of behaviour. He is not explicit, though, about 
the exact relation that exists between the value of rationality and 
the behaviour that it presumably commands or forbids. He might be 
taken to mean that certain forms of treatment are by their nature 
inappropriate towards things with a special kind of value. Or he 
might be understood alternatively as saying that agents who value 
things that are valuable would not treat these things in certain ways. 
The latter reading is better supported by the text, I think, for 
example, when Hill says that 'one who sufficiently valued persons' 
rational capacities would presumably not want to destroy the 
persons themselves'18. This answer leads to further questions, 
though. We would like to know, for example, what a person 
valuing somebody's rational capacities means. Does she believe 
something about them? Does she act with certain intentions 
towards this person? Or does she have certain dispositions to act? 
Some quick answers to these questions can be ruled out. It might be 
suggested that one does not value somebody's rational capacities 
when one does not believe that this person has the relevant 
capacities. But this cannot be what Hill means by 'valuation' 
because some of his illegitimate forms of interaction consciously 
make use of another's rational capacities. Deception and 
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manipulation, for example, presuppose acknowledging that the 
other person is indeed a rational agent. 
2. Respect
Allen Wood shares Hill's conviction that Kant's theory of value is 
central to the moral evaluation of acts. He agrees that the Formula 
of Humanity basically requires us to treat our rational powers as 
ends in themselves and that ends in themselves are entities with 
unconditional and incomparable worth19. However, Wood 
emphasizes more clearly than Hill that the wrongness of acts 
depends on the agent's valuation and he gives a name to the 
required evaluative reaction: '”Respect” is the name for the proper 
attitude toward any objective value.'20 Respect is one of the four 
moral feelings that Kant distinguishes in the Metaphysics of 
Morals and is appropriate as a reaction to all value that can be 
shared by every rational being. Wood stresses, though, that we are 
not obliged to respect objective value in the sense that we must 
have a certain state of mind in our action. Our obligation instead 
consists in expressing respect with our behaviour and whether our 
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behaviour expresses respect or not depends on putting ourselves in 
some specific inner state. If I treat someone honestly, for example, 
I express respect for my interaction partner's rational capacities 
through my action even when I act for selfish reasons.21 
To say that our actions should express something might be 
understood to mean that we have to act in ways that carry a 
conventionalized symbolic meaning. We can be obliged in this 
sense to shake other people’s hands or to say 'thank you' when we 
have received some favour. But Wood makes it clear that the 
obligation to express respect should not be understood in this 
narrow sense. We express respect for some value whenever we use 
this value to provide us with reasons for action. In some cases these 
reasons are reasons to perform some symbolic action, but in most 
cases our reasons are not of this specific kind.22 Furthermore, we 
also take an entity's value as a reason for action, if we omit some 
action for the sake of this entity. In these cases we therefore 
express our respect simply by expressing no disrespect for it (see 
Kerstein, p.6). 
According to Wood our fundamental moral duty is thus to act only 
in ways that express respect for the value of our rational capacities. 
Wood also stresses that this general idea contained in Kant's 
Formula of Humanity is 'clear and determinate'.23 That does not 
mean, though, that its application is easily done. To apply the 
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requirement of expressing respect for the value of rational nature 
we need 'intermediate premises' that tell us which particular acts 
express respect or disrespect. The need for these bridges between 
the general idea of moral respect and particular problems has the 
result that moral questions are essentially controversial. They can 
only be answered under particular cultural and historical 
circumstances and require experience and careful judgement. This 
judgement can be trained through folklore, literature, and religion, 
but all answers to particular moral problems will always remain 
transient, according to Wood. 
These problems in the application of Kant's Formula of Humanity 
notwithstanding, Wood takes the Formula to be the supreme 
principle of morality that covers the whole of our moral duties. In 
Wood's reading, the Formula has an even wider scope than it has 
for Hill, O'Neill and Korsgaard, including duties of justice, duties 
of respect, duties of love, duties to oneself and – indirectly – duties 
that follow from our special roles, institutions and relationships.24 
To derive this set of duties Wood does not employ the prohibition 
against using people, though. Like Hill, he seems to be sceptical 
about the prohibition's practical use when he mentions that, in his 
opinion, far too much is often made of Kant's claim that it is wrong 
to treat people merely as means.25 
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If we take all these features of Wood's account together, it no 
longer seems to differ much from the view defended by Thomas 
Scanlon. Scanlon has argued that Kant's Formula of Humanity 
offers a prima facie plausible moral principle that tells us which 
acts are wrong and what reasons we have for omitting them. He 
thus believes the principle to play a criterial and a transcendental 
role. He doubts, though, that Kant's principle gives us any reasons 
that make acts wrong, i.e. that the principle can play an explanatory 
role as well. Scanlon stresses in particular that the idea of treating 
people merely as means is not able to explain the wrongness of acts 
directly, as it always refers to the agent's reasons for action. Wood's 
assumption that the Formula of Humanity only offers us a general 
principle that must be supplemented by intermediate premises to 
yield practical implications; his clarification that respect cannot be 
required as a particular state of mind but only as a meaning of the 
act; and his doubts about a special role for the prohibition against 
using people may be read in this same vein. But some of Wood's 
considerations also lead in a different direction, incompatible with 
Scanlon's account:
'What, then, could be Kant's purpose in including “never merely as a means” 
so ostentatiously in the verbal statement of FH [the Formula of Humanity] 
and of his equally conspicuous use of like phrases in many of his arguments 
from FH? One answer is that the phrase calls special attention to what Kant 
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takes to be a fundamental pattern in human wrongdoing. He thinks it is a 
propensity of human nature to show disrespect for the dignity of humanity 
not because we altogether fail to value it, but because we tend to place things  
of lesser value ahead of it, treating rational nature (which is an end in itself) 
as a mere means to these merely conditional goods.'26
Wood here introduces a role for the prohibition against using 
people that differs from the roles that Scanlon was willing to grant. 
While Scanlon confined the prohibition's roles to either a very 
general principle of morality or to a factor in determining the 
meaning of acts, Wood argues in this passage that using people is a 
'fundamental pattern in human wrongdoing' and that it is 
characterized by a conflation of values: We 'invert the proper order 
of incentives'27 and use what is of absolute value for the sake of 
what is only relatively valuable. We thus act for the wrong reasons 
and therefore act wrongly. It was this relation between acting for 
the wrong reasons and acting wrongly that Scanlon meant to 
repudiate. 
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3. Self-contradiction
The role of the prohibition against using people to which Woods 
alludes in this passage was described with great clarity by David 
Velleman, a third representative of a value-based account of using 
people.
Velleman introduces the idea of a conflation of value with the help 
of two non-moral examples: People do exercise to stay healthy and 
people save money to buy things that facilitate or enrich their lives. 
But people sometimes overdo exercise and frugality in a way that is 
due to a conflation of values: They dedicate themselves to exercise 
and saving money in a way that distracts from their health and their 
wellbeing, although health and wellbeing are the values that are 
responsible for the relative value of exercise and saving money in 
the first place. According to Velleman, this prudential mistake is 
analogous to the moral mistake of someone who treats an entity 
with dignity as if it only had relative value. The entity whose value 
is not recognized by an agent can also be the agent himself, as 
Velleman makes clear in discussing the example of suicide28:
To better understand Velleman's discussion of suicide as an 
example of such a conflation of moral values, it is noteworthy that 
Velleman does not agree with Hill and Wood with regard to the 
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interpretation of Kant's term 'humanity' in the Formula of 
Humanity. While Hill and Wood argued that 'humanity' should be 
interpreted as referring to an agent's rational capacities, Velleman 
believes that it refers instead to the agent herself. I will say more 
about this new interpretation a little later. Different convictions 
about the exact value bearer are not important for the idea of a 
value conflation, though, as Hill and Wood could present 
analogous arguments by substituting 'person' with 'rational 
capacities' in Velleman's argument.Furthermore, it should be noted 
that in Velleman's eyes it is not wrong in general to kill oneself or 
to ask somebody to kill one. Like Kant, Velleman concentrates on 
the case of an agent who kills himself 'from self-love'29 or 'in order 
to escape a troublesome situation'30. A suicide of this kind eradicates 
a person for the sake of his wellbeing and thus acts as if the value 
of the person depends on the value of his wellbeing in life. But the 
opposite is true: A person's wellbeing can only matter because the 
person himself matters, and his wellbeing therefore owes all its 
value to the value of him as a person.
A suicide from self-love thus confounds a derivative value with its 
underlying value, according to Velleman's analysis. As we saw 
already, Allen Wood expressed a very similar idea. He said that in 
many acts we place what is a conditional good with lesser value 
ahead of what has dignity or absolute value. Wood states that this is 
basically what Kant means when he prohibits using an end in itself 
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merely as a means. Velleman makes it clear, though, that the 
confusion of value that is involved in suicide from self-love, for 
example, is not exactly the same confusion as that between a means 
and an end. Saving money may be a means to buy valuable goods, 
but a person's wellbeing is not a means to the person. The 
confusion of the latter sort is only an analogous confusion in the 
sense that in both cases one impairs an absolute value for the sake 
of a relative value, although that relative value owes its worth to 
the absolute one. An instrumental relation is only one possible 
relation between a conditional value and its conditioning value. 
Some things owe their value to the fact that they symbolize or 
constitute some other valuable thing, but there can be value-
confusions with regard to these different relations as well. A 
military unit may stubbornly defend a flag as a symbol of its 
country, for example, and thereby lose sight of defending a densely 
populated part of a city. These soldiers arguably confound the 
symbolic value of the flag with the original value of the country 
and its citizens. 
The central idea of all these confusions of value is that the relation 
between a conditioning and a conditional value is a normative 
relation. As a matter of fact, one value is a condition for the value 
of something else and this provides us with reasons for action: We 
should only pursue the conditional value for the sake of the 
conditioning value and should not impair the conditioning value for 
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the sake of the conditional value. If the values in question are moral 
values then a confusion of conditional and conditioning value 
makes an act wrong.
It is also a very important feature of Velleman's idea of a value-
confusion that this is not a mere cognitive mistake. Somebody who 
impairs a conditioning value for the sake of a conditional value not 
only has a false representation of the actual relation between two 
values, he also mixes up the relation between two values that he 
accepts himself – at least implicitly. The conflation of value 
discussed by Velleman and others is therefore a form of self-
contradiction.31
The idea of a normative self-contradiction implies that the reasons of 
the agent for the wrongness of his acts matter. It is not wrong per se 
to kill myself, for example, but it is wrong to kill myself from self-
love because only when I commit suicide from this motive do I 
commit a conflation of value. This assumption directly opposes 
Scanlon's view that the reasons for which an agent acts cannot 
render his act wrong.
I mentioned in the preceding chapter that Scanlon mainly defends 
this view by discussing examples and trying to offer plausible 
reconstructions of them that do not depend on the agent's reasons for 
action. He leaves out many possible examples, though, and does not 
include deception, suicide and murder, for example. But he also 
Paulus Kaufmann – Using People       224
offers one more general argument in his book that might be meant to 
include these cases as well. The argument starts again with an 
example:
Saving a rival: B is close to drowning, but A has a chance to save 
B's life. A happens to hate B and would like him to die. A does not 
want B to die now, though, because this would mean that B's heir 
would inherit B's wealth and be able to use this money against A in a 
political campaign. A saves B's life for this reason.32 
Scanlon argues that it is odd to say that A acts wrongly. He tries to 
establish this conclusion by the following premises: First, we want A 
to save B. Second there must be a permissible option open to A in 
this situation. Third, there are only two options open to A: He can 
either let B die or save him for the wrong reasons. The third premise 
seems to be the most vulnerable one as we want to say that A could 
also save B for the right reasons. But Scanlon doubts that this is 
really an option open to A. He admits that we certainly have 
legitimate expectations with regard to other people's motives for 
action and that we can criticise A's motivation and ask him to 
change his reasons for action in the course of time. Scanlon insists, 
though, that we cannot ask A to act now from a certain motive 
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because we cannot at the moment choose the reasons for which we. 
The right reasons are unavailable to A and he therefore cannot act 
wrongly if he fails to act for them.33
Scanlon's assumptions about the availability of reasons are, of 
course, very controversial. Many people would stress that moral 
considerations are not esoteric and must be available to every 
rational agent. Scanlon agrees with these critics, but he replies that 
moral considerations can be seen by everybody, but not everybody 
can act on them as we cannot choose which reasons to act on. This 
claim is not much less controversial, though, as Kantians and other 
philosopher's would reply that the fact that something has moral 
value can motivate me without any further incentives. Nevertheless, 
I do not want to enter this debate about moral motivation here, but 
instead level an objection against Scanlon that has to do with the 
particular structure that at least some wrongs exhibit according to a 
value-based account: A suicide motivated by self-love acts wrongly, 
according to this account, because he sacrifices his person for the 
sake of his wellbeing, although he knows that the value of his 
wellbeing depends on the value of his person. He therefore knows 
that his reasons for killing himself only hold if he has reason to 
preserve his person and thus cannot kill himself for the former 
reasons. In cases of self-contradiction such as this one it is never true 
that the agent does not have the possibility to act for the right 
reasons because he cannot bring it about to act for these reasons. The 
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agent not only knows, but is committed to these reasons already. 
Even if Scanlon's argument is accepted with regard to saving people, 
it never holds for cases of self-contradiction.
4. The value of persons
While Hill, Wood and Korsgaard identified the bearer of the special 
value that should not be conflated with merely relative value as the 
rational capacities that human agents typically possess, Velleman 
suggested that it is persons themselves who possess unconditional 
value. I argued above that the difference between these two positions 
is irrelevant for the idea that many moral wrongs consist in a self-
contradictory conflation of values and thereby also irrelevant for 
rejecting Scanlon's objection. But there are, of course, other 
important differences between these two positions. In what follows I 
want to explain shortly why I favour Velleman's view.
Rationality is a state that can be promoted. We can train our rational 
capacities, we can bring about more of it through procreation, we 
can preserve the rational capacities that are there already etc. But the 
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position that rationality is to be promoted together with the 
assumption that it has unconditional and incomparable value yields 
very implausible consequences: If our rational capacities have an 
unconditional and incomparable value then we are never allowed to 
impede a rational capacity in order to achieve any other good. Derek 
Parfit argues that this consequence is 'insane' as it implies that 'it 
would be wrong for us to damage our ability to play chess or solve 
crossword puzzles, even if these were the only ways of saving any 
number of people from any amount of pain'34. Hill, Wood and 
Korsgaard therefore stress that the value of our rational capacities is 
of a kind that is to be respected rather than to be promoted. But what 
does respecting rational capacities mean if it does not mean 
promoting them in the world? It seems plausible to suggest that 
respecting rational capacities means respecting the decisions of 
rational agents. This answer leads to the further question of whether 
we have to respect all decisions or only the rational ones. O'Neill 
and Korsgaard argued that we have to respect irrational decisions as 
well because we would otherwise impose our will on them 'in the 
name of higher and more rational selves'35. It is not clear, though, 
how this plausible constraint can be justified if it is rationality that 
we are required to respect. I think it is thus more plausible to say that 
we feel obliged to respect even the irrational decisions of other 
people because they are their decisions. This suggests that it is the 
person that I have to respect and not her rational capacities.
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It might be argued against this position that it is unclear what is 
valuable about an individual person. Every person often fails in 
many ways and one may wonder why we are supposed to respect all 
of a person's quirks and mistakes and even vices. But this objection 
conflates two aspects of the concept of value. One aspect is the 
entity that possesses the value, i.e. the value-bearer, and the other 
aspect is the properties that explain why the value-bearer is 
valuable.36 This distinction allows us to say that persons have value 
because they are rational and autonomous, but that it is nevertheless 
the person who is valuable and must be respected. If we do not draw 
this distinction we are forced to accept that all ultimate value must 
be a simple property in the sense that it cannot be explained or 
justified. This position is unattractive, though, because it would 
preclude any rational discourse about which properties are 
responsible for the value of an entity. It is common in our evaluative 
practice to agree about the value of something, but to quarrel about 
the reasons for this value, and it is not clear why we should give up 
this part of our social discourse. When we are asked to respect 
persons because they are rational or autonomous beings, we are 
therefore neither required to acknowledge that these persons are 
particularly valuable individuals, nor do we have to promote 
rationality because it bestows value on its bearers. We have to 
respect persons because and insofar as they are rational and 
autonomous beings.
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There is a further reason to prefer the view that persons are the 
bearers of the special value called dignity: As we have seen, the 
concept of using people is closely connected to the idea that we 
should be treated as the persons we are. To feel used often contains 
the sensation of not counting as an individual being, but only as a 
tool that can easily be replaced. If we understand using people as 
means in Velleman's sense to mean that the value of a person is 
subordinated to some relative value, we can explain this feeling very 
well. The respect that the value of a person requires is respect for the 
incomparable value called 'dignity' and this value 'calls for a 
response to the object in itself, not in comparison with others'37. If 
this respect is refused us, we thus feel that we are degraded to a 
thing that only matters because it does a good job in bringing about 
some end and is robbed of its individual value. Velleman can 
therefore solve a problem that I raised with regard to Korsgaard's 
account: I argued that it is implausible that the wronged party in a 
case of use is ultimately rationality as an abstract entity, as 
Korsgaard suggests. It is hard to see how we get from this abstract 
entity to the reasons that we put forth in our common moral 
discourse when we criticise the wrongs done to individual persons. 
Velleman's assumption that it is the value of individual persons that 
is subordinated in using people can capture these common sense 
intuitions because in his account it makes sense to respond to our 
users 'But what about me?'.
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5. Problems
The value-based account helps us in answering many of the 
questions we were pursuing during the preceding chapters. It helps 
us to understand the relation between attitudes and acts and explains 
why our common discourse contains many expressions, such as 'to 
treat a person as a means', that can be used to refer to attitudes and to 
acts at the same time. It thereby helps to eliminate an argument, 
suggested by Parfit and Scanlon that seems to rule out the possibility 
that we can act wrongly because we act for some attitude or 
intention. Moreover, we now have a better understanding of what it 
is to “feel used” and why this feeling reveals an important aspect of 
what it is to wrong a person. The value-based account fails, though, 
in offering a clear-cut scope of the prohibition against using people. 
We have seen that Hill and Wood suppose an even wider scope for 
this prohibition than O'Neill and Korsgaard, and it is even less clear 
how we get from their ideas of respect and dignity to this particular 
class of moral duties. Velleman painstakingly tries to show how we 
get from the idea of a subordination of value to concrete duties and 
illustrates this with the example of suicide. It is not clear, though, 
how his considerations about an implied self-contradiction can be 
employed in deriving other duties. It may often sound convincing to 
say that an agent who kills, deceives or harms another person 
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'acknowledges the validity of the law and only wishes to be an 
exception to it', as Kant says.38 But the derivation of a self-
contradiction often has an air of a petitio principii that only imputes 
the moral convictions to others that it actually wishes to derive. To 
avoid this impression the reconstruction of a self-contradiction has 
to follow definite rules that allow us to see what beliefs we are 
presupposing and what moral duties we want to derive. It seems 
unlikely to me that we can offer such a procedure for all agents and 
every situation. Values that can be presupposed to be universally 
shared are certainly rare and it is unclear what kinds of moral 
justification they allow for. I therefore propose to look for the 
evaluative self-contradictions that render acts wrong in specific 
contexts that offer us more material that we can use in deriving 
moral duties. Such an attempt to derive a moral duty by combining 
the general idea of a subordination of value and a specific context of 
action will be presented in the following chapter. It is essential to the 
aim of this book that it is the concept of using people that provides 
not only the idea of a subordination of value, but also gives us the 
context that we need to see what this subordination amounts to in 
concrete cases.
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VII A Contextual Account of Using People
All the accounts of using people that I have presented so far have 
contributed enormously to a better understanding of this common 
sense notion. I have found none of them entirely satisfactory, 
though, for the reasons given in each chapter. My own account can 
be seen as combining elements of these other accounts, but it is also 
an attempt to make better use of the material that is given to us by 
our common moral discourse. I argued in the introduction of this 
book that common sense contains a lot more than mere intuitions 
about the wrongness of acts or vague descriptions of morally 
relevant act types. It offers beliefs of different levels of abstraction 
and concepts with diverse functions and abilities. This pretheoretical 
material is far from being infallible, of course, and cannot even 
claim to come with particular justification. But common sense 
notions are sometimes the only material we have and sometimes 
they also lead us a good part of the way to our theoretical aims. This 
is true in particular, I believe, for the concept of using people. I 
therefore want to move backwards through the existing accounts of 
using people once again and return to the common sense notion that 
I presented at the beginning of this book.
Paulus Kaufmann – Using People       236
1. Merits of the existing accounts1
The common sense notion of using people presented in the second 
chapter of this book has left us with a couple of intriguing questions: 
Is it always wrong to use a person? And if not, how can we 
distinguish between the legitimate and the illegitimate use of 
people? (Scope) Is the fact that A uses B a reason that makes A's act 
wrong? Does the charge of having used another person refer to an 
agent's attitude or to a particular act by him? (Role) How can we 
describe the sensation of having been used more accurately and 
when are we justified in feeling it? (Justification)
The value-based account of using people helps us to give answers to 
all of these questions and comes closest to a satisfactory account, in 
my opinion. Let me briefly recapitulate some of its merits, starting 
with the last question:
If you find out that somebody has been using you, you will typically 
feel anger or indignation about the person who treated you in that 
way mixed with a disappointed awareness that your interaction is 
not what you hope it could be and the conviction that this is not the 
way you deserve to be treated. The account developed and defended 
by Thomas Hill, Allen Wood and David Velleman can make sense 
of this feeling, justify its implicit claims, but also explain when the 
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feeling has force as a moral reproval. These philosophers have 
stressed that we should follow Kant in distinguishing between two 
kinds of values to be able to explain human actions and the 
normative claims that constrain them: There are values that require 
our increasing them, i.e. ends to be promoted. But there are also 
values that constrain our behaviour, i.e. ends to be respected. The 
former ends are usually future states or events that still have to be 
brought about through our actions and the latter are self-existent 
ends that are already there. Velleman puts the difference in the 
following words: 
'Self-existent ends are the objects of motivating attitudes that regard and value 
them as they already are, other ends are the objects of attitudes that value them 
as possibilities to be brought about.'2
This characterization fits well with our common wish to be taken as 
the person we are and not only as something that can be formed to 
fit other peoples' ends. But this wish can take different degrees of 
demandingness. We may wish to be actively cherished and loved as 
the individuals we are and we may wish to be respected as persons. 
Only the latter wish comes with strict moral claims. The frustration 
contained in feeling used can also have these two faces: We may be 
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frustrated because we realise that we have not found a loving 
partner, but only a helpmate in satisfying sexual and social needs. 
This kind of frustration, I agree with Velleman, is also a moral 
emotion, but it does not ground direct claims on the other. Love is 
the 'optional maximum' that we can hope for, nothing that we can 
demand. But respect is the 'required minimum'3 and we can also be 
frustrated for not getting our dues in this way. The latter kind of 
frustration is still connected to the feeling that we are not treated as 
the person we are because the respect in question is respect for the 
incomparable value called 'dignity' and this value 'calls for a 
response to the object in itself, not in comparison with others'4. 
Besides frustration, feeling used often involves a feeling of 
degradation that is expressed by utterances such as 'I am not merely 
a tool'. The value-based account can explain why we feel degraded 
in this way when someone uses us: Not every self-existing entity can 
claim to possess dignity. Things and, according to Kant, animals and 
plants do not have dignity, but only a price. They therefore can be 
treated according to the value they have in comparison to other 
entities and need not be treated as ends in themselves. When a 
human being is treated without respect for her special value she will 
therefore feel that she is treated 'like an object' or 'as a means' and 
not as a being with human rank and status.5 The value-based account 
thus answers what feeling used consists in and when we are justified 
in feeling this way by pointing to two Kantian distinctions and by 
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introducing a distinction between respect and love. They explain that 
feeling frustrated when somebody uses us is due to the fact that we 
are thus treated as objects whose value depends on their contribution 
to some end and not as existent ends that have value in themselves. 
Kant's distinction between dignity and price, on the other hand, 
illuminates the degrading aspect of feeling used. Dignity places 
constraints on our behaviour that do not apply to beings with a price 
and when these constraints are violated we therefore feel that we are 
treated like entities of this lower status. We have a right that others 
respect our dignity and treat us as persons, but we have no right to 
be loved as the beings we are. If we feel frustrated and degraded 
because, in addition to respect, we ask for love, then our feeling does 
not represent a claim, but expresses a moral ideal.6
The value-based account can furthermore explain why the common 
sense notion of using people oscillates between an evaluation of acts 
and an evaluation of attitudes. Wood, for example, makes it clear 
that the reaction that is primarily forced on us by the value of 
humanity is the recognition of this value, i.e. the moral feeling of 
respect. Respect is thus a required attitude7 and we sometimes 
express a lack of this attitude by colloquial utterances such as 'You 
only regard me as your tool'. According to the value-based account, 
all further reactions that are required by the dignity of persons are 
not required in addition to the recognition of that value, but are only 
derived through this required attitude. Dignity thus first requires a 
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certain attitude and this attitude then requires an adequate kind of 
behaviour. Wood believes that the adequate behaviour must express 
respect for the value of humanity, whereas I prefer to say that the 
behaviour must not be incompatible with the required attitude. Both 
approaches explain, though, why it is not surprising that common 
sense expressions such as 'treating someone as a means' can be used 
to refer to an act type and to an attitude. Such expressions have this 
double function because they require acts by requiring attitudes.
A moral theory that primarily requires attitudes has to prepare for 
the objection that attitudes cannot be obligatory or that they cannot 
be required instantaneously. Moral duties are believed to be 
obligatory for every agent at every moment, though, and an 
attitudinal theory therefore does not seem to be able to derive moral 
duties. Thomas Scanlon expresses such an objection when he says 
that the wrongness of acts cannot depend on the agent's reasons for 
action because we cannot choose the reasons for which we want to 
act.8 The value-based account of using people escapes this objection, 
though, because it bases moral duties on attitudes that can be 
presupposed in every agent. If an agent violates a moral duty he 
always acts against an evaluative attitude that he embraces himself, 
according to the value-based account, and therefore contradicts 
himself. Hill, Wood and Velleman can admit that Scanlon is right 
with his general thesis about the availability of reasons. They will 
insist, though, that he ignores the fact that we sometimes implicitly 
Paulus Kaufmann – Using People       241
accept something as a reason for action, but fail to act accordingly. 
In these cases it can be our reasons that render our act wrong. 
With the idea of a self-contradictory subordination of values the 
value-based account offers a criterion for the wrongness of acts: An 
act is wrong if I fail to respect the values that I already, at least 
implicitly, recognize. I have argued, though, that it is difficult to 
construe a self-contradiction in many cases and that we need further 
criteria to see which reconstructions of self-contradictions are 
plausible. I have also mentioned that we need a relevant context for 
such reconstructions and that the context of using people is such a 
morally sensitive situation. Somewhat curiously, it is the 
representatives of the attitudinal account denying an explanatory 
role for the concept of using people, who accept the existence of a 
special context of use.
Derek Parfit, for example, says that A uses B, if A makes use of B's 
abilities, activities, or other features in order to achieve some aim.9 
This characterization is not completely convincing. First, it is 
circular as the definiens contains the expression 'to make use' that is 
not independent of the definiendum 'to use'. Second, it allows us to 
say that 'I use Kant' when I only make use of his texts. This way of 
talking seems to be only metaphorical, though, as it is odd to say that 
I use a person who has been dead for more than 200 years. To say 
literally that A uses B, A and B must interact in some way. Thomas 
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Scanlon accounts for this condition and remarks that for me to use 
certain other people it has to be true that 'their presence or 
participation must play a role in what I am doing'10. This definition 
implausibly implies, on the other hand, that I use a person when I 
make her a present or when I greet her on the street. Besides these 
details, both definitions come quite close to my analysis of the 
common sense expression 'to use a person', though, and give us a 
relatively clear context of interaction: A uses B if B's presence or 
participation plays a role in A's achieving some aim that points away 
from B.11 
This definition is based on the analogy between using tools and 
using people and states the same conditions for both forms of use. 
This is plausible insofar as our colloquial talk of 'using people' is 
inspired by our talk of 'using tools', as becomes clear through 
expressions such as 'to instrumentalise' or 'to use someone as a tool'. 
But there are, of course, significant differences between using 
people and using tools. Tools cannot act by themselves and when we 
are using tools we have to do something with them. Using people, in 
contrast, also works by activating people so that they act and thereby 
help us to achieve some goal. We can use people not only through 
their presence, but also through their participation.12 Although 
natural language allows for both forms of using, we usually have the 
participating form of use in mind when we employ the phrase 'to use 
a person' in a moral sense. This claim about the moral meaning of 
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using people was implicitly recognized by the procedural account of 
using people. O'Neill and Korsgaard claim to cover all perfect duties 
with their interpretation of Kant's prohibition against using people, 
but actually they only discuss coercive proposals and deception as 
cases of using people. Deception and coercion both work through 
the participation of the deceived or coerced person and therefore 
constitute the more restricted scope of the concept of using people. 
Although O'Neill and Korsgaard did not see it this way, I believe 
that the restriction to the mentioned forms of using people is an 
important insight into the scope of our common sense claim that it is 
morally wrong to use people. As they wanted their prohibition to 
have a wider scope, O'Neill and Korsgaard did not argue for the 
restricted scope they actually accept. I thus want to present such an 
argument in the next section. 
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2. Using someone's presence?
The definition that I have adopted from common sense consists of 
three conditions: For A to use B, A must interact with B, he must 
believe that B can be helpful in achieving one of A's ends and A's 
ends must point away from B. This definition includes cases like the 
following one:
Crossing the River: A has to cross a river to escape from his 
persecutors. The river is too deep and broad to wade through or to 
jump over, but it would be sufficient to get something in the river 
that A could use as a bridge. A therefore shoots a person B standing 
at the riverbank, B falls into the river and A walks on B's back to the 
other side.
In this example A interacts with B, he believes B to contribute to his 
plan and he pursues a goal that points away from B. A therefore uses 
B according to the definition that I proposed so far. But examples 
such as Crossing the River hardly come to mind when we think 
about using people in a moral sense. Nevertheless, many of the 
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examples discussed in the philosophical literature as cases of using 
people make use of the presence and not of the participation of the 
other person. Two very famous examples are two variations on the 
even more famous Trolley Case13. In the Trolley Case a bystander 
sees a driverless train out of control running towards a tunnel where 
five people are working. His only chance to save these people's lives 
is to operate a turnout. Unfortunately there is one other person 
working on the track to which he could redirect the train. There is 
great discussion about the moral evaluation of the options open to 
the bystander. In some arguments it is stressed that the bystander 
would not be using the one person on the second track and would 
therefore by justified in sacrificing him. This argument can be 
backed up by the following case14:
Bridge: A driverless, runaway train is heading for a tunnel. In the 
tunnel five people are working who will be killed if the train runs 
on. Person A is a bystander and has only one chance to stop the 
train: There is one other person B standing on a bridge above the 
track. A opens a trap-door, so that B falls in front of the train and 
triggers its automatic brake.
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Proponents of the argument that the bystander is allowed to save the 
five workers in the original Trolley Case because he would not be 
using the one person, feel confirmed by this example and the typical 
intuition that it is wrong to throw the man in front of the train. They 
can argue that this negative intuition is due to the fact that we would 
use the fat man in Bridge, but we would not be using the one person 
in the Trolley Case. In Bridge the presence of the fat man plays a 
role in achieving our aim, whereas the presence of the one person on 
the side track in the Trolley Case is a hindrance rather than a means 
in our plan. The question of whether a person is used or not 
therefore seems to be crucial for judging the permissibility of the 
respective actions. But critics of this argument point to the following 
counter-example:
Loop Case: The scenario is identical to the Trolley Case with the 
only exception that the tracks after the one person have the form of a 
loop and return to the main track heading to the tunnel again. 
It is generally argued that in this case we are also using the one 
person because we now need her presence to save the five workers. 
If the person were not there, the train would equally run into the 
tunnel and kill these people. But it is implausible to conclude that in 
this case the bystander would be acting wrongly, the argument goes, 
because it is unclear why the form of the tracks should make a moral 
difference.
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For all the participants of this discussion it is out of question that 
Bridge and the Loop Case are typical examples of using people. I 
want to argue, in contrast, that although these cases fit the definition 
that can be extracted from our employing the expression 'to use' in 
natural language, they are not relevant as examples of our moral 
claim that it is wrong to use people. It does not matter morally – or it 
does not matter in the same way15 – that in these examples persons 
are used in the sense of the above definition of using people. Using 
people is morally relevant only when we make use of the 
participation of that person. This claim can be supported by two 
considerations:
First, in cases such as Crossing the River and Bridge the fact that A 
uses B seems to be irrelevant for judging A's behaviour. It would be 
equally terrible to shoot B or to throw the fat man from the bridge 
because you hate them or to do so arbitrarily. This is also suggested 
by the consideration that if the fat man by chance survives, it is very 
unlikely that he will complain about having been used. It does not 
seem to be the right reason with regard to the wrong that has been 
done to him. In situations where the participation of the other person 
plays a role in the agent's pursuit of aims, in contrast, the charge of 
having been used gives reasons that indeed sound convincing. This 
is the case, for example, when the mother in The Enchanter 
complains of having been used or the young man writes a letter to 
his pregnant girlfriend complaining 'You were just using me'.16 
Paulus Kaufmann – Using People       248
Second, what is morally displeasing about using people is that we 
use them as means to our ends, although they pursue ends 
themselves. In cases where somebody makes use of our participation 
it is thus plausible to feel used. On the one hand, we are frustrated 
not to be seen as the person we are. On the other hand, we feel 
degraded because the agent's treatment fits entities of lower rank that 
do not possess the capacity to set ends for themselves. If we make 
use of someone's mere presence, her ability to pursue ends is 
irrelevant to our reaching our aim and it would thus be strange to 
feel the special feeling that I have labelled 'feeling used'. It thus 
seems clear to me, that the central meaning of the charge 'You were 
just using me' excludes cases that only make use of someone's 
presence. We should therefore reject the definition of 'using people' 
that is extracted from our employment of the expression 'to use' with 
regard to tools and to human beings. The analogy is helpful and 
plays a role in the etymology of the expression, but it obscures the 
moral core of the charge 'You were just using me!'. I thus propose to 
accept a slightly changed definition of 'using people': A is using B, if 
A interacts with B believing that B's participation can help him to 
realize one of his ends, an end that points away from B.
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3. Putting the pieces together
We have now gathered elements from all the accounts of using 
people presented so far. First, I have summarized the value-based 
account's emphasis on Kant's axiological distinctions and the 
account's position that duties are to be derived through the idea of 
required attitudes. Second, I have criticised the value-based account 
for leaving out the specific context of use as found in natural 
language and as defined by Parfit and Scanlon. Third, I have argued 
that we have reason to restrict the scope of this definition of using 
people and that this was implicitly suggested by O'Neill and 
Korsgaard, who focus on coercion and deception. These elements 
have in common that they are all drawn from our common sense 
concept of using people. So far we have two different interpretations 
of the intuitively convincing prohibition of using people, though. On 
the one hand we have the very general interpretation offered by the 
value-based account that tells us that to treat a person merely as a 
means is to treat that unconditionally valuable person as if she only 
had value as a means or any other kind of conditional value. On the 
other hand, we have the definition of using people according to 
which we use a person when we interact with her because we 
believe that her participation can help us in achieving an end that 
points away from this person. Both interpretations can claim to be 
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based on our common sense intuitions: While the first definition 
helps to spell out what it means to feel used, the second definition is 
extracted from our colloquial employment of the expression 'to use a 
person'. In the existing accounts of using people both interpretations 
are unconnected to each other17, but I think that these interpretations 
together provide an attractive account of using people. Let me now 
outline how these elements should be connected. As I said at the 
beginning of this chapter, I will try to do so in a way that makes 
better use of the material provided by common sense.
It is helpful, I believe, to start by introducing some terminology: I 
want to suggest that we exclusively use the expression 'to treat a 
person as a means' for the general interpretation offered by the 
value-based account. We thus treat a person as a means, if we treat 
her as if she only has instrumental or any other kind of conditional 
value, although we know that she really has unconditional value 
instead. I will employ the expression 'to use a person', on the other 
hand, to refer to interactions where the agent makes use of another 
person's participation. Finally, if both features come together, i.e. if 
in using a person I treat her as a means, then we can say that I 
'merely use' that person. But how exactly are the concepts expressed 
by these phrases related to each other?
I have argued that it is difficult to construe a self-contradictory 
subordination of values, if we do not have a clearly defined context 
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that allows us to see what values are involved and how the agent 
violates values that he himself accepts. This does not mean, 
however, that I reject the value-based account's interpretation of the 
prohibition against treating a person as a means. This comprehensive 
prohibition is meant to spell out in general what it means to wrong a 
person and what, in general, makes acts wrong. It is therefore 
supposed to play the roles that we have called the 'transcendental' 
and the 'explanatory' role so far and I do find it very helpful in 
fulfilling these tasks. I believe, though, that it is difficult to derive 
concrete moral duties from this abstract principle directly. What we 
need is a criterion that tells us when somebody treats another person 
as a means. To know if A wrongs B, we need to know if A treats B 
as a means. But to know if A treats B as a means, we need to know 
if he contradicts his own evaluative beliefs, and we thus need to 
know what A believes and intends in a given situation. We can 
describe actions in a way that does not refer to any agent's beliefs 
and intentions. A purely physical description of an interaction 
between two people would be of this kind. But we can and generally 
do describe interactions in a 'thick' way, i.e. we use descriptions that 
imply that the agent and other participants have certain beliefs and 
intentions.18 To decide if someone treats another person as a means 
we thus need a thick description of the interaction. Now, the 
expression 'to use a person' is such a thick description as it implies 
information about the agent's beliefs and intentions. If A uses B he 
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must believe, for example, that B can contribute to one of his ends 
and he must not intend this end for B's sake. I therefore suggest that 
the definition of 'using people' that I have proposed in the preceding 
section can provide the context that is necessary to derive concrete 
moral duties from the general prohibition against treating people 
merely as means. The context of use can thus play a criterial role in 
the derivation of duties according to my account.
The context of use is not the only context where a person is treated 
as a means. To tell what other contexts there are, we would need to 
have a comprehensive moral theory. It sounds prima facie plausible, 
though, to suppose that the intentional harm of other beings or 
intrusions into the body are examples of further morally sensitive 
contexts. Proponents of the value-based account believe that we treat 
a person as a means when we kill her out of jealousy or when we 
insult her. They also believe that we treat ourselves as means when 
we commit suicide in order to escape an unpleasant situation. I do 
not know how to reconstruct a self-contradictory subordination of 
values for all these moral wrongs. I am convinced, though, that such 
a subordination can be construed for the context of use. Let me now 
try to show how this subordination can be derived and how the 
prohibition against treating a person as a means and the context of 
use work together. The single steps of my derivation should not be 
taken to be the premises of a deductively valid argument, though; 
instead they are meant to spell out more concretely the common 
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intuition that agents who wrong other people often contradict their 
own values:
1. According to the revised definition of using people A uses B, if A 
interacts with B because he believes that B's participation can be 
helpful in realizing an end that points away from B. In using B A 
thus has the following two beliefs: First, he believes that B can 
contribute to his ends through her actions and, second, he knows that 
he does not act for B's sake, but for the ends he is pursuing. If we 
look at the evaluative implications of these two beliefs we see that A 
assigns a conditional value to B because he acknowledges B to have 
a value that depends on the value of his end. Once we accept that 
persons possess the unconditional and incomparable value that is 
called 'dignity', we thus see that situations of using people are 
always morally sensitive. The other person has unconditional value, 
but we treat her as an only conditionally valuable means to our ends. 
But the fact alone that the other person contributes to our ends, 
although she has unconditional value, does not itself violate her 
dignity, of course. Otherwise the precept to respect every person's 
dignity would imply a general prohibition of cooperation. The 
dignity of my interaction partner requires us, though, to recognize 
that she not only has the conditional value she achieves through our 
end, but also an unconditional value that has to be respected.19
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2. If A has the first of the two beliefs mentioned above, namely that 
B can contribute to his ends through her actions, then A has to 
recognize that B has unconditional value. By intending that B 
contributes to his end through her participation, A thereby 
acknowledges that B pursues ends herself. A thus necessarily 
recognizes that B and A himself are equal in one important respect: 
Both are autonomous persons and pursuers of ends. A also believes 
that his own ends are valuable. He does not have to believe that they 
are absolutely valuable or morally valuable, but he at least believes 
that they have conditional value. Furthermore, A knows that as a 
pursuer of ends B equally believes her ends to be valuable in this 
sense. His own ends are, of course, dearer to him, but he has no 
reason to believe that his own ends are more valuable in the sense 
that they condition B's value. In this sense A necessarily recognizes 
that B has unconditional value.20
3. We have thus the following descriptive and evaluative situation: 
A plans to treat B in a way that assigns conditional value to her 
because he wants her to contribute to his ends. On the other hand, he 
recognizes that B's value does not depend on her contributing to his 
ends. In this situation A has, in general, two chances to escape the 
charge of subordinating B's unconditional value to his conditionally 
valuable ends: He can pursue the end for B's sake or he must make 
sure that B shares his end. If he acts ultimately for B's sake, he does 
not subordinate her value to his ends because ultimately he acts for 
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her value. If A is sure that B shares his ends, on the other hand, then 
pursuing the end is not his subordination any more because B 
pursues the end herself. In a context of use it follows by definition 
that A does not act for B's sake.21 There is thus only one chance left 
for A to escape the charge of treating B as a means: He must attain 
the belief that she shares his end.
4. If A is convinced that his ends and B's ends cannot be 
coordinated, he would thus have to abstain from the interaction. 
However, if he is not completely sure whether B is willing to 
contribute to his ends, he would have to find out if a coordination of 
ends is possible or not. In the usual case he would thus have to ask 
what ends B is pursuing and lay open what his ends are. He must 
ask, in other words, for B's consent. The crucial point is not, though, 
that a certain process, namely the act of asking for consent takes 
place, but that A has the justified conviction that his ends and her 
ends are compatible.22
5. The necessity to have a justified belief about the possibility of 
coordinating his ends with B's ends categorically rules out certain 
forms of bringing about a cooperation: If A deceives B or makes a 
coercive proposal to her, then A cannot believe that their ends can be 
coordinated. Otherwise A would not choose these methods. Let us 
take an example: When the drug dealer uses the tourist in my 
example Drug Dealer he anticipates her ends. He is convinced that, 
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in general she wants to help other people, at least if it does not cost 
her too much. He presents his own end – the suitcase must pass the 
border – in such a way that it appears to be an instance of her end of 
helping other people. But he has, of course, a further end: He wants 
to sell drugs in the neighbouring country and the transportation of 
the suitcase is only a means to this further end. He also anticipates 
that the tourist is not willing to contribute to this end. If he could 
imagine any reason that would motivate her to contribute to his drug 
trafficking, he would not tell her a story about his sick mother, but 
present her with a real reason for helping him. But he does not have 
such a reason as his lying to her shows. He is thus convinced that his 
ends and her ends cannot be reconciled. Nevertheless, he brings it 
about through his lie that she contributes to his end and thereby 
subordinates her pursuit of ends to his own pursuit of ends. He acts 
as if she only acquires value through her contribution to his ends, i.e. 
that her value is conditional on the value of his ends. But how can 
that be? As I argued in section 2, A already believes that B pursues 
ends by herself and that the value of her cannot only depend on the 
value of his ends. He thus contradicts his own evaluative 
convictions.
This derivation was meant to show that we can easily see when the 
conditions for treating a person as a means are fulfilled in the 
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context of use. The context alone does not provide the reasons that 
make the agent's acts wrong. We also need the general prohibition 
against treating a person as a means to decide if the agent acted 
wrongly and what makes his acts wrong. The prohibition by itself, 
on the other hand, does not place us in a position to derive concrete 
moral duties. It needs to be supplemented by morally sensitive 
contexts that allow us to construe the self-contradiction that is the 
prohibition's target. We thus need both a context and the general 
prohibition against treating people as means to be able to tell what 
acts are wrong, why they are wrong and what it means to say that 
they are wrong. The context of use provides such a morally sensitive 
context and allows us to spell out a clear and strict moral duty: It is 
wrong to use a person merely as a means, i.e. it is wrong to use a 
person in a way that contradicts the agent's own evaluative beliefs 
about that person's value.
4. A common sense concept
In the second chapter of this book I surveyed the common sense 
notion of using people. The most remarkable features of this notion 
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that the survey brought to light were ordered by the two ideas of 
breadth and depth. On the one hand, we found out that the notion is 
broad in the sense that we use numerous and slightly differing 
expressions to refer to it, we use it to characterize attitudes as well as 
act types, we employ it in diverse contexts, and we see it as related 
to different kinds of evaluation. On the other hand, the notion also 
has deep aspects, i.e. there are subsets of rules governing the use of 
the notion that are clear and elaborate. The rules for employing the 
expression 'to use a person' are one such example of a clear and 
“deep” aspect of the notion; the frequently mentioned accusation to 
'feel used' is another. The existing accounts of using people differ in 
the emphasis they put on these deep aspects of using people: The 
value-based account provides a theoretical background to explain 
and justify the sensation of feeling used, whereas the procedural 
account and the attitudinal account stress the special context of using 
people. My contextual account of using people consists in 
combining both “deep” aspects of the common sense notion. To use 
a person in an impermissible way, in my eyes, means to use that 
person in a way that gives her reason to feel used. I believe 
furthermore that my account that brings together both “deep” aspects 
also helps us to make sense of many of the “broad” aspects of our 
common sense notion:
Our common talk about using people is bewildering. We say that 'A 
uses B' or that 'A treats B as a means' or that 'A regards B as a tool' 
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etc. and we jump from one of these expressions to the next without 
recognizing a change in meaning. The different expressions do carry 
different connotations, though, and it makes sense to employ them 
more carefully to draw attention to the underlying distinctions. I 
therefore proposed to distinguish between 'treating as a means', 
'using' and 'merely using', for example. This terminology is surely 
stipulative to a considerable degree, but it is not arbitrary and traces 
the connotations of our colloquial expressions.
Whoever treats a person as a means performs the mental act of 
subordinating the value of that person to the conditional value of 
one's ends, although one knows that the other person has 
unconditional value. This act is performed by adopting a certain 
intention that then guides our actions. It was Kant's insight, 
highlighted by the value-based account, that moral principles require 
or prohibit the adoption of such intentions or, as we might say more 
generally, attitudes, that then require certain forms of adequate 
behaviour. It is therefore not surprising that many of the expressions 
we use in our common moral discourse refer both to attitudes and 
act types. 'Treating a person as a means' is one such ambivalent 
expression. To clarify the relation between attitude and act one could 
reserve the expression 'to regard a person as a means' for the pure 
attitude that can also occur without leading to an interaction. The 
expression 'to treat a person as a means' should be used for all 
interactions that are done from this attitude. The expression 'to 
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merely use a person', finally, should only be used when the 
treatment occurs within a context of use. But even if these 
expressions are not clearly distinguished in our common moral 
discourse, it is not a fault of this discourse that it has expressions 
that refer to both attitudes and acts, but a feature that reveals the 
tight normative connection between them.
A further aspect of my account of using people is that I pick out a 
context for the derivation of self-contradictory subordinations of 
value that is rather formal. It is defined by its intentional structure 
and not by a situation in life, by the persons involved or by their 
relationships with each other. Because of this formality the context 
comprises divergent circumstances. This explains why  in common 
sense we also employ the expression 'to use a person' in many 
different situations, for example with regard to close interpersonal 
relationships, to working conditions or to political arrangements.
The descriptive and evaluative beliefs that lead to the self-
contradiction involved in merely using a person are part of the 
meaning of the expression 'to use somebody'. It is thus a thick 
description23 that sorts out a morally sensitive context where it is 
likely that a person is treated as a means. It is for this reason, I 
believe, that we hesitate to say that we 'use another person' even if 
we do so in a permissible way. If we interact believing that our 
interaction partner shares our end, then we master the morally 
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sensitive situation without fail. But the situation is of a kind that 
invites the moral misbehaviour that we have called 'treating a person 
as a means' and we therefore usually employ the expression 'to use a 
person' only in situations that are morally objectionable. 
By looking back on the common sense concept of using people from 
the perspective of our theoretically enriched account we thus see that 
our common discourse already contained many of its central aspects. 
I therefore cannot claim that I have done more than shed light on 
these aspects and ordered them in a way that yields not a new but a 
better thick moral concept.
4. Conclusions
I started my investigation with Nancy Davis' sceptical remark that 
'moral theorists can get no mileage – positive or critical – out of an 
appeal to commonsense views about using persons'24. I think the 
accounts of using persons that were developed after Davis made that 
remark and that I have presented in the preceding chapters are 
sufficient to contradict Davis' assumption. Moral theorists with 
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diverse theoretical leanings have actually presented elaborate 
accounts drawing from Kant but also from our common sense notion 
of using people. But Davis' scepticism can also be understood in a 
more restricted sense claiming that the common sense concept of 
using people does not help us in spelling out what actions are 
permissible. This critique is actually upheld by Derek Parfit and 
Thomas Scanlon, although they assign the concept other important 
roles in their respective theories. I have tried to reject this critique as 
well and joined the procedural account and the value-based account 
in assuming that the common sense concept of using people does 
give us features that make our actions wrong. I do not agree with 
these accounts, though, in how the concept can play this role. 
According to my own account, it is the fact that I treat a person as a 
means that makes some of my acts wrong. But to see that this fact is 
given we need to have a particular context. One such context is the 
use of persons and when I treat a person as a means in using her I 
merely use her and act in a way that is morally wrong.
I do not think that this particular moral duty can and will be accepted 
by all moral philosophers. The assumption that there is such a duty 
presupposes some ethical and meta-ethical convictions that are very 
controversial. I assume, for example, that there is a plurality of 
values and accept Kant's idea that not only states or events but also 
individual entities can have value and that this value requires a 
peculiar kind of reaction. I furthermore consider attitudes to be the 
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primary objects of moral evaluation. This assumption influences the 
whole landscape of morality as it not only asks what we owe to each 
other, but also requires a particular relation to ourselves. It therefore 
seems to me that the notion of using people will remain 
controversial among moral theorists.
The appeal of the concept of using people is partly due to the fact 
that it is deeply entrenched in our common sense morality. It is thus 
likely that theorists with little admiration for common sense will not 
be drawn to this notion. These theorists have to offer an alternative 
and show us how to improve our biased moral convictions, though. 
It is for this very reason that I believe that we must oppose Nancy 
Davis' verdict: Every moral theorist can get mileage – positive or 
critical – out of an appeal to commonsense views about using 
persons. 
There is still one question left that I raised at the end of my second 
chapter. I asked if the protagonist of Nabokov's novella The 
Enchanter only uses the mother who appears in the story or whether 
he uses her daughter as well. I already gave an implicit answer to 
this question by pointing to the fact that the enchanter is trying to 
manipulate the girl. But even before the enchanter began his 
manipulative attempts something went wrong with his behaviour. 
This can be seen at the end of the story when he notices that the girl 
is not asleep as he presumed, but is actually looking at him while he 
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masturbates:
'For an instant, in the hiatus of a syncope, he also saw how it appeared to her: 
some monstrosity, some ghastly disease – or else she already knew, or it was 
all of that together. She was looking and screaming, but the enchanter did not 
yet hear her screams; he was deafened by his own horror.' (p.57)
While the story's protagonist certainly does not feel attracted by the 
mother, he feels strongly drawn to the girl. She has characteristics 
that even make her 'unique and irreplaceable' (p.34) in his eyes. He 
becomes aware of the superficiality of this attraction, though, when 
he looks at himself from her perspective. With a sensation of horror 
he recognizes that he tragically failed to do justice to the girl's real 
value. She was, after all, only a means for him that he judged 
according to its capacity to fulfil his desires. Just before his own 
death he becomes aware that as the creatures we are, we do not 
value a person by looking at her, but by seeing the world through her 
eyes.
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Notes
1I will not give an overview of all the merits of the theories presented, of course, 
but focus on the features that I find useful for my own proposal. I am also 
convinced, though, that the features, to which I draw attention, are the features 
that best in capture our pretheoretical intuitions.
2David Velleman, “Love as a Moral Emotion,” Ethics 109, no. 2 (January 1999): 
pp.357-358.
3Ibid., p.366.
4Ibid., p.364, my emphasis.
5A careful analysis of degradation as a treatment that does not fit the other 
person's rank is offered by Jeremy Waldron, “Inhuman and Degrading Treatment: 
A Non-Realist View - Ms,” April 2008. For Waldron, intrumentalization is one 
form of degrading treatment, the others being bestialization, infantilization and 
demonization.
6The value-based approach can also account for examples such as Friendly 
Neighbour (see chapter 2) and explain why we feel that even if the agent does 
nothing that is morally wrong in the depicted situation, he acts in an objectionable 
way. Velleman, for example, could say that the young man does not meet his 
neighbour's ideal of valuable forms of relationship, but the old lady cannot claim 
that the young man must only interact with her for different reasons. 
7We can call this mental state an attitude, but we shall be aware that it is not an 
attitude in Parfit's sense that confines this word to dispositional states.
8Cf. Thomas Scanlon, Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), pp.56-62.
9I believe that this is the most plausible definition that can be found in Parfit's 
recent texts. It is actually a mixture of a phrase from his Tanner Lectures – cf. 
Derek Parfit, “What we could rationally will. The Tanner lectures on human 
values,”, p.297 – and the definition in his current work On what matters. In this 
later book Parfit says that we use a person 'when we make any use of this person's 
abilities, activities, or body to help us to achieve some aim' (p.166). This 
definition is plausible insofar as it implies the condition that the use must be done 
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with some aim. The Tanner Lectures' definition misses this aspect, but Parfit used 
the words 'abilities, activities, or other features' instead of 'abilities, activities, or 
body'. The addition of the body in Parfit's new definition is instructive, but the 
earlier definition's openness with regard to other properties is an advantage, 
because it enables us to include cases where we make use of a person's external 
properties such as her wealth or her relation to other people. That Parfit wants to 
include such cases is clear from the cases he discusses like, for example, Mutual 
Benefit, cf. Parfit, “On what matters - unpublished manuscript,” p.166.
10Ibid., p.106.
11Cf. chapter 2.
12This was first noticed by Arthur Flemming, “Using a Man as a Means,” Ethics 
88, no. 4 (July 1978): 283-298; the distinction was also adopted in the definition 
of Warren S. Quinn, “Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of 
Double Effect,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 18, no. 4 (Autumn 1989): 334-351; 
and, as we saw already, by Scanlon, Moral dimensions, p.106.
13The case was first presented by Philippa Foot, “The Problem of Abortion and 
the Doctrine of Double Effect,” Oxford Review, 1967.
14The following two problems are presented by Judith Thomson, “The Trolley 
Problem,” Yale Law Journal 94, no. 6 (1985): p.120. Thomson presents Bridge 2 - 
often called the Fat Man Case - as an argument in favour of explaining the Trolley 
Case with help of the concept of use. She then rejects the whole argument, though, 
because of examples like Loop Case; Scanlon also refers to this latter case as a 
serious problem for the 'use'-account; cf. Scanlon, Moral dimensions, p.120.
15This qualification is meant to leave room for positions that argue that using 
people does not make these acts wrong but that it makes them worse. This position 
is defended by Alec Walen, “A Moral Ground for the Means Principle - Ms,” 
2009.
16See the example at the beginning of chapter 2.
17This is especially obvious in the account of Thomas Scanlon who clearly 
distinguishes between the general prohibition that he ascribes to Kant and the 
concept of using people that he finds in our common morality.
18The distinction between thick and thin descriptions was introduced by Gilbert 
Ryle, Collected papers (London: Hutchinson and C°, 1971), ch.37; Ryle illustrates 
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the distinction with the expressions 'to contract the eyelids' and 'to wink'. Whereas 
the first expression is "thin" in the sense that it doesn't tell us anything about the 
agent's intentions, the verb 'to wink' implies that the contraction of the eyelids was 
meant to convey some message to a spectator; the term was later adopted in 
Clifford Geertz, The interpretation of cultures - selected essays (New York, NY: 
Basic Books, 1973), cf. especially ch. 1.
19I therefore follow Kant and many others in distinguishing between using and 
merely using a person. I want to stress, though, that using persons is already a 
morally sensitive situation.
20A does not have to acknowledge that B has absolute value if that means 'to have 
value independent of anything else' or 'to be the source of all other value'. For my 
argument, it is enough to show that B's value is unconditional in the sense that it 
does not depend on the value of A and his ends.
21The self-contradiction I am trying to construe here only occurs in the context of 
using another person's participation. It therefore does not rule out paternalism, for 
example, i.e. acting as if I know better what the other person's ends are. Paternalist 
behaviour is often wrong, of course, but not for the reasons I am presenting here. 
22The notion of consent thus plays a much more limited role in my account than it 
does for O'Neill, Korsgaard, Parfit and Scanlon. It does not tell us abstractly what 
may be done, but is only one means to legitimize interactions. One of the 
problems for the more ambitious use of the notion of consent is discussed by Kant, 
as we saw, when he argues that consent cannot legitimize slavery and bonded 
labour, for example. Cf. chapter 3, section 1.
23It is 'thick' in not only in Ryle's, but also in Williams' sense because it refers to 
an agent's intentions and contains an evaluation.
24Nancy Davis, “Using Persons and Common Sense,” Ethics 94, no. 3 (1984): 
pp.405-406.
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